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THE CAPITAL COMMONS: DIGITAL MONEY AND CITIZENS’ FINANCE IN A
PRODUCTIVE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC - ABSTRACT
Robert C. Hockett
All societies must address two questions where the organization of productive activity is concerned. The
first is whether production will be mainly publicly managed, privately managed, or 'mixed.' The second is
whether the financing of production will be mainly publicly managed, privately managed, or mixed.
In the American commercial republic, we seem more or less to have answered the 'who does production'
question to our own satisfaction. From the founding era to the present, we have elected to leave production
primarily, though not of course solely, 'in private hands.' Where the financing of production is concerned,
on the other hand, we have been more ambivalent.
For the past 160 years, our financial system has operated as a public-private franchise arrangement. At the
core of our franchise lie the sovereign public (the 'public' of our 'republic') and its money-modulator – the
issuer and manager of its monetized full faith and credit, its 'money' – on the one hand, and the private
sector financial institutions and markets we publicly license to allocate most of the resultant Wicksellian
'bank money' or 'credit-money' on the other hand. At the periphery of the franchise lie those institutions and
markets that 'shadow bank' through relations with the banking core.
In recent years, developments in several distinct spaces have prompted what amounts to a broad
reassessment of our hybrid financial arrangements. One such development is weariness with our system's
penchant for over-generating public credit that fuels bubbles and busts rather than production, a product of
leaving our public capital - by far the greater part of investment capital - to private management. This is
what the author has long called poor credit modulation.
Another ground of critique is our hybrid system's poor record on what the author has long called credit
allocation, from which modulation turns out to be inseparable. Our morbid fear of explicitly, rather than
implicitly, ‘picking winners and losers’ is the culprit here. Finally, other sources of disenchantment are our
system's long-term worsening of inequality, the scandal of commercial and financial exclusion our system
permits, and the promise offered by new financial technologies where ending both that and leaky monetary
policy are concerned. The current Covid pandemic and recent murder of George Floyd of course
underscore these sources of disillusion.
This article embraces these critiques, which the author himself has leveled continuously over the past
fifteen years, argues that privately ordered production requires publicly ordered finance, and shows how to
order finance publicly on a Fed balance sheet forthrightly recognized as a Citizens’ Ledger. New public
investments will make up the asset side of the upgraded Fed balance sheet, while a corresponding system of
digital public banking through ‘FedWallets’ will upgrade the liability side of the same. Newly restored
regional Fed functionalities ('Spreading the Fed'), an FSOC-inspired National Reconstruction and
Development Council (NRDC) and its financing arm (a restored RFC), and a price-stabilizing 'People's
Portfolio' round out the new system of Citizens' Finance.
In the course of its arguments, the article traces all salient consequences that flow from its overhaul of our
system of financing production, from banking through ‘shadow banking’ to the capital markets. It also
makes some surprising discoveries along the way. Among these is that full separation of Fed and Treasury
and hence monetary and fiscal policy, itself an artifact of franchise finance and hence the false hope of
separating credit modulation from credit allocation, is no longer tenable. Another is that global central bank
digital currency (CBDC) development is now corroborating much of what the article argues..
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INTRODUCTION: COMMERCE, FINANCE, AND PRODUCTIVE REPUBLICS
Americans have long prided themselves on their innovative
entrepreneurial culture and the associated creative dynamism of their
productive economy. They have likewise long celebrated the fact that their
polity was founded as, and in many ways remains, a democratic republic—a
res publica (“public thing”) inclusively constituted and managed by
materially independent and freely associating citizens, households, and
firms (personae privata).1 This ideal of the “commonwealth” or “good
society,” traceable to 17th century English and 18th century Scottish
Enlightenment updatings of Renaissance Italian and Roman Republican
antecedents, often travels together with two related conceptions—those of a
“commercial republic” and the “exchange economy” that serves as any such
republic’s material foundation.2
1

Cf. ROBERT HOCKETT, A REPUBLIC OF OWNERS (forthcoming Yale University Press,
2020).
2
Id. See also Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic Through Hamiltonian Means:
Values, Constraints, and Finance in an American ‘Ownership Society’, 79 S. CAL. L. REV.
45 (2006) [hereinafter Jeffersonian Republic]; Robert Hockett, Materializing Citizenship:

1-June-18]

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

3

Key to the formation and healthy maintenance of any such society
and associated economy are their mode or modes of finance—the means by
which current resources find deployment in the production of future
resources, or “wealth.”3 Virtually by definition in any such society and
associated economy, these modes themselves will involve at least some
degree of private sector project-planning and associated “private ordering.”4
Finance being a matter of channeling today’s resources to the production of
tomorrow’s resources, and such “channeling” in any exchange economy
being at least partly a matter of contractual transfer, financial modalities
will make at least some use of commercial modalities.5 They will employ
modes of payment through which productive units can purchase access to
productive “inputs” that they do not already have—that is, finance their
productive operations—in producing the “outputs” that constitute their
material wealth6
This reliance of financial modalities on commercial modalities in
any exchange economy on the one hand, and the aforementioned “mixed”
public/private character of any republic, including a commercial republic,
on the other hand, confront the citizens of any such republic with a critical
foundational choice. That is the choice of what roles the “public” and
“private” sectors will play in supplying the indispensible value-transfer
(“payment”), value-storage (“saving”), and other commercial and financial
infrastructures used by productive units on the one hand, and what
associated roles public and private should play in governing productive
financial flows via those structures on the other hand.7 Should production
itself be a private sector affair while financing production is made a public
sector affair, for example? Should the reverse be the case? Or should both
finance and production be mainly public or mainly private affairs?
Finance in a Producers’ Republic, 63 EMORY L. J. 55 (2014) [hereinafter Materializing
Citizenship]; and Robert Hockett, Pre-Liberal Autonomy & Post-Liberal Finance, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 105, 126 (2014) [hereinafter Pre-Liberal Autonomy].
3
See sources cited id. See also Robert Hockett, Rousseauvian Money (Cornell Law
Sch., Research Paper No. 18-48),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278408 [hereinafter Rousseauvian
Money].
4
See sources cited id.
5
Id. See also Robert Hockett, The Democratic Digital Dollar: A Digital Savings and
Payments Platform for Fully Inclusive State, Local, and National Money and Banking
Systems, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2020) (“Because a money is simply what counts for
purposes of accounting, accumulating, and transferring value within a given value-storage
and -payments system,1 supplying a universally accessible architecture of the kind here
designed is equivalent to supplying a universal (1) currency, (2) trade and payments, and
(3) retail banking platform to all who participate.”).
6
Id.
7
Id.
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In the American commercial republic, we have more or less
definitively answered, to our own satisfaction at least, the “who does
production” question—at least from the founding era to the present day: we
have elected to leave production primarily, though not of course solely, “in
private hands.” We don’t have extensive networks of “public sector
industry” and “state-owned enterprises,” for example, even though we do
have some “government corporations” and “government-sponsored
enterprises” (GSEs).8
Where the financing of production is concerned, by contrast, we
have been decidedly more ambivalent throughout our history. On the one
hand, we have in the past founded and operated two national development
banks—the First and Second Banks of the United States, which helped
oversee and finance national economic development in the late 18th and
early 19th centuries.9 And we have founded and operated at least two more
modern national institutions dedicated to productive mobilization and what
might be called national redevelopment—viz. the War Finance Corporation
(WFC) and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which presided
over national war mobilization and productive revitalization during the first
half of the 20th century.10
On the other hand, we have also allowed a nominally private sector
“financial services industry” both to flourish and to grow into an ever-larger
part of our GDP-measured macro-economy, especially over the past 50
years.11 And we tell ourselves to this very day that this industry is the
primary driver—indeed both the coordinator and the “fuel”-supplier—of
our national production processes themselves.12
The fact of the matter, then, is that while the American commercial
republic’s productive processes both are and have always to this point been
by and large privately ordered, our financial system is and has always been
hybrid in character. It has been a mix of combined public and private sector
credit allocation on the one hand, and variably successful public credit
modulation on the other hand—success and failure in turn fluctuating with
changing degrees of public sector appreciation that credit allocation on the
one hand, and modulation on the other, cannot ultimately be kept separate.13

8

See infra, Parts II and III.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See infra, Part I. The modulation versus allocation distinction, and the ultimate
practical inseparability of the two, is introduced in Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for
Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010) [hereinafter Fixer-Upper]. It also figures
prominently in the work cited infra, note 17.
9
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It is this problem—that of fluctuating success and failure in the
mixed public/private financing of private sector production—which I aim to
address, even to solve, through this article. I aim to do that by showing how
best to end financial hybridity itself, separating our financial system into
distinct public and private sector components along lines that make good
institutional sense as a matter of both democratic republican justice and
commercial republican productivity. But specifying in detail what this
entails requires more specificity both about the nature of our distinctly
American species of financial hybridity on the one hand, and about what
susceptibilities to disease are encoded in the DNA, so to speak, of that
species on the other hand. Explicating what parts or portion of our financial
system should be made forthrightly part of “the commons” in our
“commonwealth,” in other words, requires that we carefully explicate what
parts of it already are…
For the past 160 years, the American financial system has operated
not only as a generically hybrid arrangement, but more specifically as a
public-private franchise arrangement.14 At the core of our franchise lie the
sovereign public (the “public” of our “republic”) and its moneymodulator—the issuer and manager of its monetized full faith and credit, its
“money”—on the one hand, and the private sector financial institutions and
markets that are publicly licensed to allocate most of the resultant “creditmoney” on the other hand.15
For the half-century following the mid-1860s, our public moneymodulator was the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a
regulator whose name is suggestive but whose role grew progressively more
obscure to the public once its original mandate was transferred, in principal
part, to the Federal Reserve (Fed) circa 1913.16 Since the latter date, and
14

See Robert Hockett, Finance without Financiers in DEMOCRATIZING FINANCE 5-6
(Erik Olin Wright ed., forthcoming Verso Press, 2020 [2015]) [hereinafter Finance without
Financiers] (discussing how the privately owned banks in conjunction with a publicly
administered sovereign currency create a public-private partnership); Robert C. Hockett &
Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2017)
[hereinafter Finance Franchise] (explaining that at its core, the financial system can be
seen as public-private partnership); see also infra Part I (explaining further the
public/private partnership in our hybrid financial system).
15
Finance without Financiers, id., at 9-11 (explainig how banks, having monetized the
full faith and credit, make up the core of the financial system); Finance Franchise, id., at
1164 (same). For more on money, credit-money, modulation, and allocation see supra, note
13, and infra Parts I-III.
16
See Robert C. Hockett, Money’s Past Is Fintech’s Future: Wildcat Crypto, the Digital
Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking, 2 STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2019)
[hereinafter Money’s Past] (“The Federal Reserve Act (‘FRA’) of 1913 established the Fed
that we all know today, and transferred de facto and de jure administration of the national
money supply from the Comptroller to this new entity.”).
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especially since the banking reforms of the 1930s, the Fed has served as our
republic’s primary money-modulator, while private sector financial
institutions have continued to act as our primary, though not as our sole,
money-allocators.17
Over the last decade, developments in several distinct “spaces” have
prompted what is in effect, even if not yet in name, a broad reassessment of
our hybrid financial arrangements.18 One such development has been the
worldwide financial debacle of just over a decade ago, as followed by its
debt-deflationary sequel—a still-lingering malady that proximately
originated in American financial dysfunction and ultimately culminated in
global economic devastation.19 These events and their extended aftermath
have led some to propose elimination or curtailment of the mandate of the
public member of our public-private finance franchise—“end[ing] the Fed,”

17

See, e.g., ROBERT HOCKETT, FINANCING THE NEW GREEN DEAL: A PLAN OF ACTION
(forthcoming Palgrave Economics 2020) (discussing the modulatory and
allocative tasks); Fixer-Upper, supra note 13 at 142 (introducing the idea of financial
“regulation as modulation”); Robert Hockett, An FSOC for Continuous Public Investment:
The National Reconstruction and Development Council, 10 MICH. J. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. __ (2020) (forthcoming); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T.
Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority,
43 J. CORP. L. 437, 441 (2018) [hereinafter National Investment Authority] (reminding
readers of the difference between the credit modulation task and the credit allocation task);
Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to
Systemic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 229
(2014) [hereinafter Macroprudential Turn] (declaring that the reason the central bank is
suited to regulate finance macroprudentially is because the central authority already is a
money-modulator and that money); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors
in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103,
144 (2015) [hereinafter Public Actors] (stating the Fed’s role as a modulator, and extending
it, by analogy, to the labor market); Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive
Retrieval for Global Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 404 (2013) [hereinafter
Bretton Woods 1.0] (observing that the central bank has essential credit-modulator duties
that if it is prevented from exercising can have negative consequences); Saule T. Omarova,
New Tech Versus New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. REG. 735,
735, 742 (2019) [hereinafter New Tech Versus New Deal] (explaining the private right of
credit allocation and the public responsibility of credit modulation); Finance Franchise,
supra note 1, at 1213 (summarizing the task the central bank has in modulating the credit
supply, and the task private institutions have in allocating the credit).
18
See, e.g., Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17 (outlining the different
issues across several spaces that have impacted the American financial system).
19
See, e.g., Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 4, at 452 (“Scarce wonder, then, that the IMF
reported, in 2009, the first worldwide economic contraction since the 1940s. Was the Fed
asleep at the switch?”); Fixer-Upper, supra note 4, at 1218 (citing the real estate crash of
2008 as an event that caused both an American and global financial downturn).
AND RENEWAL
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as one cry has it20—or binding its hands by removing the public credit
element from public credit-money through reinstating some variant of the
antiquated practice of “pegging” currencies to exogenously given stocks of
glittering metals.21 The same developments have prompted others to
propose elimination or curtailment of the mandate of the private members
of our public-private finance franchise arrangement—that is, to eliminate or
dramatically reduce our banking institutions’ credit-disseminating role
through “100% money” (also known as “narrow banking”), or, somewhat
more modestly, what I will call “40% money” proposals.22
A second, related development prompting a rethink of our American
brand of public-private hybrid finance has been a growing awareness, on
the part of many observers, that substantial sectors of the American
citizenry not only are disproportionately harmed by finance-associated
productive dysfunction, but also are denied access both to essential savings
and payment infrastructures and, therefore, to the very financial system that
too often generates financial and, with it, productive breakdown in the first
place.23 This recognition, the modern manifestations of which first began to
20

See, e.g., RON PAUL, END THE FED 141 (2009) (“The Federal Reserve should be
abolished because it is immoral, unconstitutional, impractical, promotes bad economics,
and undermines liberty.”).
21
Compare DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE GREAT DEFORMATION: THE CORRUPTION OF
CAPITALISM IN AMERICA 706-12 (2013) (setting out thirteen different way in which the Fed
and its policies could be reformed), and JAMES RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS: THE MAKING
OF THE NEXT GLOBAL CRISIS 255-58 (2012) (explaining various ways that the Fed’s
policies can be improved to have a better currency) with Robert C. Hockett, Don’t Catch
His Eye, SALON (Apr. 4, 2013, 9:08 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2013/04/04/don%E2%80%99t_catch_his_eye_david_stockman%E
2%80%99s_alien_abduction_partner/ [https://perma.cc/VX8N-KANQ] (concluding that
the solution is not to restrict the fed, but rather to exercise good judgement ourselves).
22
For more on these proposals, see infra Part V.
23
See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 162 (2015) (proposing a more
strengthened Community Reinvestment Act); Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank,
Savings, Assets, and Banking among Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview,
in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS 1-22, 3 (Rebecca M. Blank and Michael S. Barr eds., 2009)
(explaining the concept of financial inclusion in including financial services for the poor);
ELLEN BROWN, THE PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION: FROM AUSTERITY TO PROSPERITY 397
(2013) [hereinafter PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION] (explains the public banking solutions at the
federal level); ELLEN BROWN, WEB OF DEBT 342 (2012) [hereinafter WEB OF DEBT] (citing
community banking as an example of public banking); BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL
SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL ACCESS (Michael S. Barr et al., eds. 2007)
[hereinafter BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS] (discussing the current state of
microfinance and ideas to increase access to financial services); ORGANIZING ACCESS TO
CAPITAL: ADVOCACY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 10-13
(Gregory D. Squires ed., 2003) (detailing the benefits of the Community Reinvestment Act
as a reason for strengthening it); JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIESCHNICK,
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appear in the 1990s, has prompted calls for publicly facilitated microlending or micro-finance, for an “Occupy Bank,” for public banking, for a
strengthened Community Reinvestment Act, and for sundry forms of
publicly facilitated financial inclusion or “banking [of] the poor.”24
Although proponents do not always seem fully cognizant of it, these
CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE: DEVELOPMENT BANKING FOR COMMUNITIES (1992) (discussing
development banks and their role in expanding financial access); MICHAEL SHERRADEN,
ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY 305-08 (1991) (explaining
policy innovations that can result in greater asset building for the poor); Michael
Sherraden, Asset-Building Policy and Programs for the Poor, in ASSETS FOR THE POOR:
THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP 302 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N.
Wolff eds., 2001) (discussing how the poor are unlikely to benefit from asset-based
policies due to lack of participation and highly regressive tax benefits); LISA SERVON, THE
UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 170 (2017) (arguing
for more government involvement in the financial sector, and in banking, focus the banks
on serving the public); MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN
BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999) (arguing electronic banking will expand
financial access to the poor); MUHAMMAD YUNUS, A WORLD OF THREE ZEROS: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF ZERO POVERTY, ZERO UNEMPLOYMENT, AND ZERO CARBON EMISSIONS 248
(2018) (explaining the creation and concept of social business funds to help the public);
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. REG. 121, 128 (2004) (explaining the
importance of strengthening the community reinvestment act). For sympathetic but sober
critiques, see Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 2 at 126 (outlining the importance of
public community reinvestment alternatives, among them microlending); Materializing
Citizenship, supra note 2 at 68 (“Small-scale community reinvestment, development
banking, and microlending, as well as reenlisting the Postal Service as a savings outlet for
the financially humble, are all very good ideas—particularly the latter, in my view”). On
the Occupy Money Cooperative, of which the author is a founding Board Member, see The
Occupy Money Card, POPULAR RESISTANCE.ORG (July 22, 2013),
https://popularresistance.org/the-occupy-card/ [https://perma.cc/XUR3-WHKS] (calling for
using the occupy card to pay, and each transaction being a form of protest with every
purchase against the financial institutions); see also Quentin Fottrell, Is Occupy Debit Card
Bad for the 99%?, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 8, 2013, 9:29 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/is-occupy-debit-card-bad-for-the-99-2013-10-02
[https://perma.cc/HXL4-A8ZZ] (examining the consequences of the occupy card
movement and its effects on financial markets).
24
See, e.g., Margot Adler, Occupy Groups Reimagine the Bank, NPR (Mar. 27, 2002),
https://www.npr.org/2012/03/27/149443425/alternative-banking-groups-aid-occupymovement [https://perma.cc/CW5J-NFVF] (explaining the Occupy Bank Working Group’s
hopes of a democratic or national bank to better serve the underbanked community); Eillie
Anzilotti, The One Strategy That Could Finance the Whole Green New Deal, FAST
COMPANY (June 26, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90364616/public-banking-canfinance-the-green-new-deal [https://perma.cc/GVN5-VZNV] (discussing the rise of the
public banking idea, the operation of public banks, and how they can aid in the Green New
Deal); Marguerite S. Robinson, The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the
Poor, THE WORLD BANK (2001),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/226941468049448875/sustainable-finance-forthe-poor [https://perma.cc/YF8Z-YU9Z] (discussing the need for and benefits of
microfinance).
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proposals link up quite intimately with the first class of proposals via an
underappreciated yet quite consequential common denominator—the role
that widening wealth and income inequality plays in underwriting both
commercial-cum-financial exclusion and financial-cum-macroeconomic
fragility.25
Finally, a third development prompting a rethink of our hybrid
American form of public-private finance has been the spread of new
technologies of trade and payment—in effect, new commercial
infrastructures.26 These have led some to prognosticate, in some cases
breathlessly, that sovereign currencies are destined to be pushed aside and
replaced by privately issued crypto-currencies, digital assets, and other
forms or outgrowths of “fintech.”27 Advocates of this crypto-utopian (I will
call it “cryptopian”) persuasion sometimes sound rather like “metalists” of
the sort mentioned above, inasmuch as they tout crypto-currencies’
contrived scarcity as a characteristic that renders them something like 21st
century “digital gold.”28 Other, in my view more careful, observers also see

25

See Robert Hockett, Income Inequality and Financial Fragility, 77 VANDERBILT L.
REV. EN BANC 119, 120 (2018) (explaining that the significant wealth and income
inequality is linked to market fragility); Robert Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality
and Market Fragility: Some Empirics in the Political Economy of Finance, Part I & II, 63
CHALLENGE __ (2019) (forthcoming), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204710.
26
See infra Part IV (showing a comprehensive overview, as attentive to perils as to
opportunities). For a comprehensive overview, as attentive to perils as to opportunities, see
New Tech Versus New Deal, supra note 17, at 737 (giving examples of fintech and
cryptocurrencies affecting the public-private finance model); see also Finance without
Financiers, supra note 14, at 25 (discussing new technologies in the modern shadow
banking markets); Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1202 (explaining that fintech
portrays itself as a revolutionary alternative to the existing financial system).
27
These claims are now far too numerous to cite comprehensively, and grow
increasingly difficult to read without laughter, though I engage with them infra Parts II–III.
For a few recent examples typical of the genre, see, e.g., Frank Holmes, Bitcoin Could
Replace Cash in 10 Years, BUS. INSIDER (May 1, 2018, 6:44 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-might-replace-cash-10-years-2018-5 (discussing
the maturation and growth of digital currency and claiming cryptocurrency is a contender
to replace cash in the future); Paul Schrodt, Cryptocurrency Will Replace National
Currencies by 2030, According to This Futurist, MONEY (Mar. 1, 2018),
http://time.com/money/5178814/the-future-of-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/UF4NFEA5] (explaining that cryptocurrencies are positioned to replace fiat currencies in the next
10 years); Aman Swami, Cryptocurrency Will Replace Fiat Currency in the Future Says
Famous Venture Capitalist, DOLLAR DESTRUCTION (May 19, 2018),
https://dollardestruction.com/5441/ [https://perma.cc/T5EP-C9F8] (discussing Tim
Draper’s view that cryptocurrency will replace fiat currencies completely).
28
See, e.g., NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS
AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY X (2015) (stating that in designing
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promise in blockchain, other distributed ledger, and cognate computing and
coding technologies of the kind that now underwrite crypto-assets, but see
promise of a much different sort.29 They see the prospect of a safer, faster,
and more secure value-storage and -transfer system—a payments system
that, depending on who deploys and administers it, can make for more just
and efficient central banking and finance too.30
I aim with this article to end financial hybridity and address the
aforementioned “what part of our commonwealth’s financial system should
be part of the commons” question by developing the case for the latter
view—the view that sees qualified promise in public deployment of digital
technology in the realms of both commerce and finance.31 Just as
importantly, and in the same cause, I also aim to make a new case for the
“pro-public” camps in respect of the other two recent developments just
noted—critique of the private financier’s role in our nation’s hybrid
financial system, and advocacy of a more unambiguously public form of
banking and finance in our productive republic.32 I aim to do all of this with

bitcoin, the “Cypherpunks” decided it should be scarce, a characteristic of successful
coinage).
29
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that the distributed ledger
provided by cryptography will result in the federal reserve issuing its own form of a digital
dollar that will be safer and more efficient).
30
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the benefits of cryptography in a providing safer and
more efficient payment systems, rather than to be used as brand new cryptocurrencies); see
also Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that the distributed ledger provided by
cryptography will result in the federal reserve issuing its own form of a digital dollar that
will be safer and more efficient); Robert Hockett, Betting on Betacoin, FORBES (Dec. 17,
2017, 5:59 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2017/12/17/betting-on-betacoin/#1661e5124670 [https://perma.cc/D456-LA4P] [hereinafter Betting on Betacoin]
(showing that the distributed ledger and cryptography can be used to improved our current
payment system, and not creating cryptocurrencies).
31
My earlier, more tentative endorsements include, e.g., Finance without Financiers,
supra note 1, at 28-29 (discussing the Fed’s relationship to repo technologies); Finance
Franchise, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (recognizing that the U.S. may soon be involved with
transforming digital currencies into tradable raw materials); Money’s Past, supra note 3, at
1-2 (discussing growing public interest in cryptocurrencies); Betting on Betacoin, supra
note 17 (discussing how, like Sony’s investments in video technology in the 1970s, the
public may seek to invest in cryptocurrencies).
32
In Finance without Financiers, Finance Franchise, and Public Actors, the prospect
remained open that the public-private franchise arrangement could remain viable if the
franchisor and its designated agents— in particular the Congress, the White House, the Fed
and the Treasury—could remain mindful of the franchisor’s critical role in the division of
labor. Finance without Financiers, supra note 1, at 14-19; Finance Franchise, supra note
1, at 1146-49; Public Actors, supra note 4, at 137. I still believe this, but am now more
pessimistic about the likelihood of continuous cognizance, across differing political eras, of
that that role. As I argue below in Part V, I think the proposal that I make here will
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a single far-reaching proposal that will find useful schematic expression on
both the asset and the liability sides of present-day Fed and Treasury
balance sheets—effectively our public ledger. And I hope to make my case
on grounds of both political justice and productive efficiency on the one
hand, and our commercial and financial history on the other—a history that
manifests a distinct teleological trajectory.33
The proposal, which I call “Citizen Finance,” is in a way simple and
long overdue, even while bearing many attractively transformative
ramifications that appear to have escaped notice till now. It is that our
republic’s monetary and fiscal authorities—our Fed and Treasury—cease
conducting their money-modulating and implicit capital-allocating
operations primarily indirectly, via the media of private sector bank reserve
accounts, associated private sector bank and capital market lending, and Fed
open market operations in generic Treasury securities on private sector
financial markets, and instead do so directly—by (a) channeling monetized
public full faith and credit primarily through public investment institutions
rather than private sector depository institutions and “shadow banks” as
they do now, on the asset side of the balance sheet, and (b) a new national
payments platform and associated system of what I call digital Citizen and
Resident Wallets, on the liability side of the balance sheet.34
effectively “institutionalize” that cognizance in a manner that renders it more robust and
enduring.
33
See infra Parts IV and V (referencing citizen finance-related proposals).
34
There is some overlap between my proposal and (a) my more limited “Inclusive
Value Ledger” legislation now proposed in the State of New York; (b) those of a number of
central banks worldwide, discussed infra, Part VI; and (c) a number of friends and
colleagues with whom I have discussed these and related matters for some five or six years
now. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, The New York Inclusive Value Ledger: A Peer-to-Peer
Savings and Payments Platform for an All-Embracing and Dynamic State Economy (white
paper, 2019), available at https://ronkimnewyork.com/downloads/The-New-YorkInclusive-Value-Ledger-Sept-2019.pdf (last visited March 7, 2020); JONATHAN
MCMILLAN, THE END OF BANKING 159-61 (2014) (describing how ending private banking
would lead to redefining the public sector’s role in the financial system, particularly with
respect to digital money); Morgan Ricks, John Crawford, & Lev Menand, A Public Option
for Bank Accounts (Or Central Banking for All), (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper 18-33,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3192162 (discussing the
benefits, implications, costs, and objections of creating FedAccounts); David Andolfatto,
Fedcoin: On the Desirability of a Government Cryptocurrency, MACROMANIA (Feb. 3,
2015), http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/02/fedcoin-on-desirability-of-government.html
[https://perma.cc/4P2W-W6P2] (addressing Koning’s proposal and proposing a “Fedwire
for All,” which would allow for any digital cash users to access closed centralized ledgers);
Central Banks Should Consider Offering Accounts to Everyone, ECONOMIST (May 26,
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/26/central-banksshould-consider-offering-accounts-to-everyone (arguing that accounts with central banks
should be widely-available); Nicholas Gruen, Central Banking for All: A Modest Proposal
for Radical Change, NESTA, 6-8 (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.nesta.org.uk/report/central-
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The public investment institutions, several species of which I have
authored or co-authored on elsewhere,35 will channel finance capital
primarily to productive and socially desirable infrastructural and primary
market, not to speculative secondary and tertiary market, investments.36
They will thereby take the Fed and the Treasury out of the business of
financing or otherwise abetting mere betting in securities and derivative
markets, and move them instead into the publicly critical work, essential in
any commercial republic or exchange economy where productive units
engage in private ordering, of financing inclusively productive activity and
public goods provision on the asset side of the public balance sheet.
The corresponding Citizen and Resident Wallets on the liability side
of the balance sheet will for their part be dividend-yielding or interestbearing, much as are present-day private sector bank Fed reserve accounts
and individual demand deposits held at depository institutions or money
market funds. But now the returns will effectively convey stakes in the
nation’s productive accumulation—its sustainable “economic growth”—to
the citizenry and business enterprises operating in salutary sectors of the
“real” economy, rather than rents paid to publicly privileged, privately
owned speculative financial institutions.
Returns on Citizen and Resident Wallets will be raiseable when it
proves necessary, during bubbles or unsustainable booms, collectively to

banking-for-all-a-modest-case-for-radical-reform/ [https://perma.cc/Q6BH-5MUD]
(supporting retail branches for central banking services and connecting governmentsponsored banking accounts to more bank payment systems); J.P. Koning, Fedcoin,
MONEYNESS (Oct. 19, 2014), http://jpkoning.blogspot.com/2014/10/fedcoin.html
[https://perma.cc/Q82Y-EX32] (advocating for the creation of “Fedcoin” and allowing
users to remain anonymous by using accounting benefits available through the Fed); Dirk
Niepelt, Reserves for Everyone—Towards a New Monetary Regime?, VOX: CEPR POLICY
PORTAL (Jan. 21, 2015), https://voxeu.org/article/keep-cash-let-public-hold-central-bankreserves [https://perma.cc/W233-4RL5] (arguing that the public should have access to
central bank accounts but that cash should not be phased out); Robert Sams, Which
Fedcoin?, CRYPTONOMICS (Feb. 5, 2015), https://cryptonomics.org/2015/02/05/whichfedcoin/ [https://perma.cc/QSY2-W52L] (analyzing Koning’s and Andolfatto’s arguments
while also questioning why accounts with the Federal Reserve do not exist). More on these
proposals infra, Part VII.
35
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4 (listing the author’s scholarship on public
investment institutions).
36
By “primary” market I mean the market for funds used to finance non-financial
production. By “secondary” market I mean the market for re-sale of claims generated by
primary market financing. And by “tertiary” market I mean the market for derivative
claims referencing—that is, “bets” placed upon secondary market price movements
among—claims traded on secondary markets.
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scale back aggregate credit-money generation and associated spending.37
They will likewise be lowerable, even to negative rates or their functional
(“helicopter money”) equivalent, when it proves necessary to boost credit
generation or debt-free spending during busts or recessions.38 Citizen and
Resident Wallets in this sense will lend themselves—pun only partly
intended—to digital “QE for the People” and Fed “helicopter drops”
directly to citizens and their productive enterprises, rather than to
commercial banks and other favored financial institutions, during times of
acute financial or economic distress calling for extraordinary expansion
measures like those pioneered by the Fed between 2009 and 2016.39 This
will in turn make for far more direct—and, I shall argue, more inclusive and
distributively just—monetary and even fiscal policy than do present
arrangements. It will also make for much greater and more equitable
productive, commercial, and financial participation on the part of our
citizenry, as well as a fit use for new fintech technologies as these now
develop and proliferate.40
In effect, then, what I propose is to reclaim those public utility
functions that our hybrid finance franchise arrangement now outsources to
private sector franchisee institutions, and to return them “in house” to our
sovereign republican franchisor institutions.41 There will still be, of course,
privately accumulated wealth, privately offered financial services for
wealth-accumulators, and private sector investments of many a familiar
kind. But there will no longer be indefinitely extended, monetized public
full faith and credit flowing (or hemorrhaging) toward artfully inflated
secondary and tertiary financial and derivatives markets as our present
arrangement enables and, all too often, all but assures.42 Instead public full
37

See Koning, supra note 21; Andolfatto, supra note 21; Sams, supra note 21; Ricks,
Crawford, & Menand, supra note 21, at 22-23 (discussing how central banks could choose
to raise rates when necessary).
38
These are in my view critically important features of the plan, for reasons sounding
in the modulatory and allocative tasks mentioned in supra note 21. See id.
39
See Timothy A. Canova, The Role of Central Banks in Global Austerity, 22 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 665, 689-93 (2015) (advancing the view that the Fed's approach to
quantitative easing, which favored Wall Street financial institutions over Main Street
businesses, was inadequate at bolstering broad sections of the economy after the 2008
financial crisis).
40
More on these features, too, infra Parts IV and V (addressing "citizen finance" and
how it will both benefit new fintech and promote financial inclusion).
41
The importance of these matters is discussed thoroughly infra Parts I–V. They are
also my primary concerns in, e.g., Finance without Financiers, supra note 1; Finance
Franchise, supra note 14; FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17; Hockett,
FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 17;
and Development Finance State, supra note 17.
42
Infra Parts IV and V (highlighting the benefits of “citizen finance”).
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faith and credit will flow only toward primary markets and such secondary
or tertiary markets—like those for home mortgage, higher education, small
business, family farm, and public utility loans—as legitimately require, for
reasons sounding in justice or systemic market failure, sovereign
assistance.43
Private investors will likely increase their primary market
investment activity, as distinguished from secondary and tertiary market
speculative activity, as well under my proposed new arrangement. That will
be thanks to the impetus—and the collectively underwritten stability—that
sustained public investment in those primary and other markets affords: an
impetus and stability whose absence at present denies, in classic “market
failure” fashion, productive investment opportunities to yield-requiring
“patient capital.”44 Meanwhile, secondary and tertiary markets, which with
public credit-money are now larger by orders of magnitude than any bona
fide liquidity or hedging need ever could justify, will become mainly
private affairs—and much smaller on that account.45 Indeed, they will
become what they have long falsely claimed that they are—sites of “one-toone” credit-intermediation rather than “one-to-many” credit-multiplication
and “none-to-many” credit-generation.46
43

Id. On some of those public secondary and tertiary market-making activities, see,
e.g., Robert Hockett, Open Labor Market Operations, 62 CHALLENGE 113, 121 (2019)
[hereinafter Open Labor] (discussing Fannie Mae’s involvement in secondary market in
mortgage instruments); Robert Hockett, Republican Home-Owning, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF ST. LOUIS 15-16 (2018),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/hfs/assets/2018/tippingpoints/hockett_tipping_points_paper_2018_12.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/SV42-E7RW]
[hereinafter Republican Home-Owning] (discussing Fannie Mae’s involvement in
secondary market in mortgage instruments); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova,
‘Private’ Means to ‘Public’ Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEO. INQ. IN L. 53,
61-62 (2014) [hereinafter Governments as Market Actors] (discussing Fannie Mae’s and
Sallie Mae’s secondary market-making activities); Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 2 at
135-37 (addressing Fannie Mae’s involvement in secondary market-making).
44
More on this impetus infra Part IV. See also Hockett, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW
DEAL, supra note 4; Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National
Investment Authority, supra note 17, at 453 in which its importance is front and center.
45
More on this, too, infra Part IV. See also FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra
note 4; Finance without Financiers, supra note 1, at 41 (discussing how, in secondary
markets, “endogenously generated credit-money can recursively drive prices to dangerous,
crash-prone heights”); Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1170-71 (describing how
government-backed securities are constantly a portion of global assets); FINANCING THE
GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 4, at PIN (PAREN); Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment,
supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 17, at 470-71 (indicating private
parties would continue to be involved in secondary markets); Public Actors, supra note 17,
at 134 (highlighting how government leadership in secondary markets could provide an
advantage for profit-seeking private actors).
46
These terms stem from the work cited supra, note 1, and are reprised infra, Part I.
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And while fintech is not strictly necessary to make all of this
possible—indeed we could, and probably should, have put in place
something like Citizen Finance during the New Deal if not indeed earlier,
when Fedwire was introduced back in 191847—it certainly makes things
both easier and more urgent today than they would have looked yesterday.
That is particularly so now, as central banks worldwide look to upgrade
their national payments infrastructures even while private sector financial
conglomerates look to commandeer crypto and fintech development to their
own, hardly pro bono purposes.48
My full proposal and justifying argument proceed as follows. Part I
briefly rehearses the constitutive elements and transactional relations—the
agents and structure and “flows”—of that hybrid franchise arrangement
which now characterizes our financial system, an arrangement I have
mapped out more painstakingly in earlier work.49 It describes how the flow
of credit-money throughout our financial system is essentially a flow of
monetized public full faith and credit from central bank, through private
sector banks, financial markets, and “shadow banks,” to primarily
speculative borrowers.50 It also reminds readers of why this form of creditgeneration and –dissemination is far more unproductive and indeed even
destructive than mere “intermediation” would be.
Part II then briefly recounts the political, economic, and monetary
circumstances that prompted and partly justified public/private financial
hybridity when our combined money and payments, banking, and financial
systems were first instituted, ad hoc and in stages, over a century ago.51 Part
III then lays out the ways in which matters have changed since back then—
ways that now render the full franchise arrangement no longer necessary or,
it now seems, even tenable.
Part IV commences the process of mapping my public “financereclamation” proposal—again, “Citizens Finance”—in detail, addressing at
each stage what failures in the present arrangement the proposed
47

More on Fedwire and its significance infra, Parts IV and V.
As more fully discussed infra Parts IV.B and V; see also, supra nn. 3, 4, and 17
(discussing developments in technology and fintech, and both U.S. and global financial
architecture affecting economic development).
49
See, e.g., Finance without Financiers, supra note 14 (explaining how financial flows
stem from public accommodation and monetization of privately originated loans); Finance
Franchise, supra note 14.
50
Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 12-13 (explaining how financial flows
stem from public accommodation and monetization of privately originated loans); Finance
Franchise, supra note 1, at 1156-57 (explaining this flow as the “operative logic” of
finance and the franchise agreement).
51
See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 1149 (outlining how the hybrid
public-private franchise debunks a standard paradigm and the new interpretation redefines
the dynamics of the financial system).
48
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arrangement will rectify.52 In so doing it traces the ramifications of my
proposed changes throughout the financial system, as well as its
implications for familiar but no longer sensible distinctions we draw
between public fiscal and monetary operations. Part V discusses logistics
and highlights the sense in which Citizens’ Finance can be seen as an endstate toward which our nation’s commercial, monetary, and financial
evolution has been trending or groping for at least a century and a half, if
not since our Founding.53
In effect, I show, we are now reaching a stage of development at
which consolidated “public ledger finance,” which is inherently more stably
productive and equitable but for centuries was less feasible than “token
finance” once societies grew too large and far-flung to keep plenary citizen
“account books,” is once again possible. That is the real promise of
fintech—the promise of consolidating money, payments, and finance into
something that is public, productive, and sustainable again.
Part VI makes clear how new digital technologies make both
implementation and operation of Citizens Finance both much easier and
more necessary than would otherwise have been the case, even while they
are not, strictly speaking, necessary to do what I believe now needs doing.54
In this connection it also discusses specific technical options for the
Democratic Digital Dollar component of Citizen Finance, including the
options now being explored by forward-looking central banks worldwide.55
Part VII addresses anticipated objections and alternatives to Citizens’
Finance, demonstrating along the way the superiority of what I here
advocate to competing suggestions that I suspect likely critics will favor.56
Then I conclude and look forward.
I. HYBRID FINANCE: A BRIEF RECAPITULATION
Our financial system is essentially a public-private franchise
arrangement.57 The good that the franchise distributes is not hotel rooms,
foodstuffs, or auto-parts that conform to reliably uniform standards across
an integrated national economy. It is instead a national payment, credit, and
52

See Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17.
Money’s Past, supra note 3 (detailing the financial evolution towards a digital
dollar).
has been.”).
(discussing the benefits and feasibility of a Fed-issued digital dollar).
56
Id. at 11 (“Direct central banking, in short, is thus apt to be far more effective,
saving friendly and consumer-friendly even than indirect central banking has been.”).
57
This Part summarizes the detailed account of the U.S. financial system as a whole
found in Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, and Finance Franchise, supra note
14.
53
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value-storage medium—the monetized full faith and credit of the United
States.58 Our system distributes, in other words, a uniform national currency
and its credit equivalent—dollar-denominated debt—most of it in the form
of what is alternatively called “credit money,” “bank money,” “deposit
money” or “broad money.”59
Our sovereign republic issues this good, and like any franchisor
promulgates and enforces certain “quality control” measures to ensure that
specific exemplars of the good conform to a uniform standard.60 Licensed
private sector banking and other financial institutions in turn act as
franchisees, distributing the good—again, monetized public full faith and
credit—for the public sector franchisor and earning what I call “privatized
seignorage” for their trouble by being permitted to charge interest for
lending, and fees for managing, republic-issued credit-money.61
It is easiest to trace the truth of this claim in connection with
commercial banks, which extend dollar-denominated credit in the form of
newly opened or credited deposits for borrowers.62 These bank-issued
deposits are immediately spendable (“drawable upon”) as money—that is,
as full payment equivalents of Federal Reserve notes, better known as dollar
bills—in virtue both of the role that our system confers upon banks in our
Fed-administered national payments infrastructure, and of the role Fed
accommodation plays in conferring money status on payments made out of
licensed bank deposit accounts via that payments infrastructure.63 But
effectively the same thing now happens in other subsectors of the financial
sector—notably capital markets, money and commercial paper markets,
repo markets, derivatives markets, and other shadow banking markets—as
58

See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 6 (defining the franchise
arrangement); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1156 (defining the franchise
arrangement).
59
See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 11 (describing how credit-money
can be issued); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1156 (explaining how credit-money
fits into the franchise agreement as the capital for public franchisors).
60
See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 26 (“[Repo transactions] have not
yet become subject to the ‘quality control’ standards that the franchisor imposes upon those
forthright franchisees.”).
61
See id., at 11 (describing the process in how private franchisees might earn a
profit—the “privatized seignorage”—by dispensing a good provided by the sovereign
franchisor).
62
Id., at 8 (using commercial banks as a counterexample to the intermediation
interpretation). Finance Franchise, supra note 14 (reiterating that our financial system is a
franchise agreement and does not follow the intermediation orthodoxy).
63
See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 12 (“Accommodation and
monetization are the processes through which the sovereign enables credit to be
indefinitely generated in immediately spendable form, by committing ex ante to convert
certain private liabilities into public liabilities that serve as money.”); Finance Franchise,
supra note 1, at 1156-57 (defining what accommodation means).
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well as, thanks to the multilateral credit and payments linkages we now
permit among all of these markets, private sector banks, and our republic’s
central bank, the Fed.64 The upshot is a financial system that is far less
about “intermediating” scarce private capital, as banking and financial
orthodoxy still surprisingly proclaim, than it is about generating and
multiplying often over-abundant, because mis-allocated, public capital,
a.k.a. credit-money.
As just suggested, an unfortunate misconception, both assumed by
non-experts and reinforced by some lawyers, financiers, economists, and
public servants who ought to know better, is that banks simply lend what
others have antecedently deposited, and that other financial subsectors
likewise just intermediate between such private sector accumulators of
putatively scarce capital and end-users of capital.65 In the case of the
banking sector, the assumed picture is nicely captured by phrases like
“loanable funds,” on at least one understanding of that phrase, and slogans
like “deposits make loans.”66 In fact, however, it is far more accurate to
speak of “loan-generated funds” and say “loans make deposits,” since most
of what we see in the way of deposits is simply the bank balance-sheet’s
liability-side equivalent of bank-disseminated, publicly enabled, dollardenominated asset-side credit.67
The real key to loans’ spendability as deposit account “bank money”
(again, that is a term of art) is not those loans’ fictitious derivation from
antecedently deposited private-sector-supplied funds, as the dominant
misconception—what I call “the intermediated scarce private capital
myth”—has it.68 It is, rather, what I have elsewhere dubbed Fed

64

Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 40 (“In sum, then, all of the shadow
banking channels enable the capital and money markets to amplify and replicate, in all
salient respects, the functions of traditional banks.”); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at
Part III, IV.
65
Finance without Financiers supra note 14, at 4, 6 (suggesting an alternative to the
‘intermediate’ interpretation); Finance Franchise supra note 14, at 1147 (defining the
franchise agreement by dispelling the intermediation interpretation).
66
Finance without Financiers supra note 14, at 14 (describing loanable funds to be an
orthodox notion that Hockett later dispels). See also Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at
1159 (defining “loanable funds” and its relation to banking sector).
67
Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 15 (explaining bank lending
transactions—the bank will record the loan as an asset and the deposit as a liability);
Finance Franchise, supra note 14, Introduction and Parts I–II.
68
See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 5-9 (explaining the “intermediated
scarce private capital orthodoxy” view is false); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1146
(“The intermediated-scarce-private-capital orthodoxy is a myth, in turn, because it
profoundly misrepresents the reality of modern financial systems.”).
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“accommodation” and “monetization.”69 That is to say, Fed-recognized
clearing and settlement, through the public payments architecture that the
Fed oversees and administers, of payments drawn upon deposit accounts
maintained with publicly licensed and enabled banking and other financial
institutions.70
The license in question, in turn—the best known and most coveted
“flavor” of which is known among specialists as the “bank charter”—is
essentially a franchise contract.71 Required reserves and capital buffers, like
portfolio regulation, consumer financial protection, and other modalities of
financial regulation, are in turn simply terms of that contract.72 They
amount to quality control terms meant to maintain the stability of the
franchisee banks and other financial institutions, along with the payments
infrastructure that they largely constitute, upon which the public relies, all
while preventing both (a) exploitation of that same “general public” and (b)
over-issuance (inflation) of the public money in relation to the quantum of
available goods and services that this money can command.73
Thanks in part to their deliberately cultivated borrowing, other
transactional, and affiliative relations with banking institutions, and in part
to public backstopping of themselves along with the banks during times of
financial distress, nonbank financial institutions have steadily become, as
suggested above, de facto franchisee institutions as well.74 As shown in
prior work, they now issue and multiply public credit-money much as do
banks, and do so far in excess of anything they borrow from depositors,

69

Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 11 (explaining “what can be called
public “accommodation” and “monetization” of initially privately extended credit.”).
70
Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining federal bank
accommodation is necessary given central banks administer payments infrastructure on
which privately drawn checks clear at par from private banks); Finance Franchise, supra
note 14, at 1162 (explaining central bank accommodation is an unavoidable result of
administering a payments system on which privately drawn check clear at par from private
banks).
71
Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 6 (“[C]ontemporary financial systems
as we now find them are best interpreted as public-private franchise arrangements.”).
72
See id. (explaining the terms of the “franchise” operate like a licensing agreement
where the Fed contracts out their monetized full faith and credit).
73
See id. at 16 (explaining financial regulation, like reserve requirements or capital
requirements, mitigate the risk privately-owned banks create when over-lending or lending
at rates that increase inflationary pressures).
74
See id. at 23 (explaining “capital, and now also money, markets amplify and
replicate the role of banking and Treasury securities markets as channels for dispensing the
full faith and credit of the sovereign” just as banks do under their ‘franchisee’ agreements).
See also id. (discussing the financial crisis of 07-09 that shed light on so called, “shadow
bank[s,]” that replicate the banking industry and similarly promote public accommodation
and monetization).
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investors, and other non-bank counterparties.75 Nonbank financial
institutions assist, in a word, not only in credit-intermediation but in creditmultiplication and -generation too, again as our commercial banks do.76
And this is made possible by public accommodation and facilitation of these
institutions’ transactions in manners that resemble or replicate public
accommodation of banks’ and their depositors’ transactions. In short, then,
money being simply “that which pays” in the making of payments, and
“what pays” in turn mainly comprising as it does payments made out of
loan-credited transaction accounts, our money system boils down to our
Fed-overseen and -enabled payment and financial systems.77
The upshot of this set of arrangements is that even the capital and
money markets, and even the repo and derivatives markets, and even the
rest of the so-called “shadow banking” sector, are now franchisees in our
public-private finance franchise too, albeit less carefully monitored than
traditional depository institutions (that being part of their point).78 All of
these institutions are now privately owned and operated distributors of that
endogenously generated public good which is the monetized full faith and
credit of the United States, also known as the money supply.79 And this is
so even though these institutions continue also to intermediate.80 What I call
credit-multiplication and -generation, in other words, now accompany and
vastly exceed or supplant credit-intermediation throughout our financial
system, with its share of transaction volume and the associated money
supply growing ever larger through time to the point that it dwarfs what has
been antecedently accumulated.81 And thanks to our system’s ties to our
central bank—our Fed—the credit-share’s growth is the public-share’s
growth.82 The overwhelmingly greater part of that monetized full faith and

75

Id. (“[Nonbank financial institutions are] now a critically important complement to
the traditional banking sector where credit-money proliferation is concerned.”)
76
Id. (explaining the “credit-money proliferation” complements our traditional banks).
77
See Democratic Digital Dollar, supra, note 5, at 1; also Finance without Financiers,
supra note 14, at 30 (explaining a non-bank derivative transaction replicates bank lending
and “necessarily augments public accommodation and monetization as described” above).
78
Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 6 (“[C]ontemporary financial systems
as we now find them are best interpreted as public-private franchise arrangements.”)
79
Id. (“Under the terms of the franchise, the sovereign public effectively licenses
private financial institutions to dispense a vital and indefinitely extensible public resource –
the sovereign public’s monetized full faith and credit.”)
80
Id. at 5 (explaining that many financial institutions intermediate).
81
Id. at 9 (“Finance capital in the form of credit might instead be more accurately said
to be ‘generated’ by lending institutions than ‘intermediated’ or ‘multiplied’ by them.”).
82
Id. at 34 (“The Fed’s converting both private borrower liabilities and private insurer
liabilities into public liabilities amounts to its monetizing that much more public full faith
and credit, and injecting it into the financial system.”).
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credit which is our money is, in other words, quite literally ours—our
republic’s.
Why is this? How did we get here? The brief functional trajectory
that I will now narrate addresses these questions. More importantly, it
shows that what I propose in this paper “fulfills,” in a sense, our polity’s
monetary, commercial, and financial history—a history from what I call
“ledger money” to “token money” and back that manifests a distinct
teleological pattern in its steady “dialectical” unfolding.83
II. HYBRID FINANCE: WHY AND HOW WE GOT HERE
Why we first instituted a de facto public-private finance franchise
arrangement, and why we have allowed it to radiate steadily outward from
its banking and payments system core to the farthest reaches of our shadow
banking and broader financial system, can be gleaned by addressing three
questions. All three are implicated by the opening remarks in Part I above,
where I said that our system distributes a uniform national currency and its
credit equivalent.
The pertinent questions that this observation raises are: first, why
“currency and its credit equivalent”; second, why uniformity; and third,
why uniformity through franchising rather than through direct distribution?
My replies to these questions indicate not only why we now publicly
franchise, but also why we both can and now ought to move on to a more
thoroughly republican form of ledger finance such as Part IV describes and
prescribes.
A. Why Credit and Currency
I begin with a brief reminder of what a financial system is for, and
the roles credit, money, and payments play in any such system.

83

I allude to the familiar “Hegelian” pattern pursuant to which, as societies develop,
solutions that they have earlier developed to particular challenges grow obsolete as the
forms that those challenges take themselves develop, then are updated to address the new
forms that the challenges take. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES GEISTES (1807).
In the present context, I will be showing in Parts I through III how monetary relations
within any community begin as informal accounting—credit, debit, and hence
“payment”—relations tractable on mental or paper “account books,” or ledgers; then move
to circulating currencies that function as payment ledger substitutes when societies grow
too large and productively complex for their credit and debit—their “payment”—relations
to be tracked mentally or on paper account books; and then return, in a sort of “higher
synthesis,” to ledger accounting once communications and payment technologies grow
sufficiently sophisticated to track even complex and far-flung sets of credit and debit
relations.
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1. Credit: Production & Payment in Time
As I suggested in introducing this article, finance is the means by
which people or entities presently lacking in resources necessary to engage
in productive activity secure temporary access to those resources from
others who have them.84 It is, in other words, the means by which
productive units productively borrow.85 One way to do this would be for the
would-be user of resources simply to borrow them directly from their
possessors, then return them as-is or in-kind.86 A credit transaction then
would occur, with the lender conveying the needed resource and the
borrower conveying a promise to return the resource as-is or in-kind at
some later date, perhaps with a premium couched as a “rental” payment.87
This would amount to a borrowing rendition of barter, as
inconvenient and transaction-slowing, and therefore production-slowing, as
barter is in any exchange economy with a complex division of labor and
resources deployed in productive activity.88 Non-stone age economies
accordingly employ some form of fungible money or ledger accounting in
exchanges of resources and repayment promises just as they employ money
or ledger accounting in exchanges of goods and services.89 It is how they
84

See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1213 (explaining finance, specifically the
franchise arrangement just discussed, is meant to supply the economy with sufficient credit
to support productive enterprise).
85
There is, accordingly, a trans-temporal element baked in to the concept of finance,
as the word’s etymology – ‘fin,’ meaning ‘finish’ or ‘end’ – itself suggests. I refer here
primarily to ‘productive’ finance rather than finance for consumption because productive
activity is in an important sense ‘prior’ to consumption activity. Any economy that has
moved beyond gathering to hunter gathering or more is an economy in which that which is
consumed has been grown, killed, constructed or otherwise produced. Indeed, even much
gathering is in a certain sense producing. See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 3 at 37-38
(describing financial institutions as making productive activity possible, whereby
productive activity “allow[s] us. . . to spend now (part of) what we won’t actually have
until later.”).
86
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 38-41 (explaining that “when you
borrow money. . .you just temporarily trade your own notes for Fed notes”).
87
Id. (discussing the function of promissory notes and ensuing obligations upon the
borrower).
88
Id. at 13 (“And because we organize productive activity, in a decentralized exchange
economy such as our own, largely by swapping obligations – that is, by contracting – the
principal medium through which such organizing is done is our money.”).
89
I do not intend this as a historical claim, but a functional one. Nor do I mean by
“exchange economy” a “private ownership economy.” With respect to the latter point,
communal economies involve exchange just as private property economies do. And as to
the first point, no historical evidence supports the common economist’s argument that
money ‘was invented to improve upon barter,’ or even that barter occurred much at all.
Indeed all available evidence suggests that monetary arrangements grew out of highly
‘networked’ state, social, and religious authority-maintained credit systems. See, e.g.,
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efficiently transfer and track mutual credits and debits among transacting
parties.
The same medium that is used to purchase goods or services for
production or consumption is accordingly lent—or “advanced”—for the
purchase of goods and services; indeed the latter appears historically to
precede the former.90 We call that medium “money,” which amounts among
other things to a universally usable mode of payment for—or claim upon—
resources.91 Money is how, or that with which, we pay—it is that which
“counts” for purposes of our “accounting” to one another where mutual
exchange and attendant obligations are concerned.92
2. Currency: From Ledgers to Tokens—and Back
Money of course need not take any particular physical form. Where
societies are small enough, or claim-tracking technologies sophisticated
enough, a formally or informally kept “account book” or “mental ledger”
suffices to “keep score”—that is, to keep track of everyone’s claims and
PETER EINZIG, PRIMITIVE MONEY 316 (2d ed. 1966) (illustrating several definitions of
money, including “means of purchasing goods and services and of defraying social costs”
and “a commodity which is habitually and without hesitation taken by anybody in
exchange for a commodity”); DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 21-23
(2011) (describing the forms money has taken, including as a “medium of exchange, unit of
account, and store of value”); A. HINGSTON QUIGGIN, A SURVEY OF PRIMITIVE MONEY 3-4
(Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1970) (1949) (categorizing money as a “recognized medium of
exchange, a standard of value and a symbol of wealth”); MICHAEL HUDSON & MICHAEL
VAN DE MIEROP, DEBT AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 165-69
(2002) (summarizing seventeenth and eighteenth century financing, including the credit
system that supported the natural resources market); Alfred Mitchell-Innes, What is
Money?, 30 BANKING L.J. 377, 377-78 (1913) (describing that “by common consent one
particular commodity is fixed on which is generally acceptable and which therefore,
everyone will take in exchange for the things he produces or the services he renders and
which each in turn can equally pass on to others in exchange for whatever he may want;
That this commodity thus becomes a ‘medium of exchange and measure of value.’ That a
sale is the exchange of a commodity for this intermediate commodity which is called
‘money’. . . .”).
90
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 38 (suggesting that “money’s being a
kind of circulating credit/debit is part of what enables it to function as an inter-temporal
claim—a ‘store of value’—in the first place”).
91
Id. at 34-36 (“Insofar as money functions as a medium of exchange, it can be
thought of as a claim upon what it’s exchanged for. It’s status as legal tender makes it a
legal claim upon what it buys – a claim upon resources.”)
92
Id. at 16-17 (“The next thing to note is how readily our obligations here – what is
due, what is owed – will be ‘cashed out’ at discharge into something like money. In so
doing, we’ll see not only money’s rootedness in normativity, obligation, accountability and
associated accounting, but also its elaboration into the notions of credit, asset, and liability
that populate the familiar legal and financial ‘universe’. . .”).

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

[1-June-18
24

counterclaims, credits and debits, assets and liabilities.93 Coin and currency
get into the act only when societies grow large and complex enough to
render informal “mental” accounting and even paper “book-keeping”
incapable of tracking all transactions, while still being technologically
underdeveloped enough to render a single formally kept digital social
account book or ledger not yet practicable.94
Currency and coin are in this sense intermediate-stage payment
technologies in monetary evolution.95 They are means of “keeping
accounts” with each other in a common “unit of account”—a “common
currency” or “coin of the realm”—even when we do not all know one
another or have means of recording and tracking our many exchanges with
one another on one common ledger or spreadsheet.96 They are in other
words primitive ledger-substitutes, we might say.97
This observation affords us a clue as to why coin and currency
issuance typically become sovereign functions—in a republic, republican
functions—as economies and the polities in which they are always
embedded grow ever more populous, socially complex, and technologically
advanced.98 Just as people in very small societies or proto-polities could in
theory keep accounts with one another through debit and credit entries in a
common mental or paper book-like ledger, so could they decentralize that
account-keeping as they grew larger and no longer able to use the same
physical book.99 They could do so by conveying individually issued

93

Id. at 38 (“And just as your merely ‘mentally tracked’ promise did in our you, me,
and Jean-Jacques story, where scale was sufficiently small, trust sufficiently high, and
matters sufficiently simple as to allow for the keeping of mere ‘mental accounts.’”).
94
Id. at 24-25 (“When populations grow larger and asset/liability relations grow more
farflung and complex, however, things must be ‘formalized’ and ‘regularized.’ That is so if
for no other reason than to enable us all to ‘keep track’ and ‘verify.’”); see also QUIGGIN,
supra note 71, at 4-5 (describing general difficulties in a bartering system and that such
problems were later avoided by “elaborate customs of credit, deferred payments or
payment by services.”).
95
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 28 (describing the process by which
currency can be introduced and formalized until it is officially made commonplace).
96
Id. (“What we do is develop means of converting . . . small-group-recognizable
‘horizontal,’ or ‘private,’ IOUs into full-polity-recognizable ‘vertical,’ or ‘public,’ IOUs.
Then we have truly common ‘common currency.’”).
97
Id. at 18-19 (illustrating informal ledgers via running chores hypothetical).
98
Id. at 24-26 (“When populations grow larger and asset/liability relations grow more
farflung and complex, however, things must be ‘formalized’ and ‘regularized.’ That is so if
for no other reason than to enable us all to ‘keep track’ and ‘verify.’”).
99
Id. at 9 (“Productive and distributive activity in decentralized exchange economies
pervasively involves joint exchanges of promises, hence joint issuance of countless
reciprocal obligations. . .Citizens. . . authorize one another to demand that such promises be
honored and obligations be met.”).
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promissory notes to one another, with holders understood to have claims
upon issuers.100
This is essentially how wooden “tally sticks” and breakable clay,
then metal, tablets and bars—the first circulating currencies—functioned in
ancient societies.101 The break pattern clearly identified who owed whom by
reference to who held each half of the broken token.102 The problem this left
was that the same growth in population and economic complexity that
prompted the move from mental accounting to what we might call “metal
accounting”—that is, to commercial- and financial-instrument-issuing—
ultimately rendered private instrument-issuing, like mental accounting,
unsatisfactorily transaction-limiting and hence production-limiting too.103
Broad transferability and hence usability of claim tokens was limited to
those able to “credit”—that is, to believe in the credibility of—the tokenissuer.104
It was natural in this circumstance to begin centralizing tokenissuance, which for present purposes is best seen as a step toward
reinstituting centralized bookkeeping to societies that have grown beyond
both informal account-keeping and private token-issuing.105 This form of

100

Id. at 26-27 (introducing the concept of promissory notes and the resulting interperson obligations).
101
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 44 (“The important thing about claim
checks was never their material form, but the fact that they reliably represented claims. 44
Receipts of this kind actually took many different material forms over time. In the early
Near East, clay tokens stamped with the grain authority’s seal were the most convenient
form.”).
102
Mitchell-Innes, supra note 71, at 395 (describing the process by which a coin was
broken to serve as a tally for a debtor-creditor relationship); HENRY DUNNING MACLEOD,
THE THEORY OF CREDIT 83-84 (2d ed. 1889) (illustrating the different types of substances
used to represent currency).
103
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46-47 (“The credit-money – the ‘finance
capital’ – supply must be able to grow at a rate that allows for this resource stock to grow
through the productive activity of those who need claims upon current such resources – that
is, again, money – in order to produce future resources”); Mitchell-Innes, The Credit
Theory of Money, 31 BANKING LAW JOURNAL 151 (1914) (discussing how buying and
selling are really only exchanging promises to pay); N.T. Skaggs, Debt as the Basis of
Currency, 57 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 453, 456-59 (1998)
(discussing the disadvantages of a metallic currency, and the evolution of money).
104
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 47 (“It’s all about optimizing productive
capacity. . .Too little money—too little finance capital—diminishes such capacity. . . Too
much money— too much finance capital—diminishes the reliability of money as a claimtransfer device, hence again productive capacity.”).
105
Id. at 14 (“. . . [J]ust as state and economy emerge, respectively, out of the
(contract-like) authority and (contract-like) obligation birthed by the joint ‘we,’ so is
money simply the authoritative means of signifying and discharging the multiple (contractlike) obligations. . . .”).
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centralization has historically taken two forms.106 And the second of these
forms can be viewed in principle as the near-completion of the first, even
though in some cases it has in practice chronologically preceded the first,
owing to late discovery of the need for currencies to become “elastic,” as I
will explain.107
The first mode of centralization was the establishment of institutions
with which large numbers of people could maintain monetary—that is,
again, credit and debit—relations, which then could act as account-keepers
for all of them, transferring credits and debits among them on single
account books.108 Call this “the physical ledger strategy,” a more broadly
usable digital rendition of which I will be schematizing and advocating
below109
The second mode of centralization was for sovereign or quasisovereign authorities themselves to issue tokens that could function as
claims and payment media far more widely—at the limit, throughout their
jurisdictions or realms—than could privately-issued tokens.110 Subjects or
citizens then could lay hold of such tokens either by making tax payments
in kind—for example, in the form of crop shares paid the local liege lord, or
grain bushels requisitioned by a priestly authority—or by temporarily
swapping private promissory tokens for public promissory tokens.111 Here
centralization of issuance substitutes for centralization of account-keeping.
Call this “the sovereign issuance” strategy, which I shall show now to be
digitally mergable with the ledger strategy when I get to Parts IV through
VI below.
In most societies still in existence, the second mode of recentralization seems to have preceded the first, with the first added on only
later as societies groped toward recognition that money supplies must be
elastic and what I call “modulatable”—that is, adjustable to accommodate

106

Id. at 37 (discussing the purpose of financial institutions, especially in regards to
enabling productive activity).
107
Id. at 39-40 (explaining the dual private promissory note and public promissory
note system).
108
See id. at 19 (explaining the concept of a ledger as a set of accounts through which
multiple parties owing obligations to each other another transfer debt and credit).
109
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 19 (“[W]e’ll call it a ledger.”).
110
Id. at 26 (“[M]odern societies deem certain ‘privately’— that is ‘horizontally’—
incurred obligations ‘publicly recognized’ and hence ‘vertically’ enforceable in special
adjudicative institutions we call ‘courts.’”).
111
See id. at 43 (observing receipts can function as assets to their recipients and as
liabilities to their issuers). See also EINZIG, supra note 71, at 316 (illustrating several
definitions of money, including “means of purchasing goods and services and of defraying
social costs” and “a commodity which is habitually and without hesitation taken by
anybody in exchange for a commodity”).

1-June-18]

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

27

fluctuating transaction and productive credit demand.112 Authorities
dispensed tokens as evidences of payment-obligations’—in effect, tax
obligations’—fulfillment.113 Because the mentioned obligations were
universal and ongoing, the tokens, as de facto tax receipts representing the
authority’s obligation to recognize payments’ having been made, were
universally desired.114
These tokens of “vertical” credit/debit relation between sovereign
and subject or republic and citizen accordingly came to function as means
of discharging even “horizontal” credit/debit relations among subjects or
citizens inter se.115 Originally fashioned of clay into which sovereign seals
could be stamped before baking for purposes of authentication, in time they
came to be fashioned of more durable yet malleable metals resistant to
corrosion, for which purposes gold and silver were most suitable.116 Here
lies the origin of sovereign-stamped metal coinage—not to mention of coinmetals’ perceived preciousness.117
Banks got into the money business—indeed, came even so much as
to exist—in these societies much later than tribute-requisitioning and
receipt-issuing sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns.118 They began as metalsmiths whose business required the keeping of safes.119 Safe-ownership led

112

Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67 at 42 (explaining civilizations heavily
dependent on agriculture stored grain during ‘fat years’ in anticipation of ‘lean years’ due
to fluctuating crop yields).
113
Id. at 42 (“Growers were required to make ‘grain deposits’ into a community pool,
which requirement operated as a kind of tax or mandatory social insurance premium, both
of which boil down to essentially the same thing . . . .”).
114
Id. at 43 (“These are public liabilities that circulate as private assets, so everyone
uses and accepts them.”).
115
Id. at 43 (“Once ‘tax receipts’ become ‘vertical claim checks’ . . . they begin
circulating as ‘horizontal claims’ too among those who need them. . . .”).
116
Id. at 43 (explaining claim checks represented by many different material forms
such as clay tokens in the early Near East and overtime by precious metals).
117
Id. at 44 ([T]hese metals became ‘precious’ largely because they came to be used
widely as material representations of money claims.”). An irony here is that these
‘precious’ metals, rather than becoming money because they were precious, instead
became precious because they were money. See Daniela Pylypczak-Wasylyszn, The
Historical Value of Silver: A 2000-Year Overview, COMMODITYHQ.COM (June 24, 2015),
https://commodityhq.com/education/a-brief-2000-year-history-of-silver-prices/
[https://perma.cc/734G-UPLC] (documenting declines in money-price of silver when it has
ceased to be used as a money medium).
118
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45 (“The benches— or ‘banca,’ as benches
are still called in Italy where this practice first developed— on which metalsmiths did their
smithing gave their name to what we now call ‘banking’.”).
119
Id. (“People began ‘depositing’ their metal with metalsmiths who happened to have
safes, for ‘safe-keeping.’”).
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naturally to a sidelight, that of metal storage for a fee—bailment.120 Holding
metal in trust for many people in time came to recommend issuance of
“claim checks” used to keep track of whose metal-stores metal-smiths
held.121 Some smiths—the most trusted ones—might well have simply kept
books.122 Others, with clients less trusting, issued verifiable claim tokens.123
In time it came to be recognized that claim tokens could substitute,
as payment media, for the heavier metal coins or other objects that they
represented claims upon, and then that they also could be issued in excess
of those metal stores themselves.124 The life of fully functional “elastic
currencies”—moneys whose supply could in theory be modulated more
readily than metals could be mined and then minted—effectively
commenced at this juncture.125 Metal-smiths who had banked soon became
bankers, full stop.126 These bankers could spend their own claim checks as
money or lend them to others at interest so long as they did not issue too far
in excess of metal stores.127 Fractional-reserve banking was born.128
Public authorities appear to have permitted this eventually
burgeoning private practice owing to the advantages an elastic currency
afforded.129 Money supplies could grow to accommodate growing
transaction volume as economies grew, even when metal-mining couldn’t
keep pace.130 All that was needed was to ensure that they did not grow too
120

Id. (explaining how once claim checks began circulating as paper currency
metalsmiths could issue checks for lending at interest).
121
Id. (“People began ‘depositing’ their metals with metalsmiths who happened to
have safes, for ‘safekeeping.’ The smiths for their part issued paper claim checks – or
‘notes’ representing claims upon the deposited metals.”).
122
Id. (explaining the smiths’ move from metal to banking).
123
Id. at 45 (“People began ‘depositing’ their metals with metalsmiths who happened
to have safes . . . [t]he smiths for their part issued claim checks . . . representing claims
upon the deposited metals.”).
124
Id. (“It also didn’t take long for the metalsmiths to discover . . . [o]nce their claim
checks began circulating as paper currency, they could issue such checks to themselves in
order to buy things.”).
125
Id. (explaining how coins were magnified by practice of issuing derivative paper
claims as multiples of metallic claims, causing the money supply to increase many-fold).
126
Id. (“[P]eople began ‘depositing’ their metals with metalsmiths who happened to
have safes . . . . The smiths issued paper claim checks . . . upon the deposited metals.”).
127
Id. (“Once their claim checks began circulating as paper currency, they could issue
such checks to themselves in order to buy things. They could also issue such checks for
lending at interest. As long as the checks were not issued too far in excess of the metal in
store, there was no danger in doing this, and there was much gain to be had.”).
128
Id. (“[T]he practice of issuing more notes than one had metal became known as
‘fractional reserve banking.’”).
129
Id. (“In time this line of work unsurprisingly became much more lucrative than
metalsmithing.”).
130
Id. (“[T]he elastic currency could be ‘over-stretched,’ issued too far in excess of the
metal that ‘backed’ it.”).
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fast—at rates that brought excess inflationary pressure, excess liquidity risk,
or both.131 (Excess metal-mining, which did sometimes happen even if but
rarely, could exert similar inflationary pressure. This seems to have
happened, most notably, after Spain and Portugal struck silver in conquered
South American territories.) So sovereigns allowed, but also regulated,
private bank currency issuance based upon sovereign coin issuance.132 And
they let bankers lend in those currencies at interest so as to facilitate trade,
investment, productive activity, and growth.133 In effect, they shared their
seigniorage, which their coin issuance long had afforded, with bankers in
the form that new note issuance afforded.134
This privatized “note seigniorage” was meant to serve as an
incentive to bankers to lend prudently and productively—that is, in ways
that were well calculated to prove wealth-generating.135 In effect,
sovereigns were outsourcing the role of productively issuing and lending
sovereign claims upon resources, money—in elastic, readily multipliable,
hence modulatable paper form—to their citizens.136 And they were
controlling the quality of the multiplied money by requiring licensure of its
private disseminators and regulating their activities.137 In effect, what I call
the finance franchise was born.138
131

Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45-46 (“One could . . . ‘over-promise’ by
issuing too many promissory notes, which would undercut the value of promise and
promissory note alike.”).
132
A banker who over-issued and went insolvent in consequence was deemed
‘bankrupt’—a term that derives from the practice of public officials ceremonially—rupta,
from which the English word ‘rupture’ derives—the benches—banca —on which metalsmith bankers plied their trade in late Medieval Italy, where modern European banking
originated. (The Italians were first among Europeans because they were first to trade
extensively with Asia and North Africa, where commercial and associated financial
practice were then far in advance of their European counterparts.) See id. at 46 (observing
much of bank regulation during olden days involved licensing requirements and reserve
regulations to avert risk of elastic currency being issued too far in excess).
133
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46 (explaining how various jurisdictions
permitted banks to issue claim tokens for promoting growth).
134
Id. at 45 (stating that note issuance allowed for “a currency whose supply could be
grown both to accommodate growing transaction activity and to finance growing
productive activity”).
135
Id. at 45–46 (observing that “this practice of issuing more notes than they had metal
made banker’s business . . . profitable”).
136
Id. at 40, 45–46 (theorizing that publicly licensed private banks act as outsourced
credit checkers for the central sovereign entity).
137
Id. at 40 (stating that federally regulated banks “assist our Fed . . . in temporarily
transforming private money into public money”).
138
Id. at 41 (stating that reliance on the “public full faith and credit” of the sovereign
allows for “the franchise” of proliferated private banking by a multitude of financial
entities).
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But with the currency elasticity and prudent lending incentives this
system brought came a vulnerability as well, the seriousness of which
varied inversely with the effectiveness of sovereign franchisor monitoring
of franchisee institutions’ activities.139 That was the danger of losing,
through the franchise arrangement itself, precisely that form of monetary
uniformity and associated de facto account centralization that sovereign
coin issuance had afforded in the first place.140
This takes us to a closer look at the need for monetary uniformity, as
well as at the single most idiosyncratic historical attribute of the American
rendition of the finance franchise: its having had, until late in the game, a
multitude of ersatz-franchisee money-issuing institutions under the control
of no single coherently acting franchisor money-modulating institution.141
This is important in understanding both the nature of the present American
financial system and the necessity of that modernization of this system
which Parts IV through VI propose below.142
B. Why Uniformity
Franchises, as noted above, are among other things uniformitymaintenance regimes.143 The reason for monetary uniformity is not unlike
that for hotel room or foodstuff uniformity of the sort that franchise
arrangements in those industries ensure.144 But it also is much more
139

See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45–46 (observing that franchisee
lending of sovereign tender was “risky – both for the banker and for society – because the
elastic currency could be ‘over-stretched,’ issued too far in excess of the metal that
‘backed’ it”); see also Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1149 (stating that “the public
franchisor . . . retains primary responsibility for preventing both under- and over-generation
of credit”).
140
See Rousseuvian Money, supra note 67, at 45–46 (stating that “bank-licensing
requirements and reserve-regulation” appeared at attempts at maintaining through the
financial franchise the uniformity once afforded by sovereign coin issuance).
141
Money's Past, supra note 3, at 4 (observing that, in the early days of the United
States, “the U.S. Mint minted coins [and] the Treasury issued some paper . . . [b]ut paper
money—‘notes’—were issued primarily by private banking institutions until late in the
19th century”).
142
Id. at 4–6 (providing an overview of United States currency issuance from the late
th
18 century through 20th century).
143
Id. at 3 (explaining that “banks are franchisees, while we the sovereign public are
the franchisor and our national money—the dollar, the monetized full faith and credit of the
United States—is the franchised good”).
144
Fast food and hotel franchises emerged and spread through the American economy
at the same time that the interstate highway system developed across the country and newly
affluent Americans began taking road trips and family vacations. However good or bad the
accommodations or foodstuffs might be in the places one visited or re-provisioned at, one
could at least rest assured they were no more undesirable than their counterparts back
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compelling. A well-functioning and fully integrated economy, in both its
productive and its distributive functions, requires a common unit of account
and a common payment medium whose value as measured in that unit is
reasonably insensitive to variations among issuers, users, transaction
locations, and time intervals.145
These are the twin needs that necessitate “account uniformity” of the
kind that I noted above as economies grow in both size and complexity—
the kind that amounts to the keeping of a single ledger or the using of its
functional equivalent, a uniform coin or currency.146 We can think of these
as forms of what I will call spatial and temporal uniformity. The story of the
American republic’s gradual securing of those forms of uniformity for its
money and, through that, its commercial and financial systems, is a story of
long struggle.147 And this is because the story of America’s gradual
attainment of coherent national sovereignty itself is a story of long—and at
times tragically violent—struggle.148
1. Spatial Uniformity: Payments & “Universal Equivalents”
Before federal passage of a sequence of mutually complementary
legal tender, currency, and banking acts in the early 1860s, there was
neither a single national payment ledger nor any national “dollar bill” worth
the name in the United States.149 The circulating medium—the token-form
home. That is the sense in which franchises were ‘quality control’ compacts. Id. (“You can
think of the uniform value and appearance of our currency as being a bit like those identical
sandwiches and golden arches you see all around the country (and world) if you like: They
serve to let everyone know that the item’s the same irrespective of just where you are in
our nation —New York, California; Florida, Alaska . . . . They are always and everywhere
the same: green notes, worth no more and no less that they purport to be worth.”).
145
Rousseuvian Money, supra note 67, at 35, 37 (stating that money “can be thought of
as a claim upon what it’s exchanged for” and by virtue of its stability is “ultimately meant
to make possible more productive activity across time”).
146
Id. at 25, 27–28 (asserting that as a financial system becomes widespread and
complex, the sovereign must “‘formalize’ and ‘regularize’ . . . which obligations shall
‘count’ for purposes of ‘accounting’ and public ‘accountability,’ . . . [and] where to track
and enforce such obligations and their discharge”).
147
See Money's Past, supra note 3, at 4–8 (explaining the history of United States
currency issuance from the late 18th century through 20th century).
148
Jane Kamensky, The American Revolution: A History of Violence, NY TIMES
(May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/books/review/scars-ofindependence-americas-violent-birth-holger-hoock.html (discussing America’s violent
beginning).
149
See id. at 6 (“The banking and currency acts of the 1860s transformed our
interlinked banking, financial, and monetary systems. In very short order there were
federally chartered banks in most states and territories of the Union, all of them subject to
uniform regulatory standards.”).
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substitute for a centralized ledger—took the form primarily of privately
issued bank notes.150 These were effectively paper “claim checks” or
currencies representing claims upon private sector banking institutions.151
The claims they betokened were in theory redeemable in precious metal
specie minted by many different sovereigns or, as time went on, various
forms of primarily but not solely publicly-issued debt.152 Banks for their
part were kept local by the only public authorities then legislatively
authorized to license and regulate them: sub-sovereign U.S. state
governments.153
This arrangement, because it fell short both of a national ledger and
of any uniform national currency that could serve as that ledger’s
circulating functional equivalent, posed two challenges to efficient
transcontinental market integration across the still young United States.154
First, payment in one state out of accounts held in another state was fraught
with uncertainty.155 Differing states regulated banks with differing degrees
of strictness and effectiveness.156 New York and New England, for
example, appear to have been doing quite well by the mid-nineteenth
century, while Nebraska and Michigan did notoriously poorly at that

150

Id. (explaining that before the reforms of the 1860s, “America’s paper money
supply was primarily a plethora of privately issued ‘bank notes’”).
151
Id. (stating that banks’ “notes were their own liabilities – hence liabilities of private
issuers”).
152
See id. (explaining that “differing state willingness or readiness to regulate”
privately issued bank notes “could bring differing values to currencies issued in different
locales”); see also CHARLES A. CONANT, A HISTORY OF MODERN BANKS OF ISSUE, WITH
AN ACCOUNT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISES OF THE PRESENT CENTURY 310-85 (1896);
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 44 (stating that “just as the paper memorialized
promises, so did the metal – it’s just that the paper memorialized private bank promises”).
153
Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 4 (stating that “banks then were chartered and
regulated . . . by states rather than by our federal government”); Rousseauvian Money,
supra note 67, at 46 (explaining that, until the establishment of the Fed and its uniform
currency regulations, currency was backed by local institutions that varied in authority
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
154
An integration, I might add, the need of which grew all the more poignant when the
nation slipped into civil war over precisely the question of how much sovereignty the
federal government was authorized to exercise and how much was “reserved to the states.”
Money's Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that with no national ledger “[t]wo banks
might both promise redeemability of their notes into the same quantum of something more
solid—gold, for example, or U.S. Treasury certificates—but might well be differently able
to live up to their promises.”).
155
Id. (explaining that redeemability of bank notes issued by state-regulated banks
were not reliably redeemable in other jurisdictions).
156
See id. (explaining how the reliability of different banks depended on the individual
state’s regulation).
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time.157 This meant in turn that the practical redeemability, and hence
ultimate reliability, of notes issued by, or of drafts drawn upon accounts
maintained with, banks in one state could appear “iffy” to counterparties
domiciled in other states.158
In effect, every state had its own licensed private purveyors of
private money variously backed, with purveyor reliability varying according
to backer liability and of course charter address.159 This in turn meant that
the dollar, though in theory a national unit of account, could not in practice
serve either as such a unit—there was no centralized national account
amalgamating all citizen accounts—or as a bona fide national currency
substituting for credits and debits on a national account.160 A nominal dollar
note issued by, say, Wyatt Earp Bank in Kansas might circulate at par or
near-par, while another nominal dollar note issued by Jesse James Bank in
Texas might circulate at but 20% of par; that is not good for Kansas-toTexas cross-border transacting.161
The second challenge posed by spatial non-uniformity was the
intrastate counterpart of the interstate challenge just noted. It was that, in
157

See id. (describing how Nebraska and Michigan banks were unreliable because of
the state regulation); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46 (observing that in the early
19th century, “New York and New England banks, for example, were often reliable.
Nebraska or Michigan banks, by contrast, not so much”); CONANT, supra note 134, at 311–
312, 328–329 (commenting on the varying reliability of early banks’ notes); RONALD E.
SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855 149-90
(1982) (providing an overview of early currency stability in the United States).
158
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3 (“Two banks might both promise
redeemability of their notes into the same quantum of something solid—gold, for example,
or U.S. Treasury certificates—but might well be differently able to live up to their
promises. Some might be sound, other might be less so. Some might be sound this year but
not so much next year.”).
159
Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 3 (stating that banks’ reliability differed on states’
charters); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 40 (“In doing so, banks decide whose
private promissory notes will be temporarily tradeable for public promissory notes. They
thereby assist our Fed, and hence ‘us,’ in temporarily transforming private money into
public money—purely horizontal claims into vertical or vertically-enhanced horizontal
claims.”).
160
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing that bank notes fluctuated in value.
“Needless to say, private banknote money did not make for an optimal payments system. It
was good that the nation had a unit of account—the dollar—but unfortunately it still lacked
a widely usable national currency.”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 23-24 (using
hypothetical to explain single, unified ledger necessary for creation of functioning unit).
161
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3-4 (“The upshot of this ‘Banking Babel’ was that
the nation’s currency supply largely consisted of hundreds or thousands of distinct bank
notes all trading at various discounts to stated par. A dollar note issued by Bill the Kid
Bank or Sidewinder Bank might trade at 50% of par, for example, amount to no more than
‘four bits,’ not a dollar. A dollar note issued by Wyatt Erp Bank or Bald Eagle Bank might,
by contrast, go for 90% of par, or even full par.”).
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states where bank chartering and regulation were lax, currencies could vary
in value relative to one another even within states.162 Wildcat Bank’s dollar
might trade at twelve cents up in Omaha, while Eagle Bank’s dollar might
trade at par in the same general vicinity. This patchwork form of reliability
found reflection in merchants’ having to maintain periodically updated
discount schedules for locally used currencies, advising for how many cents
on the dollar to count various private bank currencies when these were
offered in payment for goods or services.163 That too, of course, operated as
an impediment to (intrastate) transaction activity—an impediment more
pervasive than that to what was then still only nascent interstate
commerce.164
In many ways, this “wildcat” era in banking—called “free banking”
by its advocates during the rare intervals that it was not in crisis—
confronted market participants with a bewildering array of wildly
fluctuating payment media reminiscent of that which confronts those who
use newly issued privately issued crypto-currencies today.165 I will have
more to say on that later when I propose, in Part IV, a publicly administered
Democratic Digital Dollar associated with my proposed system of Citizen
and Resident Wallets. For present purposes, what matters is what ultimately
emerged as the nineteenth century’s imperfect paper currency substitute for
my proposal, which latter simply brings the former into the twenty-first
century.
I allude to the institution, through the Legal Tender Act of 1862,166
the National Currency Act of 1863,167 and the National Banking Act of
1864,168 of a nationwide network of federally chartered National Banks,
located all over the nation, all subject to the same regulatory standards and
all issuing notes convertible into the very same Treasury-issued currency—

162

Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that notes fluctuated in value in every
store); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 24 (explaining that regulations are needed
for uniformity and stability).
163
Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 4 (“Shopkeepers and tradesmen in consequence
had to maintain regularly updated discount schedules behind their counters, instructing
clerks how much to discount different banks’ notes in determining ‘how much’ (of what) to
charge buyers for goods or for services.”).
164
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (determining that transactions could take
significantly long given the various calculations and valuations of notes).
165
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“We are amidst, that is to say, digital currency’s
‘wildcat’ era. For one thing, there are many such currencies—indeed, a bewildering and
seemingly all-the-time growing array of them.”).
166
Legal Tender Act of 1862, ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532 (1862).
167
National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 85, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
168
National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
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tellingly called then “the Greenback.”169 This was effectively the birth of
the dollar as we now know it—a centrally issued and universally employed
money that is not only a unit of account, but also a bona fide payment
medium circulating throughout the entire republic.170 It was a centralized
ledger-substitute,171 a uniform currency whose nationwide uniformity in
effect substituted for the “centrality” of a centralized national ledger that at
the time was not technologically feasible but now is in the way that Parts IV
through VI below will elaborate.172
The new 1860s regime marked the commencement of the American
republic’s rendition of the full finance franchise described above.173 It
delegated quality control duties to a newly established federal
instrumentality whose name becomes comprehensible against the backdrop
just narrated; I refer to the OCC.174 It is instructive that this agency,
contemporarily described simply as a bank regulator, was originally a
currency regulator.175 The Comptroller, whose name derives suggestively
from an archaic English word for controller, was essentially the agent
through whom our finance franchisor, the sovereign public, “controlled”—
that is, maintained the quality of—that which it franchised, the dollar.176
Of course, this involved maintaining what we have ever since called
the “safety and soundness” (believe it or not, that is a term of art) of the
169

Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that notes were converted into
Treasury-issued currencies called Greenbacks after legislation); Rousseauvian Money,
supra note 67, at 44 (stating that Greenbacks were seen as uniformed currency); CONANT,
supra note 134, at 345-46 (stating that after Federal regulations notes were replaced with
bills of credit). Since the drafting of this Part in late 2017, this author’s friends Lev Menand
and Morgan Ricks have conducted further legislative-historical research that appears to
corroborate my account in every detail. See Morgan Ricks & Lev Menand, Federal
Corporate Law and the Business of Banking (2020) (working paper, on file with the
author).
170
CONANT, supra note 134, at 344 (explaining need for every dollar to be in
circulation on the credit of the Fed).
171
Rousseavian Money, supra note 67, at 24 (using analogy to highlight usefulness of
a shared ledger).
172
Rousseavian Money, supra note 67, at 30 (describing Federal notes as uniformed
currency); CONANT, supra note 134, at 344 (describing necessity of uniformity on equal
value).
173
Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 4 (outlining various acts of 1860s and explaining
how financial landscape changed).
174
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 5 (describing OCC’s job).
175
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 5 (outlining history of OCC).
176
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 5 (“The name is telling because ‘comptroller’ is
merely archaic English for ‘controller.’ The OCC, housed in Treasury, was effectively the
‘controller’—the administrator—of our national currency system.”). see also Rousseauvian
Money, supra note 67, at 45 (“One could, in other words, ‘over-promise’ by issuing too
many promissory notes, which would undercut the value of promise and promissory note
alike.”).
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franchisee institutions—the banks.177 But the primary reason for federally
maintaining that safety and soundness was precisely the fact that, as
distributors of that public good which is the public’s currency, these
institutions were in effect privately owned public utilities.178 They were
accordingly locked into partnership with the designated agent of the public
itself—its Currency Controller.179
The banking and currency reforms of the 1860s comprehensively
transformed the United States’ interlinked banking, financial, and monetary
systems.180 In very short order there were federally chartered banks in most
states and territories of the Union, all of them subject to uniform regulatory
standards—including that every $100 in notes be backed by $111 in U.S.
sovereign securities—and all of them issuing, accordingly, a de facto
uniform national currency with a uniform value.181 These banks also sold
U.S. Treasury securities, effectively making them a system of outlets for the
issuance of both of our federal government’s principal circulating liabilities
177

“Safety and soundness” is a ubiquitous banking law term of art, used by legislators
and all U.S. bank regulators to designate a sort of regulatory touchstone by reference to
which banks are to be supervised. See Making Sense of the Federal Reserve: “Safety and
Soundness,” FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Oct. 15, 2019, 5:45 PM),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/in-plain-english/safety-and-soundness [https://perma.cc/DXN4K2GF].
178
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (describing current money system as “publicprivate franchise system.”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 39 (explaining that
when one borrows money, they transform “private money into public money” and
effectively exchange “your . . . promissory obligations” for “our promissory obligations.”);
Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1151 (“Private parties essentially borrow from or
invest in one another, and one can only invest or borrow what is “already there” in
previously accumulated, privately-owned form.”).
179
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (describing our system as ‘outsourcing’ “creditchecking and public money-dispensary functions to private institutions.”); Rousseauvian
Money, supra note 67, at 40 (“One way of thinking of ‘private’ (yet always publicly
licensed) banking and other financial institutions against this backdrop, as noted earlier, is
as ‘outsourced’ credit-checking offices of the Fed and, in consequence, of Us (our joint
political ‘we,’ our ‘We, the People’)—all Americans in their capacities as citizens of one
shared republic (one res publica, or public thing), whose central bank the Fed is.”).
180
Richard Sylla, The U.S. Banking System: Origin, Development, and Regulation,
THE GILDER LEHRMAN INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN HISTORY (last visited Nov. 1, 2019),
https://ap.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/economics/essays/us-banking-system-origindevelopment-and-regulation (discussing the changes in American banking from 1781 to the
present).
181
See BENNETT MCCALLUM, MONETARY ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 318
(1989) (“The mechanism was simple: national banks were required to hold $111.11 worth
of government bonds for each $100 of bank notes issued”); BORIS P. PESEK & THOMAS R.
SAVING, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MONEY AND BANKING 397 (1968) (“For each $100 of bank
notes produced, the national bank had to deposit with the U.S. Treasurer “eligible” U.S.
bonds promising repayment of $111”).
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at the time—Greenbacks and T-Bills.182 In very little time, “wildcat”
banknotes lost value and drained out of circulation.183
2. Temporal Uniformity: “Sound Money” & “Elastic Currency”
The foregoing paragraphs implicate two of money’s oft-noted
functions—its serving both as a “unit of account” and as a “medium of
exchange.”184 The other role typically observed to be played by money—its
function as a “store of value”—is what lay behind our polity’s later
replacement of the Comptroller as money-modulator by a new central bank,
the Fed.185
Key to maintaining a currency’s stable value over time—that is, to
preventing inordinate inflation and deflation—is the capacity to fine-tune
and regularly readjust the supply of that currency as transaction volume in
the “real” economy grows, shrinks, or fluctuates.186 The currency must, in
the words I used earlier, be elastic and modulatable.187 Its supply must be
adjustable (a) to accommodate, while not over-accommodating, transaction
and credit demand, and (b) to counteract sudden and destabilizing credit
expansions or contractions.188

182

See MCCALLUM, supra note 163, at 318-319 (discussing the issuance of greenbacks
and T-Bills).
183
PESEK & SAVING, supra note 163, at 391-95 (illustrating the change from
‘Greenbacks’ to the ‘Gold Standard’); Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 6 (“In very little
time, ‘wildcat’ banknotes drained out of circulation”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67,
at 19 (discussing liabilities and assets).
184
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 23 (“Our ‘chore money’ now will be
transparently functioning not only as a ‘medium of exchange’ usable in ‘settling [chore]
accounts,’ and not only as a ‘unit of account’ used in keeping such accounts, but also . . .
.”).
185
Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 7 (“The Federal Reserve Act (‘FRA’) of 1913
established the Fed that we all know today, and transferred de facto and de jure
administration of the national money supply from the Comptroller to this new entity”);
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 35 (“The ‘value’ component of money as ‘store of
value’ stems from money’s status as a claim . . . .”).
186
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (summarizing what an elastic currency is intended
to do); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45-46 (discussing the danger of
oversupplying currency into the market).
187
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“A money whose supply can be ‘modulated’ in
this way, as I call it, is essential if we’re to avoid needlessly disrupting either transaction
activity, investment activity, or currency value”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at
45 (expounding on the importance of an ‘elastic’ currency).
188
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“An elastic currency is a currency whose supply
can be adjusted (a) to accommodate, while not over-accommodating, transaction and credit
demand, and (b) to counteract sudden credit expansions or contractions”).
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The idea is to maintain just enough credit-money supply to
accommodate desired transaction volumes and enable
productive investment, so as not needlessly to squelch either,
while at the same time preventing over-issuance of the sort
that can spark inflation—the classic problem of ‘too much
money’ chasing ‘too few goods.’ A money whose supply can
be ‘modulated’ in this way . . . is essential if we’re to avoid
needlessly disrupting either transaction activity, investment
activity, or currency value. And that is to say it’s essential [if
people would maintain smooth, steady growth of their
national wealth and productive capacity.189
This is why, as noted above, polities in the early modern era tolerated
metal-smiths’ and then bankers’ issuances of what came to be widely
spendable “claim checks” in excess of their sovereign-issued metal coin
stores.190 It is also why they regulated them carefully; regulation was as
much about monetary control—what I call “money modulation”—as it was
about consumer protection.191 But the American republic, founded partly by
landed aristocrats who were suspicious of centralized political governance
and centralized banking alike, had to rediscover for itself the dependence of
money’s temporal uniformity upon public money modulation.192
The OCC in particular and Treasury more generally
were not well equipped, operationally or transactiontechnologically speaking, to engage in the daily moneymodulatory task that maintaining a value-retentive elastic
currency requires—particularly not so long as state-chartered
banks now offering checkable deposits in lieu of private
banknotes continued to operate alongside the new national
banking system.193
189

Id.
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45 (explaining how bankers began issuing
more notes than they had metal).
191
See id. (discussing metal and regulation).
192
See Public Actors, supra note 17, at 117 (“This political side of the government,
however, is also the perennial source of suspicion that accompanies state participation in
economic activity”); Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 10, at 113 (“Second is an attendant
suspicion of large aggregations of financial capital . . . .”). See also Materializing
Citizenship, supra note 10, at 2075 (discussing suspicion of large aggregating entities).
193
Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 7. See also Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at
45 (discussing elasticity of currency); CONANT, supra note 134, at 20 (explaining the need
for elasticity); SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 150-67 (discussing the development of the free
banking system).
190
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The Second Bank of the U.S. from 1816 to 1836 on the one hand,
and the central banks familiar to the rest of the world since the late 17th
century, on the other hand, had shown the means of performing that
function.194 In serving as “banks to other banks,” they had developed
methods by which publicly to modulate private bank currency-issuance in
ever more finely tuned and sophisticated ways, including a “public marketactor” role.195 In a similar but unavoidably less complete manner, clearing
house arrangements among U.S. private sector banks had developed means
of at least partly buffering note-issuing private sector banks against periodic
liquidity shocks.196
The U.S. thus patterned its own version of a central bank partly on
its own earlier Banks of the U.S., partly on European models, and partly on
these clearinghouse arrangements. This it did with the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913, which like the banking acts of the 1860s was proximately
occasioned by a crisis—this time the market panic of 1907.197
The Federal Reserve Act, especially as supplemented by further
legislation during the New Deal, established the Fed that we all know today,
and transferred de facto and de jure administration of the national money
supply from the Comptroller to the new instrumentality.198 Yesterday’s
“Greenback” Treasury notes became today’s green “Federal Reserve Notes”
[(Fed Notes)].199 That means that while we are still using “bank notes” of a
194

Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“The Second Bank of the U.S. from 1816 to 1836,
and especially central banks of the kind found all over the ‘developed’ world circa 1913, by
contrast, had shown themselves well suited to the task.”); RICHARD TIMBERLAKE, MONEY,
BANKING, AND CENTRAL BANKING 163-71 (1965) (discussing the development of the
Second Bank of the US, which was chartered in 1816).
195
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“By acting as ‘banks to the banks,’ these
institutions were able to modulate private bank money-issuance in ever more ‘fine-tuned’
manners, using ‘carrots’ as effectively as ‘sticks’”); Public Actors, supra note 4, at 158
(characterizing a public market-actor); Governments as Market Actors, supra note 29, at 55
(“We call the underappreciated governmental role that we have in mind here the "market
actor" role”).
196
EUGENE N. WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING
SYSTEM, 1900-1929, 63-74 (1983) (discussing the development and impact of the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913); Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining how New York and
New England banks were reliable); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46
(highlighting how the United States Fed followed actions taken by the Bank of England).
197
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“Like the banking acts of the 1860s, this change
too was proximately occasioned by a crisis – in this case, the panic of 1907”).
198
Id. (“The Federal Reserve Act (“FRA”) of 1913 established the Fed that we all
know today, and transferred de facto and de jure administration of the national money
supply from the Comptroller to this new entity.”).
199
Id. (“This is why the ‘Greenbacks’ you now find in your pocket call themselves, not
‘Treasury Notes’, but ‘Federal Reserve Notes’.”).
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sort as currency much as we did in the 19th century, the notes in question are
now public bank notes—“central” bank notes—rather than private bank
notes.200 We might even call them Citizen Notes, or claim-check
equivalents of dollar-denominated credits in incipient Citizen Wallets
tracked on an implicit or incipient Fed-administered Citizens’ Ledger.201
They are issued and spent in the name of us all.202 And so we now have a
publicly franchised good—a sovereign currency—that is more or less
uniform not only across space, but also across time, as the Fed engages in
daily monetary operations aimed at preventing inflation and deflation
alike.203
It bears repeating that what is true of Federal Reserve Notes in this
connection is true of credit extended in Fed Note denominated increments
too.204 The loan that a private sector bank or other Fed-accommodated
financial institution makes in the form of a newly opened or credited
deposit is made in the form of dollar-denominated drawing or spending
rights—credits, or “assets.” By accounting convention, these correspond to
counterpart dollar-denominated bank debits, or “liabilities.”205 Since our
Fed-administered payments system recognizes payments made out of these
deposits as settling transactions, dollar increments of these bank liabilities
are functional equivalents of dollar bills.206
Once we appreciate this, and once we remind ourselves both that
those dollar bills are Fed Notes and that one gives the bank a signed
promissory note for one’s loan, we are able to see something else in
addition: a loan is simply a temporary swap of a citizen’s promissory note
for Fed promissory notes—of one’s privately issued money for more widely
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Id. (“It is just that they are public bank notes – ‘central’ bank notes – rather than
private bank notes now.”).
201
Id. (“They are Citizen Notes, you might say.”).
202
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“They are issued and spent in the name of us
all.”).
203
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 37 (observing that financial institutions
enable “more exchange to take place across space by enabling exchange across time”).
204
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (“And what is true of Federal Reserve Notes here
is true of bank credit extended in Fed Note – that is, dollar – increments too.”).
205
Id. (“The loan the bank makes to you in the form of a newly opened or credited
deposit it ‘makes’ in the form of dollar-denominated withdrawal or spending rights.”).
206
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (“The deposits, in other words, are functional
equivalents of dollar bills.”). What makes this possible, again, is that a bank-issued card
that you swipe in a machine at a retail outlet hooked up to the Fed-administered payments
system “counts” as a payment and accordingly both debits your account and credits the
retail outlet’s. Were I, who am not licensed as a bank, to issue you an identical card,
nothing would happen other than that I would be arrested for fraud our counterfeiting.
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spendable publicly issued money.207 This is the contemporary form taken by
what I labeled above “vertical” tokens coming to function as “horizontal”
tokens. Modern bank lending is in this sense just temporary private-public
currency swapping.208 That is how things have long been in Europe and, for
less long, in the rest of the world as well.209 The reasons are found in the
tale just told.210
But why do we still operate in this way? Why do we still franchise
finance and in effect outsource much of our payment infrastructure’s
provision to the private sector institutions whose managed accounts we use
as its pillars? Must we continue to do so? Why not make publicly issued
money elastic and modulatable, not by supplementing it with dollardenominated bank-ledger credit-money, as we now do, but with Fed- or
Treasury-ledger money—Public Ledger money, as we will be able very
soon to do? 211
As it happens, there once were good functional reasons for
incremental resort to public-private franchising where our republic’s
financial and commercial infrastructures were concerned—reasons rooted in
the American polity’s incomplete sovereignty during its first hundred years,
give or take.212 But those reasons have by and large long since receded, as I
will now indicate. This means our civilization’s long detour in the realm of
ledger-substitute coin and currency can end. It means that a full publicly
administered citizens’ ledger and associated Digital Dollar are now possible
and indeed easily instituted, as I shall demonstrate.
207

Id. (“Once you realize this, and once you remind yourself both that those dollars are
Fed ‘Notes’ and that you give the bank a signed promissory note for your loan, you are
able to see something else too: This is that a loan is simply a temporary swap of your
promissory note for Fed promissory notes—of your privately issued money for more
widely spendable publicly issued money.”). This point is emphasized, and its significance
more fully elaborated, in Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 39-40 (“When you
borrow money, then—which you often do in this country by handing a bank your own
promissory note in exchange for Fed promissory notes (or their depository or cashier’s
check equivalents)—you just temporarily trade your own notes for Fed notes. It’s just a
temporary swap.”).
208
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (“Bank lending is just temporary private-public
currency swapping.”).
209
See e.g., CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING
OF CAPITALISM 295-329 (2014) (discussing the history of currency in England and its
origins in the 17th century).
210
See generally id. (tracing the history of currency and the reasons for its
development).
211
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing the potential adoption of a Fed-issued
digital currency & the subsequent feasibility of a Fed-administered central banking lender).
212
CONANT, supra note 134, at 311 (“A new country, poor in specie and in loanable
capital, is almost forced by the necessities of her situation to adopt monetary devices which
would not be tolerated under better conditions.”).
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III. HYBRID FINANCE: WHY WE RETAIN IT— AND WHY WE NEED NOT
I have now elaborated both why a geographically and temporally
uniform, elastic currency was necessary when consolidated nationwide
ledger-accounting was not yet feasible and why it was all but inevitable that
our sovereign republic would ultimately issue it.213 In this sense my account
embeds a teleology. It tells a tale of steady development and improvement
through a course of alternating improvisation and consolidation—a tale that,
I argue below, will almost certainly be replicated in the space of digital
payments technology and associated digital currency. There should be, and
will be, a Fed- or Treasury-administered Digital Dollar affording the same
spatial and temporal uniformity that previously Treasury-administered and
now Fed-administered “green paper” dollars afford at present.214
Matters are different when we turn from monetary uniformity and
elasticity to monetary and financial hybridity. While the first two seem to be
ultimately necessary in all times and places, and in this sense essential to
commercial and financial optimization themselves, the third is historically
contingent, a product of political and technological under-development and
associated ideological inertia.215 And here the best explanation of what has
been recommends change in what soon shall be. The story is still
teleological, to be sure, but now the story of money’s returning to being
fully public figures as simply the penultimate chapter in the story of
finance’s returning to being fully public—in the form of a consolidated
public ledger. We can see why when we ask ourselves what accounts for
hybridity in the first place, then ask whether that which accounts for it
continues to necessitate it.
A. Why We Retain It: New Facts, Old Thoughts
Why did we first take to franchising money and finance? Why do
we still do so now? Why does our sovereign republic still outsource the
allocation of its resource—its monetized full faith and credit—and privatize
the seigniorage rents earned on its rental?
In light of the foregoing discussion, it will not be surprising that I
think the best explanation stems from popular assumptions that once were
well founded in political and technological “facts on the ground,” but which

213

Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 26-27 (discussing the modern societal trend
of centralizing and formalizing currency arrangement).
214
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10-11 (concluding that a Fed-issued digital currency
would be “more effective, saving-friendly and consumer-friendly” than the current system).
215
Id. at 4 (discussing the historical necessity of U.S bank franchising).
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have long since receded.216 Since the receding of those facts, popular beliefs
have not yet been updated, and it is part of the purpose of this article to
instigate just that updating.
The two most foundational popular assumptions to which I allude
are that investable capital—a.k.a. “finance capital”—is both inherently
scarce and unavoidably privately supplied.217 These two assumptions
underwrite a third which stems also from other assumptions—namely that
capital allocation decisions are most justly and efficiently made in the
private sector, with the public sector playing at most a supportive and
modulatory role in respect of credit aggregates so as to smoothen “the
business cycle.”218 These assumptions all jointly underwrite the picture that
I call the “intermediated scarce private capital myth.”219
Investable capital, probably not accidentally, seems to figure almost
like precious metal money in the intermediated scarce private capital
picture. It is as if the publicly issued coins discussed above were both (a)
not multiplied by paper currency, bank credits, or other tokens, and (b) not
issued by republics or other sovereigns at all. There seems to be assumed, in
other words, a finite and determinate quantity of metal money capital at any
one time in the intermediated scarce private capital picture, and most if not
all of it is viewed as rightfully owned and hence lent by domestic or foreign
persons in the private sector.220 When you think about money in this way, it
is easy then also to think that “intermediaries” can only “lend out” what

216

Id. at 5 (“It is at best a holdover from earlier times: times when currencies were
pegged to exogenously given stocks of precious metals, finance was indeed by and large
privately supplied, and capital – at least liquid capital – was indeed scarce.”).
217
Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1145-46 (“An unspoken assumption behind
the orthodox picture of finance is that a certain defined quantum of unavoidably scarce
finance capital first accumulates in private hands, after which financial intermediaries
facilitate flows of the privately owned funds toward other private (and some public)
actors.”); Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 4-5 (“The dominant intermediated
scarce private capital view of finance is, then, a myth.”).
218
Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1211 (“It is simply assumed that efficient
“one-to-one” financial intermediation naturally results in the right quantities from capital
flowing to the right economic actors.”).
219
See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 4-5 (arguing that financial
institutions do indeed intermediate, capital is not actually “scarce”); Finance Franchise,
supra note 14, at 1218 (claiming that the “the financial system operates essentially as a
franchise arrangement in which the public is the franchisor, while the private institutions
that dispense its full faith and credit are effectively its franchisees); see also Rousseauvian
Money, supra note 67, at 33-34 (explaining misconceptions of the government’s role in
managing markets).
220
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67 (claiming that financial intermediation
theories “conflate[-] an indefinitely extensible resource—finance capital—with a
(momentarily) scarce resource – physical capital”).
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they antecedently “take in,” and that those who supply what is lent are thus
both entitled and best suited to directing it.
The “sanctity of property” and “common sense about incentives”
alike, the intermediated scarce private capital story accordingly continues,
recommend leaving investment decisions to those who own and provide the
putatively scarce money capital.221 These rentiers have every right to charge
rents and every reason to do their homework and lend their money out
cautiously only to those who will put it to productive use, using the
temporary claims to productive resources that lent money affords them to
add to the stock of society’s wealth over time, pay back their lenders, and
pocket rich profits while at it.222
Et voila, the miracle of “finance and development”—a tale told
often in textbooks, journal articles, white papers, and speeches all valorizing
the role of “financial liberalization” in fueling economic growth miracles.223
The public sector typically is admitted into this picture at best as an
afterthought, or as a necessary evil.224 The story begins with the need to
standardize the monetary units into which precious metal capital, already
used as a private money-form thanks to its putatively “intrinsic” value, is to
be parceled.225 (Money as a unit of account, as noted above.)
Standardization is an orthodox public good, the solution to a coordination
problem. So is enforcement of standards. So the public can be permitted
these roles, hence the role of a franchisor in the standard-maintenance,
quality-control sense of the word.226
The story might then reach, if narrated by people cognizant of the
need for a currency that is not only spatially uniform but also temporally
uniform (again, “elastic”), the need also to standardize paper
representations of precious metal coins once it is recognized that wealth
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See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 4-5 (debunking the intermediated
scarce private capital myth).
222
See id. at 5 (“[Intermediated scarce private capital view] is a myth whose
widespread acceptance is no doubt convenient for certain rentier interests in contemporary
‘financialized’ societies, but is a myth nonetheless.”).
223
See id. at 4 (explaining the intermediated scarce private capital “view is routinely
stated in treatises, textbooks, learned journals, and the popular media.”).
224
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 41-42 (explaining early development of
standardized monetary systems and the need for currency uniformity in commerce);
Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1170-73 (explaining the essential role of government
in regulation in fostering a stable economic environment).
225
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 44-45 (discussing the origins and
history of metal capital as backing for paper currency).
226
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the consistent standards across
franchisors).
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expansion is outstripping metal money supply expansion.227 Such
imbalances are addressed, the story will continue, with adoption of an
elastic currency that can be issued in excess of the metals that “back” it, so
long as the currency volume isn’t allowed to become too great a multiple of
the metal reserve.228 (Money as an elastically expansible means of exchange
and a reliable store of value, again as noted above.)
In both cases the public is grudgingly seen as provider of an
orthodox public good that it is suited to providing—standard-setting and
enforcement—while private sector agents are viewed as still acting as
ultimate providers of the “monetary base,” hence the “real capital,” and thus
as the proper deciders as to that capital’s disposition or allocation.229 Here is
the kernel of the franchise arrangement to which I have referred, as it would
be described by our still-ubiquitous purveyors of the intermediated scarce
private capital myth.
What escapes notice in this picture, however, is that (a) what is
monetary about the metal coin base is the stamp of the coin, not the metal in
the coin;230 and (b) that once the money supply comes significantly to
outstrip the coin supply, the putative “base money” does no real work any
longer.231 It grows ever more vestigial as real wealth and its monetary
representation—the full money supply—grow ever larger in relation to it.
The real monetary work is thus done by the multiplier from putative “base”
to full money supply, and that means that this work is done by the decider
of the multiplier—that is, the public, which sets and enforces required
reserve ratios in the first place.232
In effect, then, the moment we move from putatively private moneys
used among some people to public-private franchise money used among all
people is the moment we move to the prospect of cutting out private
moneys, and with them private payment platforms and private finance,
altogether.233 For it is the moment we recognize money’s ineluctably public,
227

Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 47-48 (describing how inflation results
from printing more money without having additional backing for it).
228
Id. at 45 (explaining the risk that “elastic currency could be ‘over-stretched,’ issued
too far in excess of the metal that ‘backed’ it”).
229
Id. at 45-46 (tracing the historical risks of unregulated private banks over-stretching
their currency leading to the development of national standards and bank regulations).
230
Id. at 44 and 51 (explaining that the stamp on the precious metal coin gave it
recognition and value as currency; “currency and coin are not money, they represent
money”).
231
Id. at 46 (discussing the move from the metallic constraints of issuing notes to
“credit-money”).
232
Id. at 45-47 (describing the loss of the metallic constraints).
233
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 40 (“For in effect private banking
institutions are simply distributing that public resource which is the monetized full faith
and credit of the United States, earning privatized seignorage for doing the credit checks
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and hence ineluctably “fiat,” character.234 Now that we know it is possible,
all that remains is to decide whether it is desirable. In other words, now that
we know assumptions (a) and (b) above to be false and (c) therefore to be
weakened, should we bring money and finance back “in house” and stop
franchising it out to privately run institutions?
B. Why We Need Not: New Facts, New Prospects
I believe that the answer to that question is now largely, if not in fact
wholly, “yes.” My reasons stem partly from changes in those facts on the
ground that I alluded to before in accounting for assumptions (a) through (c)
of the intermediated scarce private capital myth. I’ll explain this first before
turning to additional reasons that I believe militate in favor of bringing
money, payment, and finance back in-house for the public that is our
republic.
During the first century of the American republic, metal coin money
was still, by tradition, the preferred form.235 And specie was indeed scarce,
especially in North America.236 In this sense there was indeed capital
scarcity.237 This meant, ironically, both that non-metal expedients grew
urgently necessary quite early on in our nation’s history once economic
while being publicly licensed to play this role only so long as they maintain the ‘quality
standards’ we demand through our franchisor Fed and its co-regulators.”).
234
Id. at 46-48 (discussing the history of gold currency and sovereign backing of the
same).
235
A History of American Currency, AMERICAN NUMISMATIC SOCIETY (last visited
Nov. 1, 2019) (discussing the evolution of currency in the United States).
236
See CONANT, supra note 134, at 311 (“A new country, poor in specie and in
loanable capital, is almost forced by the necessities of her situation to adopt monetary
devices which would not be tolerated under better conditions.”); SEAVOY, supra note 139,
at 154 (describing banking policy in the early 1830’s as responsive in part to the scarcity of
specie at several distinct financial crises).
237
Id. (describing banking regulations regulating the denominations of paper bills to be
circulated in response to the shortages of coins). Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s
fiscal and banking plans were all about simultaneously addressing this scarcity and the
incomplete centralization and sovereignty that perpetuated it. See, e.g., Public Actors,
supra note 17, at 109-111 (introducing Hamilton’s banking policy ideas designed to
introduce capital into American markets and centralize sovereign financial regulation);
Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 10; Materializing Citizenship, supra note 10, at 2077-79
(describing the decentralized early-American financial landscape preferred by the
government at the time, to which Hamilton’s banking plans responded); Jeffersonian
Republic, supra note 29 (describing the “Hamiltonian spirit” of developments in American
financial policy encouraging access to capital and diversified sources of wealth amidst a
backdrop of a decentralized, agrarian early economy); see also Robert C. Hockett, When
All Enterprise Was ‘Social,’ in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW
(Benjamin Means & Joseph Yockey eds., Cambridge University Press 2019) (referencing
the “free banking” period of American financial history that lasted from 1836-1863).
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growth had got underway, and that hastily adopted non-metal money
expedients came often to grief in those early days, ironically reinforcing
beliefs that metal moneys were somehow inherently more “sound” (another
term of art)238
Just as its supply of reliable money had difficulty keeping up with
its economic growth, moreover, so did our new republic’s governance
structures at first have difficulty keeping up with its geographic and
populational growth.239 It proved as difficult to integrate the nation
politically and administratively as it was to integrate the nation
monetarily.240 Indeed, the latter difficulty, in large measure, both stemmed
from and reinforced the former difficulty in ways noted above. Incomplete
sovereignty and incompletely sovereign money were mutually
exacerbating.241
Partly this was a matter of antecedent political ideation and attitude
—southern plantation owners’ suspicions of centralized federal government
and centralized finance continued to hold sway in the years that culminated
in the Civil War.242 Partly it was also a matter of consequent incapacity’s—
“imbecility’s,” as our Constitution’s co-drafter and first Treasury Secretary
Hamilton called it—seeming to validate those suspicions in self-fulfillingly
prophetic fashion.243 And partly it was a matter of communications
infrastructure, fiscal infrastructure, and other technical determinants of
governmental capacity’s still being underdeveloped in the early decades of
the American republic.244 A federal government without deep reach or a
238

See CONANT, supra note 134, at 286, 291, 346, 356 (discussing the early moneyprinting policies of the banks of several early states and the abrupt and adverse regulatory
reactions to the influx of new capital therein and the American public’s general trust in a
metallic currency standard); SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 154 (describing a collective
national “panic” due to the shortage of metal currency and its replacement with paper
currency).
239
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 25 (“When populations grow larger and
asset/liability relations grow more far-flung and complex, however, things must be
‘formalized’ and ‘regularized.’”).
240
See Sylla, supra note 162 (discussing the history of American banking).
241
See generally CONANT, supra note 134 (arguing the decentralized political structure
of the early United States served as an impediment to effective centralized banking and
financial policy).
242
Id. at 345 (comparing the state banks of northern, midwestern, and southern states).
243
See Public Actors, supra note 4, at 109 (contrasting Hamilton’s notion of the
“imbecilic” agrarian economy with his notion of the “energetic” economy, built on
technical prowess and a “well-developed system of finance”).
244
Id. at 108-114 (detailing how the early policies of Alexander Hamilton addressed
structural perceived weaknesses in the American economy to create the idea of centralized
finance as we know it in America); see generally CONANT, supra note 134 (arguing that the
agrarian, decentralized nature of early American society created myriad challenges to
creating an effective, centralized financial system).
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widely used currency of its own could take but a minimal role in the
allocation of finance capital throughout its own territorial jurisdiction.245
The upshot was a system of commerce and finance in which
inherently imperfect private ordering was bound to play a key role until
such time as the nation’s sovereignty and capacity both fiscally and
physically to act as a sovereign, in respect of both money and beyond, had
fully coalesced.246 The divided sovereignty of the pre-Civil War era,
pursuant to which the states ironically were constitutionally barred from
issuing currencies even as they retained sufficient powers to prevent the
federal government from doing so and the sole power to charter banking
institutions, was effectively incomplete sovereignty.247 And incomplete
sovereignty meant incomplete money and incomplete commerce and
finance.248
Once both national and monetary sovereignty finally were settled by
the non-accidentally concurrent Civil War and banking-cum-currency
reforms of the 1860s, however, our republic’s monetary and financial
system moved into its present hybrid state.249 The public sector grew
steadily better able, through practice and time, to handle the moneymodulatory task.250 Establishment of the Fed—our present day public sector
money-issuer and money-modulator—in 1913 marked our republic’s
monetary coming of age, and it took very little time from then on for the
new institution to begin in effect calling the shots even in the putatively
private sector money and financial markets.
As early as the 1920s, foreign central bankers were noting how Fed
open market operations had become the primary determinants, not only of

245

See CONANT, supra note 134, at 311 (positing that the United States government
was severely restricted in its early years because of its lack of centralized currency and
capital).
246
Id. at 310-335 (describing the proliferation of small banks in early decades of the
American Republic, which had four systems of note, and the diversity of their charters and
loaning practices).
247
A History of American Currency, supra note 220 (“With the adoption of the
Constitution, monetary production was redefined and restricted as a national prerogative. . .
. Although the actual states were constitutionally forbidden to issue their own money,
hundreds of private firms circumvented the law by producing what became generally
known as “broken-bank notes.”).
248
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 14-15 (arguing that money, in any form
of ‘commercial exchange’ is necessary for any political or social entity to exist).
249
See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1147 (characterizing the U.S. financial
system in two forms where the first form “comprises directly-issued public liabilities,” and
the second form comprises “publicly accommodated and monetized private liabilities”).
250
See FELIKS MLYNARSKI, GOLD AND CENTRAL BANKS 33-34 (1928) (demonstrating
the steady increase of gold reserves and deposits during the 1920s in America).

1-June-18]

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

49

the American, but indeed also of the global money supply.251 Our republic
also developed considerable facility with the allocative task complementing
the modulatory task.252 This began partly with the institution of overtly
allocative regional Federal Reserve Banks as part of the Federal Reserve
System itself, charged with discounting productive project associated
business paper in manners I shall advocate resuming below.253 It was then
furthered by the operations of the twinned War Industries Board (WIB) and
War Finance Corporation (WFC), established in 1918 to mobilize and
channel investment capital toward war-related production following U.S.
entry into the First World War—a cluster of necessarily coordinated tasks
that classic collective action challenges would have rendered privately
ordered financial markets incapable of performing.254 Federal involvement
in finance allocation then grew even more impressively during the New
Deal through the WFC’s successor, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC), supplemented ten years later by a WIB-inspired War Production
Board (WPB)—a model on which I have partly drawn elsewhere and will
draw on again, in a critically modified fashion, below.255
The RFC in effect made amends for earlier switch-sleeping by the
public member of our finance franchise, which had effectively fueled
financial explosion in the 1920s and meltdown in 1929 by not taking the
tiller during the bubble-inflating “Roaring ‘20s.”256 During its twenty years
of operation, the RFC was by far the world’s largest financial institution,
with a portfolio dwarfing those of all private financial institutions

251

Id. at 52-70 (discussing effects of open market operations).
See generally Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; and National
Investment Authority, supra note 17, at 458 (discussing the ways in which “dedicated
public investment vehicles…played a pivotal role in rescuing the American economy”).
253
See Robert Hockett, Spread the Fed: Distributed Central Banking in Pandemic and
Beyond, 19 U. VA. J. BUS. & FIN. L. __ (2020) (forthcoming).
254
See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17; Hockett, FSOC for Public
Investment, supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 458 (“The WFC
made direct loans, backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, both to banking
institutions and to strategically and economically important industrial enterprises. . . .”).
255
See Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment
Authority, supra note 17, at 458 (describing the RFC’s creation during the Great
Depression, and how it was modeled after the WFC).
256
See id. (stating that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was significant in
guiding the nation out of the Great Depression). On public switch-sleeping in the 1920s,
see Robert Hockett & Richard Vague, Debt, Deflation, and Debacle: Of Private Debt
Writedown and Public Recovery (white paper, Global Interdependence Center, Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2013), available at https://www.interdependence.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-and-Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf (last visited March
7, 2020).
252
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combined.257 That portfolio included assets as small as micro-loans to
Watts barber shops and as large as multimillion dollar debt and equity
holdings in banks, thrifts, railroads, power and light companies, and such
still-operating entities as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA; Fannie Mae), the Small
Business Administration (SBA), and the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im
Bank).258 And in all of these investments, the RFC made substantial profits,
all of which were either plowed into further investments or remitted to the
Treasury.259
The WFC and, especially, the RFC showed decisively that the
public finance franchisor ultimately needs private finance franchisee
institutions little more for the allocative task than it does for the modulatory
task, not to mention that getting modulation right requires getting allocation
right.260 They showed that public-private finance-franchising, however
useful it might have been during the early years of the new national money
regime in the final decades of the nineteenth century, was no longer
necessary for the bulk of financing by the second decade of the twentieth
century, and that it was downright dysfunctional in any economy beset by
coordination needs and recursive collective action problems of the kind that
afflict all decentralized markets—especially those in which credit is
endogenously generated.261 Indeed, perhaps partly in recognition of this
very fact, influential economist John Maynard Keynes began advocating a
“National Board of Investments” for the United Kingdom in the same
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Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment
Authority, supra note 17 at 460 (“. . . at its peak the RFC had a balance sheet that dwarfed
the combined balance sheets of Wall Street banks.”).
258
Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment
Authority, supra note 17 at 459 (“Once demand in previously depressed sectors of the
economy began to pick up, the RFC commenced large-scale direct lending to
municipalities, school districts, commercial businesses, railroads, farmers and farm co-ops,
production credit associations, joint-stock land banks, livestock credit corporations, and
local banks and other lending institutions.”).
259
Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment
Authority, supra note 17 at 459-61 (describing why the RFC was so successful in its time).
260
Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment
Authority, supra note 17 at 458-463 (developing the history and purpose of the WFC and
its successor, the RFC, and how they helped pull the U.S. out of the Great Depression and
post-War years).
261
Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment
Authority, supra note 17 at 463 (discussing the winding down of the RFC from the end of
the 19th century through World War II). On recursive collective action problems and their
ubiquity in decentralized modern financial markets, see Robert Hockett, Recursive
Collective Action Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial Markets,
Macroeconomies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1 (2015).
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period, predicting that it would naturally come to account for some twothirds of Great Britain’s total investments.262
And yet nevertheless, a resurgence of nineteenth century folk belief
about finance as intermediated scarce private capital in the 1950s, perhaps
partly brought on by Cold War fears of Soviet “socialism,” brought about a
winding-down of the RFC and, with it, the late nineteenth century franchise
arrangement in the U.S.263 Popular conceptions of money and finance
formed during the pre-sovereign period had apparently continued to linger
as a sort of “lagging indicator,” and thus preserved supposedly
indispensable roles for both rentiers and what came to be called a “financial
services” industry, in the minds of those ignorant about money, banking,
and finance in some precincts of the academy, the professions, and the lay
public alike.264
And so here we still linger both as a polity and as an economy over
which that polity presides, as described above in introducing this article,
oscillating continually between misallocation and consequent undermodulation and associated asset price inflation on the one hand, and bust
and ensuing debt-deflation on the other hand—all because the job that we
started in 1862, though haltingly improved and fine-tuned through the
1910s, 1930s, 1940s, early 1970s, and 2010s, has still to be finished, with
even the good done quite often being undone. The job that remains to be
done is that of finally more fully federalizing finance as we have federalized
money and governance in the century-and-a-half since the 1860s, leaving
private players to play with their own private money holdings but not
ours—the public’s. To that task of completion I now turn.
IV. CITIZEN FINANCE: WHAT WE NOW CAN AND MUST DO
The foregoing discussion culminates in three suggestive
conclusions. The first is that the sovereign—in a republic that is the
public—must issue and modulate the supply of the polity’s sovereign
credit-money. The second is that the sovereign public both can and should
262

See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES 384-395 (Donald Moggridge ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1978) (developing
Keynes’ economic theories); see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 336 (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) (1936) (discussing
the same).
263
See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 1-7 (explaining the intermediated
scarce private capital myth and the finance franchise).
264
See generally John G. Gurley & Edward S. Shaw, Financial Aspects of Economic
Development, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 515 (1955); John G. Gurley & Edward S. Shaw,
Financial Intermediaries and the Savings-Investment Process, 11 J. FIN. 257 (1956);
James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of "Money”, COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER
205 (1963) (representing examples of 1950s and 1960s economic theory).
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actively allocate much of that vital resource, especially toward productive
primary and away from speculative secondary and tertiary markets—partly
in furtherance of the modulatory task itself, and partly for reasons quite
independent of that task, including reasons of justice, macroeconomic
stability, and the solving of ubiquitous recursive collective action problems
that impede productive investment.265 And the third is that sovereign coin
and currency represent what I have here been calling an “intermediate
stage” monetary technology, necessary for purposes of monetary uniformity
and elasticity only (a) after populations outgrow mental or paper account
book ledger-money practicability and (b) before those populations develop
digital account book ledger-money capacity.
I have more fully elaborated and argued for the truth of these
propositions, as a theoretical matter, both in the previous two Parts and in
prior work.266 And above I have also now provided a brief explanatory
historical narrative showing both how and why we as a polity arrived at our
present set of no-longer necessary or even desirable hybrid arrangements.
What remains to do now is to show how to integrate the modulatory and
allocative functions practically in the design of one fully federalized system
of digital finance—what I shall call, since we are a republic, “Citizen
Finance.” That is the task of this Part.
What I shall sketch here is a system of Fed “Citizen” and “Resident”
Wallets maintained on a single digitized national account book—a
consolidated public ledger—to which will correspond public assets that will
be generated by public investment along the lines indicated above. These
will fall into three classes. One will be public Discount Window loans to
both public and private sector lending institutions, which will take the place
of much in the way of deposit liabilities currently owed by contemporary
private sector commercial banks to the borrowers whose accounts they
credit. Second will come issuances of the National Investment Council
(NIC) mentioned above, along with other public investment institutions
such as the Small Business Administration (SBA), all as more fully
described below. And third will come other assets that the Fed or Treasury
will hold and deal in in the interest of socially just credit allocation and
stability-maintaining credit modulation, as I shall also describe below.
The implications of these changes for private sector banking, capital
markets, and “shadow banks,” not to mention traditional distinctions
between Fed and Treasury monetary and fiscal policy instruments and
operations, will be extensive, as I shall show.267 But what they will all have
265

See again Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 261.
See supra nn. 1, 4, and 67 (offering arguments in support of the preceding
conclusion).
267
In particular, infra Part IV.C.
266
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in common is one simple feature: private sector finance in all subsectors of
our financial sector now will indeed be private, and hence veritably
“intermediated” as orthodoxy now falsely describes. Public credit-money,
for its part, which is generated rather than “intermediated,”268 will flow
only toward publicly approved projects, meaning that public allocation will
be forthrightly embraced and Fed/Treasury operations accordingly by and
large consolidated as described in Part IV.C. below.
A. Liability Side: Reserve Accounts, Citizen Wallets, and Resident Wallets
Let us begin on the liability side of the present-day public sector
balance sheet. On the liability side of a digitized national account ledger,
which can constitute either the Fed’s balance sheet, the Treasury’s balance
sheet, or a consolidated balance sheet comprising both,269 my proposal is
quite simple. Indeed it is surprisingly so because, once one sees just how
simple it is, the wonder is that we have not done something like it since
1913 or, at latest, 1918 or 1933. Indeed, for some institutions, we have been
doing it since then, as I will indicate in due course.
1. What We Do Now: Reserve Accounts
Begin with what we do now. All nationally and most state-chartered
banks, including U.S. affiliates of foreign banks, hold Reserve Accounts
with the Fed.270 It is through these accounts that the Fed manages its day-today bank reserve requirement and liquidity management regime, to which
all banks chartered or operating in the United States are subject.271

268

See again supra, Part I, and my work cited there.
Again, for reasons discussed infra, Part IV.C. In brief, the reason is that ending the
franchise means narrowing, if not indeed closing, the traditional gap between fiscal and
monetary policy.
270
See 12 U.S.C. § 342 (2012) (authorizing federal reserve accounts for federal reserve
member banks). A limited number of other categories of entities are authorized to hold
Federal Reserve Accounts. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 391 (2012) (authorizing federal reserve
accounts for the Treasury) 12 U.S.C. §§ 1435, 1452(d),1723a(g) (2012) (authorizing
federal reserve accounts for mortgage GSEs); 12 U.S.C. §§ 347d, 358 (2012) (authorizing
federal reserve accounts for foreign governments, banks, and central banks); 12 U.S.C. §
286d (authorizing federal reserve accounts for BIS, IBRD, IMF); 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012)
(authorizing federal reserve accounts for designated financial market utilities).
271
See Reserve Maintenance Manual, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.
(Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reserve-maintenancemanual-account-structure.htm [https://perma.cc/PCG4-NCD8] (explaining daily
maintenance of account relationship between depository institution and Federal Reserve
banks).
269

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

[1-June-18
54

Bank reserve accounts with the Fed are essentially deposits, hence
assets of the banks and liabilities of the Fed.272 The private sector banks
stand to the public sector Fed, in other words, as ordinary citizens with
demand deposits stand to their private sector banks.273 The Fed in this sense
truly is a “bank to the banks”—a central bank—and has been since its
inception.274
Since the crash of 2008, the Fed has paid interest on bank reserve
accounts held with it—so-called interest on reserves, or IOR.275 This is
another respect in which Fed reserve accounts are like bank deposit
accounts, save that the Fed pays much more than our banks do.276 It also
confers upon Fed reserves a characteristic once limited to Treasury
securities—IOR is effectively the coupon on a bond.
Interest on reserves affords the Fed a liability-side monetary policy
tool supplementing its ample kit of asset side tools, and renders Fed
reserves rather like coupon-bearing Treasury securities to their holders—
one reason I will keep saying “Fed or Treasury” in what I elaborate
immediately below, and suggest Fed/Treasury consolidation a bit further
below.277 Other such tools include the federal funds rate the Fed sets in the
272

See Credit and Liquidity Program and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
(Dec. 27, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_frliabilities.htm
[https://perma.cc/73BZ-NM7Z] [hereinafter Balance Sheet] (explaining the system of
federal reserve liabilities and institutional deposits).
273
See How is the Federal Reserve System structured? BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12593.htm [https://perma.cc/S72Q-TGMS]
(explaining the structure of the federal reserve system).
274
See Why does the Federal Reserve lend money to banks? BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS. (June 17, 2011),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12841.htm [https://perma.cc/8249-CWUL]
(explaining why the federal reserve lends money to banks).
275
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 128, 122
Stat. 3765, 3796 (2008) (authorizing the Federal Reserve to pay interest to depository
institutions on the reserves they are required to hold against their deposit liability). IOR had
been planned since 2006, to commence in 2011. The crash led Congress to bring up the
target date in the name of emergency stabilization. See Peter N. Ireland, Interest on
Reserves: History and Rationale, Complications and Risks, 39 CATO J. 327, 328 (2019).
The crash led Congress to bring up the target date in the name of emergency stabilization.
Id.
276
This is a source of sheer rent-extraction by banks; they ‘earn’ a premium on their
accounts with the Fed, only a fraction of which they pass on to those holding deposits with
them. See, e.g., Is the Federal Reserve Giving Banks a $12 Billion Subsidy? THE
ECONOMIST, March 18, 2017, at 70 (exploring income received by banks from interest on
reserves).
277
The interest on reserves is equivalent to the coupon on a bill or bond. See The
Discount Rate, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Oct. 15, 2019),
THE FED. RESERVE SYS.
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interbank lending market, open market operations in Treasury securities and
some other instruments, repo and reverse repo transactions on various forms
of collateral, and of course discount rates that the Fed applies when
purchasing eligible instruments through its asset-monetizing Discount
Window.278
All of these tools, some of long standing and others more recently
developed in the face of financial exigency,279 are means by which the Fed
engages both in liquidity-maintenance and in what I have been calling its
money-modulatory task in the name of our republic.280 Some of these tools
also have been used in more recent times in pursuit of what I have been
calling the credit-allocative task.281 A conspicuous case of the latter in
recent years has been the third round of quantitative easing—QE3—

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm [https://perma.cc/FLC3Z5EY] (explaining how interest rates are applied by the Fed to depository institutions).
More on this infra, Part IV.C.
278
The Discount Window is the primary facility through which the Fed affords
liquidity by directly or indirectly monetizing assets deemed both (a) worthy of
monetization in the interest of maintaining systemic liquidity or encouraging specific
industries or sectors of the national economy in need of solicitude, and (b) sufficiently safe
as not to raise moral hazard concerns. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §347b
(authorizing the federal reserve to use discount rates); see generally Discount Window
Lending, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sep. 30, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm [https://perma.cc/T3BDL4MF] [hereinafter Discount Window Lending]; FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PUBLICATION,
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 35, 50, 104, (2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEH56NKY] (explaining how the federal reserve engages in monetary policymaking and
monitors financial institutions).
279
The Fed actually invented the repo transaction, for example, over one hundred years
ago as an incident of First World War finance. See Stephen Mihm, The Repo Market is
More than Mere Plumbing, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-09/the-repo-market-has-a-history-ofintrigue (exploring history of the repo market and repo transactions). ‘Private’ participants
in financial markets began mimicking the arrangement decades later. Id. More recently,
yield-curve-bending via quantitative easing, and swap line arrangements with counterpart
central banks, have been pioneered to address the difficulties occasioned by the 2008 crash
and its aftermath. See Public Actors, supra note 4, at 130-133 (examining the ways in
which public actors intervene in private economics).
280
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PUBLICATION, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 35, 50, 104 (2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEH56NKY] [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS]
(explaining how the federal reserve engages in monetary policymaking and monitoring
financial institutions).
281
Id. (explaining how the federal reserve engages in monetary policymaking and
monitoring financial institutions).
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initiated in the autumn of 2012.282 Through QE3, the Fed committed to
purchasing $85 billion in mortgage-related assets in order to establish and
then raise a floor under housing prices, until such time as residential real
estate markets would stabilize.283 I will have more to say about the
importance of this as a precedent below.
Now as noted a moment ago, some of the Fed’s monetary policy
instruments operate on the asset side of the balance sheet, while
correspondingly affecting the liability side of that sheet.284 Other
instruments work in the other direction.285 Fed open market operations in
Treasury securities, or in mortgage instruments pursuant to QE3, commence
with a purchase of instruments into or sale of instruments out of the Fed’s
asset portfolio, to which correspond creditings or debitings of “primary
dealer bank” reserve accounts on the liability side of the Fed’s balance
sheet.286 Interest paid on reserve accounts held with the Fed, conversely, are
immediate creditings of banks’ deposits on the liability side of the Fed’s
balance sheet, which will be balanced by additions the Fed makes to its
asset portfolio.287
As a general matter, the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet
consists of (a) its note issuance, (b) the sum of reserve account moneys, and
(c) repo and swap line liabilities to dealer banks and other central banks.288
The asset side, for its part, consists primarily of financial instruments the
Fed holds in the form of Treasury securities, mortgage instruments, reverse
repo claims, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and accounts with the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).289
282

John Kandrac and Bernd Schlusche, Quantitative Easing and Bank Risk Taking:
Evidence from Lending, in FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES: 2017-125, at 16
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017125pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S86W-WST6] (discussing the QE3 program initiated in 2012).
283
The plan commenced in September, with a commitment to purchase $40 billion per
month. See Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS. (Dec. 12, 2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20121212a.htm
[https://perma.cc/8NU5-WAFR] (outlining economic recovery plan). The quantum was
raised to $85 billion in December. Id.
284
See Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (explaining the system of federal reserve
liabilities and institutional deposits).
285
Id. (explaining the other instruments).
286
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 260, at 2122 (explaining the function and method of open market operations).
287
See Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (explaining the system of federal reserve
liabilities and institutional deposits).
288
Id. (discussing the Federal Reserve’s liabilities).
289
International Summary Statistics: U.S. Reserve Assets (Table 3.12), BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Oct. 25, 2019),
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Needless to say, the Fed’s is a very large balance sheet—especially
since the crash of 2008 and its aftermath, and now since the onset of
pandemic in 2020, both of which have required significant Fed intervention
to prop up both failing franchisee institutions and plummeting financial
assets.290 To track this balance sheet’s changes over time is essentially to
track the Fed’s operations as our republic’s primary money-modulator and,
ever more both of late and of necessity, credit-allocator.291 It is to track, in
other words, an incipient form of a full citizens’ account book or ledger.292
Diagrammatically, things presently look as depicted in Figure 1.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/intlsumm/current.htm [https://perma.cc/RHJ8-J23Z]
(showing U.S. reserve assets); International Summary Statistics: Selected Foreign Official
Assets Held at Federal Reserve Banks (Table 3.13), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS. (Sep. 29, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/intlsumm/forassets20190930.htm
[https://perma.cc/GL4M-VX68] (showing selected foreign official assets held at federal
reserve banks); International Summary Statistics: Selected U.S. Liabilities to Foreign
Official Institutions (Table 3.15), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sep. 27,
2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/intlsumm/usliabforinst20190930.htm
[https://perma.cc/HBL9-T5HS] (showing selected U.S. liabilities to foreign official
institutions).
290
See generally Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, The
Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool, ECON. POL’Y SYMP. PROC.
335, 387 (2016) (indicating generally that the Fed has a large balance sheet: “[T]he Fed
should keep a large balance sheet indefinitely going forward, even as rates rise well above
the ZLB.”).
291
Id. at 339 (“When the Fed maintains a larger balance sheet, it effectively takes over
a part of the traditional debt management role from the Treasury, along with the associated
fiscal risk.”).
292
See id.
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Figure 1: Regular Fed/Bank Arrangements & Financial Flows
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One feature of the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet is of
particular interest for present purposes. This is that apart from the note
issuance, the liabilities in connection with which run to all holders of U.S.
currency, the Fed’s liabilities run solely to public instrumentalities and a
privileged few private sector financial institutions—what I have been
calling our finance franchisee institutions.293 This fact, arresting once one
thinks about it (why Note and Treasury security availability for all but not
Wallet availability for all?), underwrites three lines of criticism easily
directed at our present way of doing things, lines that converge with those I
laid out in introducing this article. None of these criticisms would be
warranted were the national or central bank ledger to be digitally opened to
all citizens, qualified residents, and business firms in the way I shall
momentarily be advocating, rather than merely a privileged few banking
and other financial institutions of large size.
First, the present arrangement needlessly privileges large,
systemically important financial institutions, affording them a form of
“public banking option” not offered to other firms, local governments,
citizens, or legal residents.294 It also affords those institutions a gratuitous
rent in the form of IOR, which they do not pass on to depositors in the form

293

See Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (explaining the system of Federal Reserve
liabilities and institutional deposits).
294
12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A) (2019) (allowing only "depository institutions" to hold
accounts at the reserve: excluding individuals, governments, companies, etc.).
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of equivalent IOD—interest on deposits.295 This is strikingly inequitable,
particularly under circumstances in which “the government” often looks to
be in bed with “Wall Street” or “high finance,” all while significant sectors
of the American population are unbanked or underbanked, hence
commercially and financially disenfranchised.296 Call these the financialcommercial inequity and exclusion problems.
Second, the present arrangement enables large franchisee
institutions to spend or dispense public credit with abandon, particularly
when Fed leadership, as it did during the Alan Greenspan era, loses
understanding of its modulatory and associated allocative and quality
control responsibilities as our primary franchise administrator.297 That fuels
financial market volatility, asset price bubbles, and catastrophic busts, not to
mention an associated egregious misallocation—a counterproductive
allocation—of the nation’s credit supply.298 I call this the “rogue franchisee
problem.” It is especially galling in juxtaposition with the financialcommercial inequity and exclusion problems just noted.299
Finally, third, conducting monetary policy—that is, moneymodulation and credit-allocation—through intermediaries, as using the
medium of dealer banks amounts to, is an inefficient and leak-prone mode
of operation. Part of the idea behind both quantitative easing and other
extraordinary measures taken by the Fed and Treasury alike in our name
from 2008 to 2012, for example, was to pump liquidity into our financial
295

Note that what makes this rent possible is citizens’ need of transaction accounts
irrespective of whether they be ‘paid’ by someone for the privilege of maintaining and
using them. This need could readily be supplied by the public free of charge, as it is to
large banking institutions not only free of charge, but with a ‘bonus’ in the form of IOR.
See Rousseauvian Money supra note 67, at 33 (“Financial Institutions and markets now
spring up as ‘middle men’ to enable these surplus and deficit units to find one another,
overcoming ‘search,’ ‘monitoring’ and ‘maturity-matching’ costs in so doing. [Banks]
broker (or contractually substitute for) contracts between parties for the use of ‘scarce
capital’ at a price be that price ‘interest,’ . . . .”); see also Ann Saphir, Yellen Draws Fire
for Fed Policy to Pay Banks, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-fed-yellen-politics/yellen-draws-fire-for-fed-policy-topay-banks-idUSL2N15P1Z7 [https://perma.cc/ZJV4-B3WX] (indicating that the Fed
provides interest to banks).
296
See Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked
in America, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (2015) (stating that of the adult population of the
United States, 10% are unbanked and 17% are underbanked).
297
This is one thrust of Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1214 (“The underlying
cause of this failure is continuing public accommodation of private credit-generation . . .
without effective public "quality control" over franchisees' performance of their delegated
responsibilities.”).
298
Id. (indicting that bubbles are possible as a result of ineffective quality control).
299
See Christopher, supra note 276, at 224 (referring to the population of un- and
underbanked Americans)
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system by enabling banks to keep lending even in the face and aftermath of
the 2008 credit crunch.300 There were three glitches, however, that impeded
the efficacy of money-modulation and -allocation via private intermediary
during times of crisis.
The first glitch was that many banks preferred simply to hoard their
additional liquidity while fearfully riding out the continuing storm.301 The
second was that other banks found it more promisingly lucrative to
speculate with their additional liquidity on secondary and tertiary financial,
commodities, and derivative markets than to lend to would-be producers
and consumers in primary markets, especially in the absence of any
commitment to aggregate demand support or debt-cancelation by federal
authorities.302 And the third was that many citizens, left owing more than
they owned in the debt-deflationary aftermath of the national housing and
financial market crashes, were not keen to borrow more during the
protracted slump anyway.303
These problems all added up to what came to be known as the
“pushing on a string” problem, the insight essentially being that supply side
solutions are not well adapted to addressing demand side disasters.304 In
response, many critics argued that monetary policy alone does not suffice to
address crises, particularly in a liquidity trap.305 Fiscal measures also were

300

See, e.g., Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 11 (“In the midst of recession or liquidity
trap, for example, our central bank will no longer need to supply cheap money to private
banks and then hope they will lend it to ordinary citizens so as to prime the consumer
spending pump.”).
301
See, e.g., Daniel Alpert, Robert C. Hockett, & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward,
NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Oct. 10, 2011), https://www.newamerica.org/economicgrowth/policy-papers/the-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/279V-XLXT] (stating that the
private sector “hoard[s] liquidity in the face of uncertainty over future investment
prospects”).
302
See e.g., Robert C. Hockett & Richard Vague, Debt, Deflation, and Debacle,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA (Apr. 9, 2013),
https://www.interdependence.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-andDebacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZFH-V6VK] (discussing how consumers are
in debt and the need, and implied absence, of, debt forgiveness for private debt); see also
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 490 (indicating that speculative, secondary
markets have abundant capital compared to primary markets).
303
Hockett & Vague, supra note 282 (indicating that student debt was the only type of
debt to increase in the period after the Great Recession).
304
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 438 (implying that solutions require
changes to policy, indirectly indicating that supply/demand solutions do not work); see also
Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 281 (inferring that supply-side solutions are
inadequate). You can lead a horse to water, we might say, but you can’t make him drink
when he’s not thirsty and will have, in any case, to pay the water back with interest.
305
Public Actors, supra note 4, at 133-34 (describing the importance of liquidity).
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needed.306 I agree with that criticism, but note also that the weaknesses of
monetary policy observed during 2009-12 are more rooted in franchised
monetary policy than in monetary policy as such. This paper’s insourcing
and digital national ledger proposal shows why—in effect, to take out the
middleman institutions is to narrow the space between fiscal and monetary
policy, potentially even to the point of consolidating them. But more of that
in due course, specifically IV.C. below.
2. What We Must Add: Citizen Wallets, Resident Wallets, and Their
Common Ledger
I find all three of the foregoing criticisms of our present Reserve
Account arrangements compelling, and see no downside to cutting the
ground out from under them with one single stroke. That is simply to offer
all citizens, along with state and local governments, small businesses, and
other nonbanking firms too, digital wallet accounts with the Fed or the
Treasury much like the Reserve Accounts privileged banks have enjoyed
with the Fed now for well over a century.307
In effect, parties depicted on the far left side of Figure 1 would
“bank,” instead of with the private sector institutions depicted immediately
to their right, with the Fed or Treasury one step to the right of those
institutions in the same diagram. Wallets would also enjoy peer-to-peer
(“P2P”) interoperability just as do paper currency and bank-issued stripcards and chip-cards, meaning that wallet-holders would transact with one
another simply through simultaneous debiting of payor and crediting of
payee wallets. In other words, ignoring for the moment Fed and Treasury
assets and looking only to the liability sides of their balance sheets, the
primary national money and payments system, instead of being built upon
transaction accounts held at multiple banking institutions, payment cards
associated with the same, and the plethora of now proliferating “Venmo”s,
“PayPals,” “ApplePay”s and the like, would be instantly streamlined into
looking as depicted in Figure 2.

306

Private Wealth, supra note 4, at 449 (“Traditional fiscal and monetary policy
instruments-sometimes supplemented by other actions like wage-price freezes, minimum
wage laws, or finance-regulatory measures-can be used to provide for at least some
stability in connection with some SIPIs.”).
307
See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A) (2019) (allowing only "depository institutions" to
hold accounts at the reserve: excluding individuals, governments, companies, etc.). On why
“Fed or Treasury,” see infra, Part III.C.2.
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Figure 2: U.S. Fed- or Treasury-Administered Digital Dollar Payments
System
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In short, the “Master Account” depicted here would simply be one
of the liability portfolios on the liability side of the Fed’s or Treasury’s
balance sheet—the portfolio to which the Depositors at the left of Figure 1
would now directly connect rather than only indirectly connecting via the
medium of private sector banking institutions as depicted immediately to
their right in that same diagram. Payments inter se would simply be
simultaneous creditings and debitings within that portfolio, effectively
replicating, in more direct and consolidated form, what we now do
indirectly via the medium of private sector bank accounts (bank liabilities)
balanced against reserve accounts (bank assets) held with the Fed. (I pay
you by instructing my bank to debit my account held with it and
simultaneously credit you via your account at your bank, with these changes
to banks’ accounts then registering in their accounts on the liability side of
the Fed balance sheet.)
In effect, then, this portfolio on the liability side of the Fed or
Treasury’s balance sheet will constitute a single, uniform national payment
ledger and associate system of digital wallets. In this sense, it will amount
to a return to ledger money of the kind that Part II above indicated societies
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and smaller groups historically have maintained before growing too large
and complex to maintain comprehensive account books on paper yet too
technologically underdeveloped to digitize and thus avoid circulating
uniformly valuable public IOUs as public ledger-entry substitutes. It will
also amount to a form of digital sovereign-issued cash, as all digital wallet
dollars will be direct issuances of the Fed or Treasury. There will be no
more “bank money” here other than literal “Fed money” or “Treasury
money.”
This in turn will offer not only the benefit of banking and
commercial inclusion and a simplified, far more efficient payments
architecture than our present one has become, but will also bring multiple
advantages where transaction volume and thus economic growth, monetary
policy, productive national investment, and financial stability are
concerned. We will get to all of that, in addition to anticipated objections
about privacy, “Big Brother,” and so on. But first we must fill-out a bit
more in the way of mechanical and logistical detail.
Now I referred to “offering” digital wallets before. This can take
either or both of two forms. One form would be to make wallets available to
all and only those who might ask. The other form would be to open such
wallets automatically, with beneficiaries free at any time to activate or not
as they prefer. Probably the most sensible option will be to open the wallets
automatically upon birth or naturalization for individuals born in or recently
become citizens of the United States, and to offer such wallets upon request
to states, local governments, businesses and other institutions, and resident
aliens who do not pose security threats.
I call wallet accounts of the first kind Citizen Wallets, which can be
credited automatically with federal benefits that citizens regularly receive
such as Social Security payments, tax refunds, and the like.308 This will
simplify the task of federal payments to—that is, crediting of—citizens.
Citizen Wallets also can receive “baby bond” or sovereign wealth fund
proceeds,309 if and when we at some point adopt such things, not to mention
earnings on NIC investments, more on which presently. And, of course,
Citizen Wallets can and should earn interest, just as bank reserve accounts
308

See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (suggesting “[a]ll citizens will be able to
maintain what I call ‘Citizen Wallets’ with the Fed”); see also Darylanda Bogle, What Day
of the Month Do I Get my Social Security Payment?, SOCIAL SECURITY MATTERS, (June 6,
2019), https://blog.ssa.gov/what-day-of-the-month-do-i-get-my-social-security-payment/
[https://perma.cc/RG6T-KS23] (describing the systems through which Social Security
benefits, based partially on birth dates but also including other considerations).
309
See Alaska Permanent Fund, INT’L FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS,
https://www.ifswf.org/members/usa [https://perma.cc/W24U-E3EV] (discussing the
creation of Alaska Permanent Fund “as a way to save a portion of the state’s oil revenues
for the needs of future generations).
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held with the Fed and as U.S. Treasury securities do.310 These rates, along
with direct “QE for the People” or “helicopter drop” measures in extremis,
can then serve as Fed or Treasury monetary policy instruments far more
direct and effective in their operation than can our current set of
intermediary-dependent “string-pushing” tools.311 I’ll return to this too
when I turn to a systematic tracing of the systemic ramifications that will
flow out of full implementation my full proposal.
I call accounts of the second kind Resident Wallets, which
beneficiaries can use as ordinary deposit accounts and which the Fed or
Treasury also can use, like Citizen Wallets, for monetary policy purposes.
For most if not all intents and purposes, Resident Wallets will function
identically to Citizen Wallets. The principal differences will be (a) that they
are opened on request rather than automatically upon birth or attainment to
citizenship; and (b) that they close out more frequently, at least in the case
of some short-lived business enterprises and other institutions.
One additional difference might be (c) that “QE for the People” or
“Citizen Helicopter Drop” measures, should they at any point be taken,
probably ought to be either restricted to Citizen Wallets, or restricted to
Citizen Wallets and the Resident Wallets only of (a) state and local
governments and (b) such private sector entities as can verifiably commit to

310

See Reserve Maintenance Manual, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES., (Nov. 19,
2018) https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reserve-maintenance-manualaccount-structure.htm [https://perma.cc/3R9F-FR44] (stating inter alia that “[i]f an
institution is not required to maintain balances to satisfy a reserve requirement, it may still
establish a master account with a Reserve Bank and earn interest on reserve balances at the
interest rate paid on excess balances, provided the institution is eligible to receive interest
payments”).
311
For more on ‘QE for the People’ and ‘Helicopter Money’ proposals, see, e.g.,
Anatole Kaletsky, How About Quantitative Easing for the People?, REUTERS (Aug. 1,
2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2012/08/01/how-about-quantitativeeasing-for-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/3ERH-JPZ2] (suggesting that “[g]iving away free
money may sound too good to be true or wildly irresponsible, but it is exactly what the
Fed[eral Reserve] and the BoE [Bank of England] have been doing for bond traders and
bankers since 2009. Directing QE to the general public would not only be much fairer but
also much more effective”); Martin Wolf, The Case for Helicopter Money, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/9bcf0eea-6f98-11e2-b90600144feab49a (“But the view that it is never right to respond to a financial crisis with
monetary financing of a consciously expanded fiscal deficit—helicopter money, in brief—
is wrong. It simply has to be in the tool kit.”). The ‘helicopter’ colloquialism originates
with Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
1 (1968). Keynes used the metaphor of burying money in bottles a bit over 30 years earlier.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY (1936).
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spending the proceeds of drops on real goods and services rather than
speculative securities or derivative instruments.312
Affording digital Fed or Treasury wallets to all in the way here
proposed will visit several immediate effects on the liability sides of the
Fed’s and other banks’ balance sheets.313 It will of course also bear
corresponding implications for the asset sides of these balance sheets, and
for the regulatory apparatus through which banks and other financial
institutions and markets are regulated. And, of course, it will raise various
systemic, logistical, technological, and related questions that will have to be
addressed before or during the course of implementation. None of these,
however, are especially thorny or difficult, as I shall now show.
To begin with the liability side, the Fed or Treasury’s balance sheet
will quickly begin to expand, as some—probably many—citizens and other
residents switch from holding barely remunerated funds with privately
owned banking institutions, money market funds, and other bank deposit
substitutes to holding interest-bearing wallets with the Fed or Treasury.314
This they will do in virtue both of the rates earned on Wallet savings and of
the immediate free access to the economy-wide, universal payments
platform that the system of Wallets will constitute. Banks, in turn, as their
deposit bases shrink, will replace customer deposits with Discount Window
loans from the Fed or counterpart loans from the Treasury, which will be
the new and sole “choke point(s)” through which the public sector allows
for any private sector role in “gate-keeping,” “credit-checking,” or “projectevaluating” assistance in the productive channeling of public credit, more
on which immediately below.
These changes will convert many, probably most bank deposit and
deposit-like liabilities now owed to depositors and other “near-depositors”
into bank liabilities owed to the Fed through its Discount Window or to the
Treasury through a similar facility, as depositors and near-depositors
transfer funds, first gradually and then at a likely accelerating rate, from one
set of accounts to the other.315 It will of course correspondingly grow the
312

See Kaletsky, supra note 291 (discussing “QE for the People”).
Cf. Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (describing the Federal Reserve’s Balance
Sheets).
314
Cf. Jeff Cox, Powell Says the Fed Will Start Expanding its Balance Sheet ‘Soon’ in
Response to Funding Issues, CNBC, (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/08/powell-says-the-fed-will-start-expanding-its-balancesheet-soon.html [https://perma.cc/D6EA-YMMQ].
315
By “near-depositors,” I mean holders of “near-monies” pursuant to short-term
lending arrangements of the kind constituting the so-called shadow-banking sector. This
sector too is now part of our franchise arrangement. Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at
1175 (describing the shadow banking sector as necessary for credit-money proliferation
and “with lending volumes rivaling those of the traditional banking sector”).
313
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Fed’s or the Treasury’s asset portfolio, for these new Discount Window
loans will be Fed or Treasury assets.316 I will have more to say about this
new class of Fed- or Treasury-held asset—especially its money-modulatory
and credit-allocative potential—below.
The asset sides of private bank balance sheets need not immediately
change all that much in response to the opening of Fed Citizen and Resident
Wallets—at least not if we do not wish for them to change either too much
or too rapidly. Current portfolios can be left to wind-down in due course,
per the maturities of the assets that are already held. All that will change
quickly is the identity of the creditor on a newly large portion of the banks’
liabilities that replaces a correspondingly diminishing portion of banks’
liabilities. That new creditor will be the Fed or the Treasury, pursuant to the
Discount Window or like lending just mentioned.317 This affords a benefit
to banking institutions: neither the Fed nor the Treasury is subject to the
depositor collective action problem—nor, therefore, apt to “run” on the
banks that will now owe it, meaning in turn that banks’ required reserve and
paid deposit insurance obligations will in aggregate be significantly
lightened if not eliminated.318
Indeed, deposit insurance will become a significantly less
prominent, if not indeed unnecessary, part of our bank-regulatory toolkit,
meaning in turn that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will
diminish in importance relative to the Fed and/or Treasury if we retain it at
all.319 This in turn will mean that the task of capital regulation, which
historically has fallen primarily to the FDIC on the theory that it must
protect the public insurance fund, continues and completes its already
ongoing migration to Fed administration in the name of enhanced
macroprudential regulation under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act.320 In
effect, as more fully described below in Part IV.C, all private sector lending
not funded by Fed or Treasury Discount Window lending will be subject to
a 100% capital requirement—that is, it will be bona fide credit-

316

See Discount Window Lending, supra note 258 (explaining the relationship between
Discount Windows loans as credits to banks and as assets for the Fed).
317
Id. (emphasizing the Fed acting as a creditor when it issues loans through the
Discount Window).
318
See again Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 261; and Finance
Franchise, supra note 14, at 1195 (detailing increasing deposit insurance as a by-product of
the U.S. government’s full faith and credit behind banks’ deposit liabilities for individual
investors).
319
Id. at 1157 (listing the Fed and the Department of Treasury as the two more
prominent regulators in the banking industry).
320
See Macroprudential Turn, supra note 4, at 246 (highlighting the historical and
current position of the FDIC as the primary regulator).
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intermediation rather than credit-multiplication or –generation.321 It will be,
that’s to say, “narrow banking” of various kinds.322 As this transition
proceeds, no administrative difficulties of any great significance need be
posed; capital-regulatory staff now at the FDIC will simply become de facto
or de jure staff at the Fed or Treasury, and will transition from imposing
traditional “capital buffers” to developing and administering Discount
Window lending conditionality, as I shall describe next.
If and insofar as we permit private sector banks to continue to lend
in ways that find expression in the form of newly opened deposits, the latter
will have to be deposits into Citizen and Resident Wallets, meaning in turn
that the banks will have to borrow through the Fed Discount Window or a
Treasury equivalent—for example, the Federal Financing Bank—going
forward.323 This presents a welcome opportunity to the public for purposes
of money-modulation and credit-allocation—an opportunity that lies at the
core, and is indeed part of the object, of Citizen Finance. For the Fed
already conditions Discount Window lending upon the possession of
socially desirable attributes on the part of that which it lends against, such
that converting all levered private sector lending to Discount Window
lending will be to convert all such lending to explicitly publicly evaluated
and approved lending.324 It will also restore the original function of our
regional Federal Reserve Banks, as I’ve been advocating of late in my
‘Spread the Fed’ and ‘Re-Distributed Central Banking’ proposals.325
The Fed or the Treasury will in other words now add conditions that
further their evolving credit-modulatory and -allocative missions—much as
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and associated GSEs have
historically limited their insurance provision and secondary market making
activities, respectively, to so-called “conforming” loans whose criteria
evolve over time.326 Among such investment attributes that seem
incontestably desirable will be those associated with the financing of small
321

See again supra, Part I, and infra, Part IV.C for more on these distinctions and their
significance.
322
Id. Also infra, Part VII, on narrow banking.
323
See Richard A. Werner, Can Banks Individually Create Money Out of Nothing? —
The Theories and the Empirical Evidence, 36 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2014)
(explaining one-way banks lend credit is “in the form of what bankers call ‘deposits’ and
this credit is money”).
324
See Discount Window Lending, supra note 258 (“Primary credit is a lending
program available to depository institutions in generally sound financial condition.”).
325
See Hockett, supra note 253, and associated text. Also infra, next Subpart B.
326
See Republican Home-Owning, supra note 29, at 15 (“FHA still operates today,
guaranteeing and, in many cases, originating or refinancing mortgage loans that conform to
the prudent standards that it maintains (so-called ‘conforming’ mortgage loans).”);
Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 29, at 148-152 (comparing the similarities between the
FHA and the GSE, Sallie Mae, in terms of loan requirements and limitations).
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and start-up businesses, bona fide small family farms, employee-owned
firms, non-outsourcing firms, renewable energy and other eco-friendly
firms, and the like—all of the things that collective action challenges and
other market failures of the kind discussed earlier in Part III prevent our
adequately financing now.327
As noted above and further discussed below, classic collective
action challenges now prevent adequate capital flows from reaching such
enterprises and enabling them to scale-up. Citizen Finance is all about
changing that, and the Fed’s or Treasury’s asset portfolio will be the site of
that action. This form of financial democratization will be the asset side
counterpart to that liability side democratization which is the system of
Citizen and Resident Wallets. In effect, then, the Fed Discount Window or a
Treasury equivalent will become the forthrightly public sector
“gatekeeper’s”—that is, credit-allocator’s—“gate,” and thus the focal point
at which limiting private sector lending activity solely to healthy forms of
primary market, not speculative secondary and tertiary market, creditextension takes place.
It will, in other words, become the site of a new Glass-Steagall
regime far more fine-tuned and effective than the first, to say nothing of
weaker Glass-Steagall successors like the Volcker Rule or Liikanen style
“ring-fencing.”328 For now, instead of simply imposing one vaguely
contoured categorical proscription (“no investment banking,” or “no
proprietary trading”) and saying “have at it” for all else, we shall be laying
down specific affirmative criteria and saying “nothing apart from this.”
Changing the presumption in this way, and thus in effect conditioning
public credit extension on “conformity” of the “conforming loan” type that
we require for FHA mortgage insurance, will convert the entirety of the
public portion of our financial system into an engine of simultaneous
primary market growth and secondary/tertiary market reduction, as I shall
systematically indicate below.329 And that is to say it will reverse and undo
the past 50 years’ course of “financialization.”330
In sum, then, most FDIC personnel now employed administering our
present-day capital-regulatory regime, and many OCC personnel or their
state bank equivalents now employed administering our portfolio-regulatory
regime, will accordingly be transitioned to administering a newly enhanced
Discount Window conditionality regime. By conditioning their own asset
purchases in this way, crucially, the Fed or Treasury will be governing bank
327

Id.
For more on these regulatory segregation strategies and their significance, see
Macroprudential Turn, supra note 17.
329
See again infra, Part IV.C.
330
Id.
328
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asset-creation as well. And in so doing they will be publicly assuming the
task of credit allocation upon which both credit modulation and sustainable
economic growth depend. This takes us to a more careful look at the Fed’s
or Treasury’s asset portfolio changes under my proposal.
B. Asset Side: NIC, SBA, PSF, and Other Public Issuances
The asset side of the public sector balance sheet, in some contrast to
those of private bank balance sheets, will undergo significant changes over
time with the offering of Citizen and Resident Wallets. Once again, I will
first say a bit about what we do now, then turn to what should and will
change in a regime of full Citizen Finance.
1. What We Do Now: Treasury Debt, Agency Debt, & (Sometimes)
Other
Prior to the troubles of 2008, the Federal Reserve System’s principal
asset holdings consisted of Treasury securities of varying maturities, agency
securities also of varying maturities, and miscellaneous other assets with
dollar values that paled in comparison to those of the first two categories.331
Among the latter were gold certificates, SDRs with the IMF, and various
small loans and similar assets acquired in the course of affording liquidity
to financial institutions in need of it.332 Until 2020, matters were similar
post-2008, save that the two prior categories had grown much in magnitude,
while several new categories also had been added.333
The prior categories that expanded post-2008 include (a) longerterm Treasury instruments, taken on both to accommodate fiscal stimulus
spending and, pursuant to QE1 and QE2, to afford “forward guidance” on
future interest rates; and (b) mortgage-related agency and non-agency
securities, purchased pursuant to QE3 as noted earlier.334 These categories
331

FED. RES. SYS., 94TH ANNUAL REPORT (2007),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual07/sec6/c3.htm
[https://perma.cc/23GB-QAC5] (listing U.S. government securities as $745,629 million out
of the Federal Reserve Bank’s total asset value of $915,129 million in 2007).
332
See Id. (reporting the Federal Reserve Banks’ gold certificates and Special Drawing
Rights making up 1.2% and 0.2% of total assets in 2007).
333
See FED. RES. SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK’S COMBINED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2018 AND 2017 AND
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 1, 3 (2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/combinedfinstmt2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SR49-ZFLZ] [hereinafter FED. RES. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS] (reporting
the Federal Reserve Banks’ gold certificates and Special Drawing Rights being valued at
$11,037 million and $5,200 million out of a total of $4,057,880 million assets in 2018).
334
Id. (valuing the 2018 mortgage-backed securities at $1,683,532 million, and the
amount of long-term treasury securities lent before 2017 at $2,249,307 million, out of a
total of $4,057,880 million assets).
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continued to represent by far the greater part of Fed asset holdings until
2020, with the only changes from pre-2008 being first, the absolute
quantities held, which were much larger than before, and second, the greater
portion of mortgage instruments that had come to be represented by private
issuances.335
A more qualitative than quantitative change to the Fed’s asset
portfolio since 2008 came with the addition of new classes of asset
corresponding to emergency measures the Fed took from 2008 onward to
address domestic and foreign liquidity and solvency dangers associated with
the crash and its aftermath.336 These included, among other things, (a) swap
lines provided to other central banks worldwide, and (b) a number of
Discount Window lending programs and other ad hoc facilities to prop up
banking, insurance, money market funds, and other financial institutions,
including “shadow banks,” imperiled after 2008.337
The quantitative growth of and qualitative changes to the Fed’s asset
portfolio were not worthy of the term “radical,” at least in any pejorative
sense, even if they were admittedly important and, if what I propose is
adopted, precedent-setting.338 They were straightforward extensions of
familiar Fed operations into new magnitudes or domains, undertaken to
prevent a complete collapse of the nation’s and world’s financial systems.339
Though controversial in some cases, they came over time to be accepted as
necessary, even if only as necessary evils by some, tolerated on the
understanding that they would be temporary.340 This is why we continued,
335

Id. at 3 (reporting Fed’s 2018 total assets as $4,057,880, including $2,302,462 in
Treasury Securities and $1,683,532 in mortgage-backed securities).
336
See Michael J. Fleming & Nicholas Klagge, The Federal Reserve’s Foreign
Exchange Swap Lines, 16 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONS. AND FIN. 4, at 1 (Apr. 2010),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci16-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U522-CK8J] (“[T]he Fed[] . . . established the Term Auction Facility
(TAF) to provide funding to U.S. banks . . . [and] swap lines . . . [to] reduc[e] funding
pressures on [central banks] . . .”).
337
FED. RES. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 306, at 10, 12, 18 (describing Fed’s
“liquidity swap lines,” “Discount Window borrowing privileges,” and “reverse repurchase
agreements”).
338
See Stephen D. Williamson, The Balance Sheet and the Future of Fed Policy, 25
OPEN ECON. REV. 163, 163-64 (2014) (“The Fed’s balance sheet has changed in important
ways—both in size and composition—from what existed before the financial crisis.”).
339
See Allen N. Berger et al., Bank Loan Supply Responses to Federal Reserve
Emergency Liquidity Facilities, J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION, Oct. 2017, at 2-3 (“[T]o address
the stigma associated with the Discount Window, the Fed[] . . . began the Term Auction
Facility . . . [and] [c]ollateral eligibility and valuation procedures for the TAF were the
same as for the Discount Window.”). See also Fleming & Klagge, supra note 309, at 3
(“The Fed’s establishment of swap lines with other central banks was not unprecedented.”).
340
See James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, The Role of the U.S. Federal Reserve,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 20, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-us-
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at regular intervals until 2020, to hear talk of winding-down the Fed’s
balance sheet.341 The winding-down never occurred in any serious sense,
however, as each move in that direction quickly was met by “taper
tantrums” in the financial markets and obliging Fed postponement of the
offload.342
This is of course to say nothing of the far greater expansion of the
Fed’s balance sheet in response to the Covid pandemic of 2020. Not only
are multiple trillions of dollars’ worth of new Treasury issuances now (as of
April) held, but so are corporate bonds, paycheck-protection loans, other
business loans, repos, swaps, munis, and a host of additional investments
now totaling at approximately $6.5 trillion and headed for upwards of $9
trillion. Figure 3, compiled by my colleague Lev Menand, summarizes in
pictorial form the Fed’s portfolio as of spring 2020.343

federal-reserve [https://perma.cc/N39R-8G7L] (“Though many economists argued that
additional monetary easing doesn’t help . . . many also considered QE to have been largely
successful in staving off the worst effect of financial turmoil.”).
341
See Trevor Hunnicutt, Fed Announces Plan to End Balance Sheet Runoff in
September, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usafed-balancesheet-idUSKCN1R12QA [https://perma.cc/2LPK-H3ZZ] (“[The Fed’s] current
practice . . . allow[s] up to $50 billion of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities . . . to
roll of its balance sheet each month . . . .”).
342
See id. (“The Fed[] . . . unveiled a long-awaited plan to stop scaling back the vast
portfolio of bonds it built up.”); McBride & Chatzky, supra note 313 (“While markets have
remained strong, some analysts worry that the reversal of the Fed’s expansionary policy
could cause a repeat of the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’ . . . ”).
343
See Lev Menand, Unappropriated Dollars (2020) (working paper, on file with the
author).
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Figure 3: Fed Portfolio, Measured in $ Trillions, as of Spring 2020
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In my view, the Fed’s inability to shrink its portfolio since 2008,
like the federal government’s now decade-long receivership of Fannie
Mae,344 signals a “new normal” where public maintenance of financial and,
with it, macroeconomic stability are concerned.345 The fact of the matter is
that, at least unless and until certain underlying structural conditions of our
decentralized exchange economy can change—in particular, any such
economy’s subjection to recursive collective action challenges and cognate
market failures of the kind discussed above in Part III—the public’s asset
portfolio will have not only to remain as large as it has become since 2008,
344

See Republican Home-Owning, supra note 29 (“Ten years after failing and being
rescued by our federal government . . . Fannie Mae . . . remain[s] in federal receivership.”).
345
See Williamson, supra note 311, at 166 (“There’s a sense now in which, at the
margin, the size of the balance sheet does not matter.”).
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but indeed even to grow further in proportion to GDP.346 It might indeed
ultimately have to constitute at least two-thirds of the full national portfolio,
as I noted Keynes to have predicted above. What will change first in the
coming years, then, is the portfolio’s composition, as we transition from ad
hoc emergency measures to longer-term public investment and price
stability maintenance measures.347 And what will change subsequently is
the portfolio’s size. To the rough details of these changes I now turn.
2. What We Must Add: FRB-Discounted Paper, NIC Issuances, SBA
Issuances, PSF Holdings, & Other
Changes to the asset side of the Fed’s or Treasury’s balance sheet
under my proposal will emanate from two sources. The first source will be
some of the liability side changes described above. The second will be
certain structural changes that we as a polity must make to our
infrastructural and other productive finance arrangements in order to
address the concerns I have laid out above and in prior work.348
There are two liability-side sources of likely change to the Fed’s or
Treasury’s asset portfolio. Both will stem from the addition of Citizen and
Resident Wallets to that side of the balance sheet.
First, the assets corresponding to many present-day shadow bank
liabilities—in effect, short term loans—that the Fed or Treasury will
effectively take over in paying IOR are at present substantially, if not
indeed almost exclusively, speculative in character.349 The institutions that
now issue short-term shadow bank-like liabilities do so specifically to
secure cheap funding to gamble on price movements among favored longerterm assets, and succeed in so doing by offering low returns to “cash
346

See Andrew Foerster & Sylvain Leduc, Why is the Fed’s Balance Sheet Still So
Big?, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F.: ECONOMIC LETTERS (June 3, 2019) (“The amount of
currency in circulation has grown so much that it is not possible to shrink the balance sheet
to its earlier size.”).
347
See Loretta J. Mester, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of
Cleveland, The Economic Outlook, Monetary Policy, and Normal Policymaking Now and
in the Future, Address Before Money Marketeers of New York University, Inc. (Oct. 25,
2018), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/speeches/sp-20181025economic-outlook-monetary-policy-and-normal-policymaking-now-and-in-the-future
[https://perma.cc/4NQW-WJ8P] (“[A] relatively large balance sheet . . . might . . . generate
requests for the Fed to aid other industries or use the balance sheet to fund government
initiatives.”).
348
See supra Part II (discussing circumstances causing public/private hybridity); supra
nn. 1, 6, 61, 76 (suggesting structural changes now that functional reasons for privatepublic franchising have receded). Also Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note
17.
349
See Laura E. Kodres, What is Shadow Banking?, FIN. & DEV., June 2013, at 42-43
(“Shadow banks . . . raise . . . short-term funds in the money markets and use those funds to
buy assets with longer-term maturities.”).
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managers” that at least exceed rates on bank deposits.350 The Fed and
Treasury have no interest—pun ratified if not quite intended—in gambling
on price changes among these assets with the short-term borrowings that
their offering Citizen and Resident Wallets will equate to.351 Indeed, they
have every reason to edge-out and end such gambling much as Treasury
Greenbacks edged out private sector bank monies in the late 19th century as
described above, by affording interest-bearing Wallet-deposits of the kind
sought by the cash-management departments of shadow-bank lenders
without using the proceeds of that short-term borrowing to gamble.352
The Fed or Treasury is accordingly apt, as in fact we should require,
to pair new deposit liabilities that it takes over from the shadow-banking
sector with safer assets associated with productive primary market activity
and the infrastructures on which such activity depends rather than
speculative secondary and tertiary market assets of the kind shadow bank
borrowing funds now.353 Prominent among these will be NIC, SBA, and
Regional Fed-discounted community bank and public bank issuances, as
well as what I call “systemically significant” issuances, of the kinds I
reprise briefly below and describe in detail elsewhere.354
In this sense, the Fed’s or Treasury’s replacement of the banking
and shadow banking sectors where deposit-taking and account-managing
are concerned—their bringing these currently outsourced franchisee
functions back “in-house”—will be a critical component of that reassertion
of the public franchisor’s role in our republic’s money-modulation and
credit-allocation tasks which I have been describing and prescribing both in
the present paper and in earlier work.355 And it will essentially complement
that Discount Window conditionality I mentioned above.
350

See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1175-93 (“[S]ecuritization . . . functions
to lever up the bank-generated credit-money supply.”).
351
See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012) (commanding the Fed to promote stable prices).
352
See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1175-93 (discussing “[t]he Fed’s postcrisis efforts to limit risk-taking by tri-party repo clearing banks).
353
See Lending to Depository Institutions, FED. RES. BD. (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingdepository.htm
[http://perma.cc/4P2S-VTGK] (“The Federal Reserve generally accepts as collateral for
Discount Window loans any assets that meet regulatory standards for sound asset quality . .
. includ[ing] most performing loans and most investment-grade securities.”).
354
See Hockett, Spread the Fed, supra note 253; Hockett, FSOC for Public
Investment, supra note17; Hockett, Financing the Green New Deal, supra note 2; and
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 439-43 (proposing a National Investment
Authority which would offer a “new ‘safe’ asset class”).
355
Finance without Financiers, supra note 14; National Investment Authority, supra
note 4, at 488 (“Keeping the investment management function in-house along the lines of
the RFC model, on the other hand, would enhance the NIC's legitimacy as a capable market
actor acting solely in the public interest. Once the NIC's internal asset-management and
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The second liability-side reason that the Fed’s or Treasury’s asset
portfolio will change over time dovetails with the first. It is that, over a yet
longer period of time, a growing portion of Fed or Treasury deposit
liabilities will not simply be transferred from current private sector bank
and shadow bank balance sheets, but will be Fed or Treasury liabilities from
the get-go as citizens, residents and firms (a) borrow from institutions that
credit their Citizen or Resident Wallets with loan proceeds, and (b) move to
directly depositing, or directing the direct depositing of, funds from other
persons and entities that transfer money to them, be those transfers
payments or benefits, into their Citizen and Resident Wallets.
The Fed or Treasury will presumably retain some discretion to
determine what new assets to set off against some of these growing deposit
liabilities—the ones to which no Discount Window loans to private lending
institutions correspond.356 But this discretion must be legislatively guided in
significant part toward investment in assets associated with the enhanced
modulatory and allocative tasks that I have elsewhere advocated and in
Parts II and III of this article have been reprising. This means that many of
the new assets will be issuances of the NIC or SBA, more on which below,
while others will be acquired pursuant to renewed Fed discounting and Fed
engagement in what I call “SIPI Stabilization,” again both in prior work and
below.357
It will be helpful here briefly to recount these NIC, SBA, and PSF
proposals, which I have developed at greater length elsewhere, since they
will afford ideal assets to add to the Fed’s or Treasury’s asset portfolios as
liabilities associated with Citizen and Resident Wallets grow.
Starting with the NIC, the idea here is quite simple. On the one
hand, much needed public infrastructure and even industrial investment is in
the nature of an orthodox public good—it offers returns that are not
capturable by individual investors thanks to their comparatively brief
credit-allocation capabilities increase and mature, however, it might be less problematic to
hire specialized private financial firms to manage some specialized asset portfolios.”);
Public Actors, supra note 4.
356
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 747.
357
See, e.g., Open Labor, supra note 29, at 1 (“The public agents in question work at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in lower Manhattan. There they conduct familiar
Fed open market operations—what I shall also call ‘OMO.’”); Robert C. Hockett, How to
Make QE More Helpful—By Fed Shorting of Commodities, BENZINGA (Oct. 14, 2011, 8:41
PM), https://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1988109/how-to-make-qe-more-helpful-byfed-shorting-of-commodities [https://perma.cc/HC7G-XZGP] [hereinafter How to Make
QE More Helpful] (“Monetary policy conducted by open market operations in Treasuries is
meant to stabilize prices - usually consumer prices.”); see also Public Actors, supra note 4,
at 130 (“Perhaps the most familiar example of such routine market-moving in modern
financial markets is that of the so-called open market operations (OMO) in which central
banks or monetary authorities purchase or sell government debt securities.”).
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lifespans and lack of taxing authority. This in turn renders it individually
rational to over-invest in speculative bets on short term price movements in
secondary and tertiary markets, and correspondingly to under-invest in
long-term improvements in infrastructure and primary market productivity
improvements.358
Since this is in turn collectively irrational inasmuch as it depresses
long-term productivity improvement and associated benefits that everyone
would choose could they control the macro environment and capture
benefits commensurate to desired investment, we are faced with a classic
collective action predicament much like those that prompted the nation to
establish the WIB and WFC in 1917 and the RFC, then WPB in 1932 and
1942 as noted above.359 Constituted by the heads of federal departments
with jurisdiction over national infrastructures—e.g., the Department of
Energy, the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of
Transportation, etc.—the NIC will coordinate in developing coherent
national infrastructure and industrial policy across sectors, regions, and the
public and private sectors much as the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”) does in developing and implementing finance-regulatory policy
across subsectors of our complex and hybrid financial sector.360
Most importantly for present purposes, the NIC will, in
collaboration with the Fed and Treasury or their consolidated successor,
issue multiple classes of financial instrument in connection with specific
infrastructure projects.361 It will thereby offer investment outlets to “patient
capital” now unable to find yields in productive as distinguished from
speculative investments, counteract inflationary pressures otherwise
generated by public infrastructure spending, and capitalize on markets’
“price discovery” functions in determining the likely successes and public
benefits thrown off by sundry prospective investments.362
A complementary role that the NIC will play is to coordinated with,
and provide support for, certain other instrumentalities at all levels of
government that themselves work to assist in capitalizing small businesses,
small family farms, start-up firms, and the like. Prominent among these are
the SBA and certain state and local development institutions. The SBA is
particularly important in the present context because it both (a) has
358

See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Robert Hockett, Finance
without Financiers, supra, note 14; National Investment Authority, supra, note 17.
359
See sources cited id. See also Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra, note
261.
360
See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without
Financiers, supra, note 14; How to Make QE More Helpful, supra, note 357. On a possible
“consolidated successor” to the Fed and Treasury, see infra Part IV.C.
361
See sources cited id.
362
Id.
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specialized in aiding small businesses for decades, and (b) was in fact a
subsidiary-successor of the RFC itself when the latter was wound down in
the late 1940s.363 Depending on what form the NIC ultimately takes, it will
likely make sense to bring the SBA “back” into its “family,” along with
such other still-functioning former RFC-subsidiaries as aforementioned
Fannie Mae and the Export-Import Bank.364
Similarly, if and as state and local governments develop
infrastructure plans and local business support institutions, including public
banks patterned after the Bank of North Dakota model,365 the NIC will
serve in both a coordinating and a supporting role. Importantly for present
purposes, that can mean either or both (a) direct investment in such efforts
themselves through the purchase of state government, local government,
public bank and small business issuances, and (b) “screening” of the latter
on behalf of the Fed or Treasury, which than can purchase such issuances
directly for the asset side of the balance sheet.366
The U.S. has a much richer past and even present with these forms
of public sector capital allocation in support of socially desirable sectors of
the economy than most people seem to realize, perhaps because large,
dominant firms draw most of our attention but require no aid in attracting
capital, while smaller firms, start-up firms, and other firms with desirable
attributes—e.g., employee-owned firms, “green” eco-friendly firms, urban
and rural “enterprise zone” firms, non-“outsourcing” firms, and the like—
that escape our attention do often require, and receive, such assistance.367
The NIC will significantly expand, systematize, and publicly report on such
operations in the cause of making a grand, democratically determined
national project of inclusive republican investment and capital allocation. It
will, in short, serve as a primary agent of our republic’s meaningful
democratization of the financing of genuinely productive and socially
desirable enterprise and infrastructure.368
The Price Stabilization Fund (“PSF”), or what I also call the
“People’s Portfolio,” will complement the efforts just rehearsed as a
secondary market complement to the NIC, SBA, and public investment
institutions’ primary market roles—rather as Fannie Mae was originally
founded in 1938 as a secondary market complement to the 1934 FHA’s
363

See sources cited supra, note 2. See also FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra,
note 17; Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14
364
Id.
365
See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without
Financiers, supra, note 14.
366
Id.
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Id. See also REPUBLIC OF OWNERS, supra note 1.
368
See sources cited supra, note 360.
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primary market role in democratizing home-ownership.369 But it will also
have a significance all its own.370
The idea here, too, is once again simple and straightforward. It is
that more than just interest rates and housing prices are systemically
important and thus in need of public “open market operations” conducted
with a view to keeping them within reasonably narrow bands over time to
assure overall macroeconomic stability and predictable investment
horizons.371 Many food, fuel, and other commodity prices are similarly
influential on economic activity across the board.372 Indeed, so are
prevailing wages and salaries.373 That is why our public instrumentalities
have frequently made use not only of New York Fed Treasury purchases
and sales, but also of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the Department of
Agriculture, and other agencies to stabilize critical prices in the past.374
A PSF, administered by the Fed, Treasury, or NIC, will accordingly
conduct open market operations in the markets in question with a view to
“collaring” their swings just as we collar borrowing (“interest”) and
mortgage rate swings now and have collared other swings in the past.375 In
effect, it will amount to a public fund counterpart to the market portfolio,
through which the public will modulate price-swings within certain
systemically important markets that are every bit as significant as are the
“systemically important financial institutions,” or “SIFIs,” that we have
recognized to be in need of “enhanced prudential regulation” since the
passage of Dodd-Frank.376
The key point for present purposes is that NIC and PSF issuances
will be ideal candidates for new assets that the Fed or Treasury will have to
hold on the asset side of the balance sheet to associate with some of the new
liabilities, in the form of new Citizen and Resident Wallet deposits, that will
be tracked on the liability side of the balance sheet.377 In effect, the Fed or
Treasury will then stand as the intermediating link between the nation’s
savers and investors (liability side) on the one hand, and its stable and
369

Cf. Republican Home-Owning, supra note 43
See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without
Financiers, supra, note 14.
371
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See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without
Financiers, supra, note 14; How to Make QE More Helpful, supra, note 357.
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Id. See also Open Labor Market Operations, supra, note 357.
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Id.
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FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17, at 35-37 (elaborating NIC
issuances in greater detail); National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 471-72
(discussing similar new asset classes).
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steady wealth and productivity growth (asset side) on the other hand, all
while the liability side of the balance sheet serves also as a single public
payments ledger on which all payment transactions, commercial and
financial, take place.378
This will be fully digitally integrated, fully public, and purely
productive and stable, as distinguished from speculative and volatile
(secondary and tertiary price-gambling) finance.379 It will amount to full
public recognition, and counterpart action on the basis of that recognition,
that (a) in a “commercial society” or “exchange economy” such as our own,
a payments platform and associated system of digital wallets and digital
currency is an essential public infrastructure, and (b) that finance being
rooted in money in any such society, with money in turn being no more and
no less than “that which pays” and “that which counts” in a system of
payments and value-accounting, any such platform will be the core of the
nation’s financial system as well—as indeed today’s banking and payments
system constitutes the core of its financial system.380
As noted earlier, private finance will continue under the Citizen
Finance reform I here advocate, but it will no longer be readily fueled by or
supplied with our republic’s public full faith and credit.381 The public credit
prerequisite for endogenous private sector “money creation” will no longer
be liberally “outsourced” to private sector gate-keepers, credit-checkers, and
project-evaluators, but instead limited to strict public sector Discount
Window conditionality.382 Private sector finance will, for its part, in effect
be made to conform to its own oft-repeated false claims of itself—namely,
that it is all a matter of intermediating between private suppliers and end-

378

Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1143-44 (stating that an intermediating link
“stands between the lender and the borrower” and matches “checking account deposits”
with “commercial loans”).
379
FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17, at 34-35 (elaborating NIC’s
capital-absorption functions in greater detail); National Investment Authority, supra note 4,
at 441 (“[T]he NIA will diffuse potentially destabilizing demand for privately-issued
substitutes and channel it into non-speculative, longer-term productive investments.”).
380
FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17, at 37-39 (elaborating NIC’s
relations to Fed and Treasury in greater detail); National Investment Authority, supra note
4, at 456 (“Functionally situated between the Treasury and the Fed, the NIA will serve as a
separate institutional base from which to conduct a more cohesive and targeted allocation
of patient public and private capital toward specific economic activities likely to facilitate
and enhance inclusive and sustainable long-term growth on the part of the national
economy.”).
381
Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1167 (“[P]ublic full faith and credit serves to
underwrite putatively private finance in the capital markets.”).
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See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14 (discussing the public credit).

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

[1-June-18
80

users of “scarce capital.”383 Private lending and other forms of finance will,
in other words, be made to conform to the intermediated scarce private
capital story, channeling antecedently accumulated finance capital from
accumulators to users in “one-to-one,” rather than “one-to-many” or “noneto-many” fashion as described in Part I.
Private sector banking will thus become much more like narrow
banking, funded by actual private sector deposits that are not themselves
bank loans.384 Credit-generative banking—dependent as it is upon the
monetized full faith and credit of us, the sovereign public that constitutes
our republic—will for its part be reserved to (a) our public instrumentalities,
and (b) private banks able to secure Fed or Treasury Discount Window
lending, through strict conformity with the earlier mentioned conditionality,
in connection with any loans they originate.385
The less proximate, more distant ramifications of these changes will
be much more far-reaching than might at first meet the eye. For one thing,
the entirety of the nominally private sector side of our financial system will
change as the public sector by and large withdraws from it, converting it to
being truly private sector rather than mixed public-private—that is,
franchised—finance. For another thing, the public sector side of our
financial system will change as well, as many commonly drawn distinctions
to which we have grown accustomed over the past 160 years but have not
recognized to be outgrowths of franchising itself—distinctions, e.g.,
between Fed functions and Treasury functions, between monetary policy
and fiscal policy, and even between dollar bills (Fed notes), sovereign
securities (Treasury paper), and metallic coins (Mint tokens), diminish to
near the vanishing point. To those I now turn.
C. Systemic Ramifications: Private Sector Transformation, Public Sector
Consolidation
As just noted, the transition to full Citizens’ Finance will bear
farther reaching consequences that might not be immediately appreciated. It
will accordingly be helpful briefly to catalogue the more important among
them, starting with the nominally private sector side of things, then turning
to the forthrightly public sector side.

383
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1. Private Money: From Credit-Generation & -Multiplication to Honest
Intermediation
In earlier work I have traced the flow of monetized public full faith
and credit throughout the financial system—from the Fed, the Treasury, and
the commercial banking core to the farthest reaches of our capital, money,
and shadow banking markets.386 That is what mapping the franchise
consists in. Since what I propose here is meant to replace that hybrid
financial system with a system in which public credit-money originates
from and flows primarily if not exclusively through public institutions while
only genuinely pre-accumulated, “private money” flows through private
sector institutions, the best way to trace the impact of Citizens’ Finance on
“private” sector finance might be to proceed in the same order that I follow
in that earlier franchise-expository work. I shall do that now, systematically
indicating what private sector finance will come to look like as the finance
franchisor—that is, our republic—withdraws from the franchise and brings
our republic’s own public credit-money operations back “in house.”
Beginning with the banking core, then, the Fed or Treasury—
whichever administers the digital Wallets saving and payments architecture
and holds assets offsetting those liabilities—will now channel monetized
public full faith and credit primarily through the public sector NIC and PSF
as described above. It will channel any such “public money” through
private sector banking institutions only insofar as the latter originate
productive (primary market), not speculative (secondary or tertiary market)
loans that conform to newlt enhanced, strict Discount Window lending
criteria applied by newly empowered Regional Federal Reserve Banks.387
Earnings—privatized seignorage—on such lending will thus essentially be
simply the spreads between interest charged on private sector bankoriginated loans and interest paid on Discount Window loans.
Because demonstrably productive planned projects will be eligible
for NIC and other forms of direct public financing, private rates on bankoriginated loans meeting the Discount Window criteria are unlikely to
become usurious—there will, in effect, be “public options” with which
private sector lenders will be competing. But it is also always possible to
regulate spreads, and of course to lower both discount rates and the rates
paid on Wallet savings, in the event that private sector rates do come to
seem to be discouraging productive investment.
Private sector bank lending that doesn’t conform to newly enhanced
Discount Window conditionality, for its part, will have to be fully funded
by private sector loans stemming from pre-accumulated private sector
386
387

See supra, Part I, and sources cited supra, note 14.
See again Hockett, Spread the Fed, supra note 253.
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money—be these loans short-term “deposits,” medium-term certificates of
deposit (CDs), or the like—that the banks are able to attract. They will be,
in other words, “narrow bank” loans of the kind advocated by “100%
money” and, to a lesser extent, “40% money advocates of the stripe that I
noted in introducing this article and discuss more fully below in Part VII.
The banks that extend credit on this (pre-accumulated) basis—that is, on the
basis of so-called “base money”—will in that sense at long last conform to
the one-to-one intermediation tale that they tell of themselves, and hence
effectively function as today’s lending companies or money market funds
function.388
Turning from the banking core to the capital market near-periphery
as Part I above and my earlier work does,389 commercial bank lending for
the purpose of purchasing firm-issued equities or other securities, and
investment bank margin lending for the same, will no longer be possible.390
For these loans, used as they are to fund secondary or tertiary market
purchases, will not be eligible for Discount Window lending and, therefore,
public sector credit allocation outsourced to private sector franchisee
institutions.391 Rather, they will have to be funded, “one-to-one,” again as
any narrow bank, mutual fund, or lending company’s investments are
funded.392 That is, again, with antecedently accumulated private sector
“loanable funds.”393
The same now will hold true of securitization and repo markets as
well, at least in their capacities as recipients of monetized public full faith
and credit.394 Banks will not be able to offload loans “originated to
distribute” onto securitization trusts in order to amplify lending and thereby
disseminate ever more public credit.395 For again, all lending now will be
either fully privately funded lending or Discount Window-conforming
388

See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 3-4, 5-6 (elaborating what the
author calls the “(one-to-one) credit-intermediation” and “(one-to-many) creditmultiplication” models of financial flows, and the role played by “base money” in the
latter).
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See, e.g., id. at 12-17.
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Id. (elaborating how bank-extended credit fuels purchases of firm-issued securities
on the capital markets).
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the author calls the “(one-to-one) credit-intermediation” and “(one-to-many) creditmultiplication” models of financial flows.
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Id. at 9-10 (explaining the “loanable funds” misconception and its connection to the
“(one-to-one) credit-intermediation” picture of financial flows.
394
Id. at 15-19 (describing the functions and operations of the securitization and repo
markets, as well as the “originate to distribute” model of credit-extension that securitization
encourages); Finance Franchise, supra note 14 at 1175-83 (same).
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lending. And, the latter will be almost exclusively “buy and hold” lending
since the usual justifications for “originate to distribute” lending—viz.,
liquidity needs and associated “cost of capital” minimization—will, as I
now will explain, no longer be applicable. 396
On the latter justification for origination to distribute, it cannot be
emphasized enough that the usual benign-sounding justifications given for
allowing loan sales on secondary markets and the “origination to distribute”
into which that always degenerates—the need for liquidity and the capacity
thereby to “lower the cost of credit”—simply will no longer be applicable.
For liquidity-availability and the “cost of capital” are, crucially, public
policy variables, variables that must be democratically determined in any
democratic commercial republic such as our own. And they are variables
that, under the reforms mapped above, now will be directly and
transparently—hence again, democratically—controlled by the public’s
own Fed or Treasury, rather than merely indirectly, opaquely, and
ineffectively “influenced” through (seemingly always lax) liquidity and
capital regulation of private sector financial institutions.397
This is just one, albeit very important, sense in which arguments
commonly made in order to justify either tightening or loosening regulatory
requirements will simply no longer be pertinent under the republican
Citizens’ Finance arrangements I am proposing. For all such justifications
stem from our current system of Hybrid Finance. That is, they stem from
the fact that credit-money availability is on the one hand a republican policy
variable, while the means of varying that variable presently make use of
private sector institutions—that is, are “franchised out.”398
End the franchise and bring public credit-money modulation and
allocation fully back “in house,” and you remove the indispensable factual
predicate of literally all such discussions. “Financial regulation” then
divides and reduces to public finance policy on the one hand, corresponding
to public sector credit-money generation, modulation, and allocation; and
anti-fraud/consumer protection law on the other hand, corresponding to
regulated private sector intermediation. 399
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See supra, Part I, rehearsing the nature of our public/private system of finance and
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Turning now to private sector repo, this will become smaller-scale
and reduce to “one-to-one” intermediation as well.400 For returns on Citizen
and Resident Wallets will eliminate most if not all incentive for cashmanagers to lend in the repo markets.401 And the practice of
rehypothecating repo collateral, which presently renders repo market
practice something akin to credit-multiplying fractional reserve banking,
will be prohibited per the “one-to-one” credit-intermediation principle to
which all private sector financial institutions now will be required to
conform.402
Once again the usual justifications given for what we do now—
putative liquidity and short term funding needs, the satisfaction of which
“lowers the cost of capital”—simply will not be applicable. For again,
liquidity and the cost of capital are policy variables that now will be
handled directly by the public, not indirectly through “incentives” offered
by the public sector franchisor to private sector franchisees. Repo will
accordingly return to being what it was when the Fed invented it in 1917—a
convenient form of bona fide short-term credit-intermediation, instead of
indefinitely extended private sector credit-amplification. 403
Turning next to derivatives markets and clearing houses, the primary
source of public credit here has in the past been the ex post rescue of failing
such markets when they have grown “systemically important,” and now
includes additional ex ante assurances (and some accompanying regulation)
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank reforms.404 There are two reasons that this
outlet of public support will largely if not fully close under the Citizen
Finance proposals outlined above. First, public credit use is the primary
enabler of private sector financial institutions’ and markets’ growing
systemically important in the first place. Cutting off that public credit
channel as my proposals do in the ways just described—viz., prohibiting
bank lending with public credit-money to secondary and tertiary market
speculators—accordingly cuts off the source of systemic importance itself.
The only “SIFIs” left under my reforms, in other words, are our
republic’s public sector FIs that preside over the “[financial] system”
itself—our republic’s franchisor institutions. Second, should this somehow
not suffice to derivatives markets from becoming systemically important,
400

Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14 at 17-19 (laying out the mechanics of
repo transactions); and 2-9 (laying out and comparing the credit-intermediation, multiplication, and -generation models of financial flows).
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simply reinstating the “insurable interest doctrine” in derivatives markets
will eliminate any remaining vestige of pure gambling in derivatives just as
ending the rehypothecation of repo collateral as described above does in
repo.405 For these are the modes by which “one-to-one” credit
intermediation balloons into “one-to-many” credit multiplication in these
two spheres.406
Finally, coming full circle back to commercial paper (CP) and
money market funds (MMFs) as my “franchise”-tracing work elsewhere
does,407 eliminating the practice of margin lending to funds that purchase
paper in the commercial paper markets, along the lines described just above
in connection with the capital markets, will immediately leave public credit
only one channel into CP markets. Again, that will be Discount Window
lending, which as noted above amounts simply to the public’s directly
determining the conditions of its own credit-extending and associated
monetization, i.e., swapping of public IOUs for private IOUs.
2. Public Money: From Fed & Treasury, Fiscal & Monetary, and TBill, Fed Note & Mint Coin Separation to Digital Consolidation
Perhaps most surprising of all to those who do not often think of
these matters will be the implications of Citizen Finance for traditional
distinctions familiar to public finance. We are accustomed to most modern
polities’ having both treasuries or fiscal authorities on the one hand, and
central banks or monetary authorities on the other hand. We are also
accustomed to characterizing instrumentalities of the first kind as being
engaged in forthrightly allocative “fiscal” policy on the one hand, and
instrumentalities of the second kind as being engaged in putatively
separable “monetary” policy on the other hand. And finally, some also are
used to thinking of fiscal policy’s making use of interest-bearing treasury or
exchequer paper (sovereign bonds, bills, etc.) on the one hand, and of
monetary policy’s being concerned more with non-interest-bearing central
bank notes (currency) on the other hand.
What we do not tend to think about, I suspect, is how all of these
distinctions are rooted in finance-franchising itself, such that to back away
from the franchise is to diminish the distinctions. The reason for, and nature
of, the link are quite clear when one thinks on the matter: the whole point of
the franchise arrangement is to delegate credit allocation primarily to
private sector financial institutions, while consigning whatever public
405

Id.
Id.
407
Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14 at 21-24 (describing the operations of the
commercial paper markets and money market funds); Finance Franchise, supra note 14 at
1188-93 (same).
406
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allocation we wish to engage in to our democratically accountable fiscal
authorities. We then confer what we mistakenly think to be separable
modulatory functions on monetary authorities, and expressly insulate them
from democratic decision-making precisely in order to preserve what Part II
called a “temporal uniformity” on the part of the value of public currencies.
But this means that once we grow skeptical of (a) modulation’s
practical separability from allocation, (b) private sector institutions’
superiority as allocators to public sector institutions, and thus (c) the utility
of attempting to distinguish between “neutral” monetary policy and
forthrightly “winner-” and “loser-picking” fiscal policy at all, we effectively
grow skeptical of the ultimate rationale for franchising itself, as well as for
separating central banking from treasury operations and currency from
sovereign debt. Something we might have begun to suspect once, say, Fed
Reserve accounts began paying IOR and thus became functional equivalents
of Treasury securities408—namely, that Fed and Treasury might not be
necessarily different at all—then begins looking to be possibly confirmed.
Likewise suspicions that grow when we notice the Fed is prohibited from
directly purchasing Treasurys from Treasury on the one hand, while
routinely purchasing Treasurys from “dealer banks” that are effectively
required to purchase whatever the Treasury issues on the other hand.409
The whole business of allocation/modulation, fiscal/monetary,
Treasury/Fed separation then begins to look like an odd sort of sham—a
“Noble Lie,” perhaps, that we all tell ourselves so as to dodge the
responsibility of deciding, together and democratically, how we shall spend
our own money. This “Noble Lie” is the foundation of finance-franchising.
It’s why we do it. Yet the litany of dysfunctions with which I introduced
this article indicates that this lie might not be so noble. It might be no more
than a destructive and opportunity-squandering self-deception.
As the foregoing Parts of this paper and other work indicates, there
is no reason to think fragmented private sector institutions, unable to
capture the benefits of public goods provision, unable to control macroeconomies, and unable even to plan, let alone coordinate across, vast
408

See again supra, Part IV.A.
By law, the Fed may not purchase Treasury paper directly from the Treasury, but
only on “the open market.” See 12 U.S.C.A. §14. The Fed accordingly simply purchases
Treasurys from “primary dealer” banks that maintain “an established trading relationship”
with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the one hand, the U.S. Treasury on the
other hand. See Federal Reserve Board, “FAQ: Why Doesn’t the Federal Reserve Just Buy
Treasury Securities Directly from the U.S. Treasury,” available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12851.htm. The “established relationship” in
each case is such that primary dealers step-in as counterparties when either Fed or Treasury
wish to purchase or sell newly issued or previously issued Treasurys. In effect, the primary
dealer banks serve as permanent funnels between Fed and Treasury.
409
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stretches of national geographical space or of time, are the best allocators of
capital to productive primary market or infrastructural uses.410 To the
contrary, agents who act in the name of our spatially and temporally
extended republic as a whole are the only ones suited to that task, while
spatially fragmented and temporally ephemeral private sector actors will
nearly always find there is more to be gained by gambling on short-term
price-swings in bubble-inflating secondary and tertiary financial and
derivative markets than by investing “patiently” in productive primary and
infrastructural markets.411
That is precisely the secret of, and the reason behind, the malady
known as “financialization,” which I define as the growth of secondary and
tertiary market transaction volume, or “churn,” relative to primary market
capitalization.412 Hence it is also the key to the steady erosion of the
industrial and infrastructural base of our productive economy, of our middle
class, and hence of our commercial republic itself.413 It is time, then, to
work a separation—private money for private uses, public money for public
uses. And this separation is in effect the consolidation of traditional fiscal
and monetary policy, of traditional fiscal and monetary instruments, and of
traditional Treasury and Fed operations. This is one of the reasons that I
have repeatedly used the locution “Fed or Treasury” above, and continue to
use it below. It is because I do not believe that our franchise arrangement
either can or will endure for much longer, or that any meaningful
Fed/Treasury distinction can long outlast it.
The consolidated digital ledger I laid out above, then, and the
associated Democratic Digital Dollar that I discuss in more detail below,
amount in a way to the natural monetary outgrowth of this form of fiscal
and monetary, Fed and Treasury, T-Bill and Fed Note consolidation.
Indeed, they are its transparent accounting and institutional expression.
They elide both the Fed Note and Treasury Paper distinction as discussed
above, and the present-day “token”/“account” distinction that I treat of
below. They similarly elide the distinction between Fed-issued “currency”
and Mint- (hence Treasury-) issued “coin.”
What is going to matter in future is our productive commercial
republic’s digital value-storage, -transfer, and -accounting platform—our
republic’s full digital ledger—along with the Democratic Digital Dollar that
will be its unit of account. That Digital Dollar and the interest-bearing
Citizen and Resident Wallets that will be credited and debited “in” Digital
410

See, e.g., Finance without Financiers, supra note 14; FINANCING THE GREEN NEW
DEAL, supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 17.
411
Id.
412
Finance without Financiers, supra note 14.
413
Id.
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Dollars will be simultaneously currency and coin, token and account,
monetary and fiscal policy instrument, … in short, Fed or Treasury liability.
Against that digital backdrop, in which “all that [was once
monetarily or fiscally] solid melts into air,”414 what difference does it make
whether we call our commercial and financial platform the Treasury or the
Fed? Let us just call it the Consolidated Ledger, and its authority the Office
of Public Finance (OPF).
And that’s it. Public and private finance separate, Fed and Treasury
consolidate, and public money flows only to bona fide publicly chosen,
productive investments. To sum up diagrammatically, public money and our
public money-modulator’s and -allocator’s financial relations to private
sector persons and other entities under Citizen Finance will then come to
look as depicted in Figure 4.

414

The allusion is the Marx & Engels’ celebrated observation concerning capital’s
capacity to break down all previous legal, social, and cultural distinctions, in THE
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848).
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Figure 4: Reformed Bank/ Fed/ Treasury/ NIC w/ Stabilization Fund

$

$

D
W

Depositors

Fed

Bank

$
Issuers

NIC,

/

SBA,

or
Wallets

Treasury

Liabs

Liabs

Investors

Liabs

a.k.a.OPF

$

Liabs

$

Liabs
$

Other Issuers
Liabs

Fed or Treasury
Digital Payments Platform
a.k.a. Citizens’ Ledger
(See Figures 2 & 4)

Instruction

Credit
Debit

Payee

Payor
Payment

(Price Stabilization Fund)

Etc.

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

[1-June-18
90

V. CITIZEN FINANCE: LOGISTICS & TECHNICS
Parts I through III worked to motivate, and Part IV worked to
schematize, the proposal of full Citizen Finance in broad outline, organizing
discussion under the familiar balance sheet categories of assets and
liabilities. I now turn to more detailed matters of implementation and
logistics, by reference both to familiar and to now newly emergent finance
and payment technologies.
A. From Abstract Accounting to Concrete Logistics: Making It Happen
I begin with some very basic questions that the Citizen Finance
proposal will implicate. For example, will there be Fed or Treasury bank
branches, teller windows, and ATMs? Will there be Fed or Treasury online
banking and mobile banking? Will the Fed or Treasury lend to individuals,
small businesses, and large firms as banks do? And what will creditmodulatory monetary policy look like?
Some of these queries are readily answered quite quickly, while
others present optionalities that we should discuss. To begin with, because
digital wallet and P2P payments technology, discussed briefly above and in
detail below, are by definition device-associated and in that sense “online,”
public banking will indeed be online banking. The question accordingly is
what role, if any, we wish to retain for cash, perhaps for reasons sounding in
privacy or familiarity, and how to accommodate this role in the event we
decide to retain it for some time to come. That takes us to branches, tellers,
ATMs and the like.
Assuming we wish to allow for some cash continuance and ready
convertibility of Citizen or Resident Wallet dollars to paper dollars, one
possibility is that private sector banking institutions, as they lose their
traditional deposit-taking business to the Fed or the Treasury, will want to
downsize their workforces and physical plant.415 These trained personnel
and facilities then can be simply taken on by the Fed or Treasury and
continue, respectively, as public sector personnel and facilities.
Another possibility here would be simply to require, as a condition
of bank licensure, that private sector bank branches offer necessary man
hours and teller window face time to the conduct of Citizen and Resident
Account deposit-taking, withdrawing, money-transferring, money-

415

See Thomas Heath, Bank Tellers are the Next Blacksmiths, WASHINGTON POST
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bank-tellers-are-thenext-blacksmiths/2017/02/08/fdf78618-ee1c-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html
(explaining Bank of America’s reduction in bank tellers and expansion of robo-banking
services).
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exchanging, check-ordering, cashiers’ check franking, and so forth.416
Banks can similarly be required to forgo charging fees on ATM and debit
card transactions for Citizen and Resident Account users.417 The appropriate
regional Federal Reserve Banks can then monitor compliance with these
requirements.418
With respect to online banking and similar services, there is no
reason the system of Citizen and Resident Wallets and associated P2P
payments system cannot offer everything that private banking institutions
do to their depositors with online access—save without exploitative rentseeking fees and collateral services.419 Indeed, the very large boost to its
seigniorage revenues that the Fed or Treasury will realize on a new system
of Citizen and Resident Wallets should enable it to cover any new personnel
and administrative costs occasioned by the new regime and then some.420
In time, most deposit, payment, online, and other services currently
handled in person or via the web will likely migrate to mobile phones and
other devices, as is of course already happening quickly in the United States

416

See generally What We Do, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019), https://occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/index-what-we-do.html
[https://perma.cc/RTN9-F4FA] (explaining the power of the OCC to issue rules and
regulations over the banks it supervises).
417
Id. (explaining the power of the OCC to issue rules and regulations over the banks
it supervises).
418
See Consumer Compliance, FED. RES. BOARD (last visited Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/consumer-compliance.htm
[https://perma.cc/NS2D-K5JM] (“A primary Federal Reserve responsibility is to ensure
that the financial institutions under its jurisdiction comply with applicable laws and
regulations established by Congress and the federal regulatory agencies.”).
419
For more on these, see, e.g., Robert C. Hockett, Wells Fargo, Glass-Steagall, and
“Do You Want Fries with That?” Banking, THE HILL (Sep. 22, 2016),
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/297256-wells-fargo-glass-steagall-and-doyou-want-fries-with-that-banking [https://perma.cc/JF8Q-VAR8] [hereinafter, Do You
Want Fries With That?] (discussing how Glass-Steagall would have prohibited banks from
selling collateral services such as life insurance annuities, investment advisory services,
and other financial products).
420
The Fed, for example, regularly earns a wide spread between the returns on its asset
portfolio and the interest payments it makes. In recent years Fed seignorage has approached
$100 billion annually. I anticipate that these revenues will rise substantially when the Fed
or Treasury grows its portfolio in tandem with new Citizen and Resident Account
liabilities. For more on recent Fed seignorage revenues, see Press Release: Federal
Reserve Board Announces Reserve Bank Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the
Treasury for 2017, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (Jan. 10,
2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20180110a.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZL3K-TULM] (announcing Federal Reserve net income of $80.2B after
payment of its interest expense).
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and, even more quickly, in other jurisdictions today.421 Indeed, if
developments throughout Asia, Africa, and Northern Europe are any
indication, we will achieve 100% financial inclusion through deviceaccessible digital banking long before we could build out any system of
renewed postal or brick and mortar public banking.422 The Fed or Treasury
will be well equipped both to benefit by and to shape this new revolution, as
I detail below in Part VI on the “Democratic Digital Dollar.” And I believe
it a matter of urgent public interest that it do so now with all deliberate
speed, for neither other jurisdictions nor the fintech industry is tarrying, as
discussed below.
For purposes of the present discussion, however, the point to be
noted is that logistical questions concerning bank facilities, spaces, and
traditional services already are being addressed in new ways by private
sector banking institutions themselves as new financial technology
develops.423 This means the Citizen and Resident Wallet regime will not so
much “disrupt” today’s retail banking and fintech development as take
charge of, in the name of the citizenry, our republic, and our financial and
payment systems, a disruption that is already well underway.424
How about lending, and other “asset-side” activities in which private
sector banks presently engage? Will banks no longer be lenders?425 Well,
this is in effect already answered at least partly above. Primary investment
will be the primary function of the NIC referenced already, as well as of
commercial banks whose loans will now have to conform to strict Discount
Window conditionality as also described above.426 In addition, commercial
421

In Kenya, for example, 90% of adults use the M-Pesa e-money phone app to
transact, while in China the AliPay phone-based payment app accounts for nearly $19
trillion in transactions per annum. See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Facebook’s “Stablecoin” Libra
Raises Questions for Regulators, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 13, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/d4c1e00c-8dd6-11e9-a24d-b42f641eca37 (on central banks
serious reaction to Facebook’s introduction of Libra through nations’ reaction to other
nation’s stablecoins). I will have much more to say about all of this infra Part VI.B.
422
Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A
New Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1271, 1273-74, 1298 (2016). (discussing the
rise in Asia and Africa of “recent FinTech developments” in the “pursuit of economic
development.").
423
World Economic Forum, Beyond Fintech: A Pragmatic Assessment Of Disruptive
Potential In Financial Services, at 90-94 (Aug. 2017) (documenting traditional banks’
methods of partnering with and developing fintech options to gain market share).
424
Id. at 84-88 (chronicling the changes among banks methods of payments and
applications available to customers).
425
See Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315, 336337 (2017) (arguing that banks’ role as traditional lenders to consumers and businesses
began to change after the financial crisis of 2007-2009).
426
David Schmidde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory
Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 715 (2009) (indicating “conforming
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banks and other financial institutions—e.g., loan companies, money market
funds, and even many shadow banking institutions—will continue to lend,
but will simply have to do so with funds they are able to acquire from
others, in one-to-one “narrow bank” fashion. They will no longer be able to
lend public credit-money save through the Fed Discount Window or some
comparable facility established at Treasury.
In sum, then, I envisage private banks continuing to engage in safer
renditions of their customary lending and retail investment functions,
simply owing their liabilities now to the Fed or Treasury rather than to
borrower-depositors and thus required to conform to Discount Window
conditionality. This will continue as the NIC and perhaps public banks of
the Bank of North Dakota variety fill the plethora of small, large, and
medium-sized gaps that relying solely on private sector franchisee
institutions for credit-allocation now leaves unfilled.427
It bears noting also that what I propose here is fully compatible and
interoperable with other public option in lending proposals, including my
own. The NIC itself, as described above, can lever the full faith and credit
and superior risk-bearing capacities of the United States to assist public
banks, local development banks, co-op banks, land banks, and all manner of
other local development institution with their tasks.428 Indeed, doing so can
be interpreted as a form of fiscal-cum-monetary subsidiarity.429
What is true of the NIC here can be true of the Fed or Treasury too
as it develops its asset portfolio in tandem with its growing Wallet liability

loans” as loans meeting an amount limit and certain funding criteria established by
government bodies); National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 439 (suggesting the
role of the NIC as a public partnership with greater influence with investors and lenders as
an investment vehicle).
427
Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1149 (“[R]edefining the financial system's core
dynamics along the proposed lines allows for more accurate, less superficial diagnoses of
that system's present dysfunctions, which fundamentally constitute manifestations of an
underlying failure on the part of the franchisor to modulate and oversee the allocation of
credit. It also opens the policy agenda to bolder and more comprehensive reform options
for restoring a healthy relation between the financial and ‘real’ economies.”).
428
More on these matters, see infra Part V (discussing the implementation and
logistics in finance and payment technologies for the Citizen Finance program). See also,
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 439 (discussing the role of the National
Investment Authority in supporting banking institutions and the abilities of collective
banks). See also FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17, which discusses these
options at length.
429
Cf. Elizabeth J. Upton, Chartering Fintech: The OCC's Newest Nonbank Proposal,
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1396 (2018) (arguing state level banks may act as a better
“subsidiarity” in regulation as opposed to the federal government in light of their ability to
govern “at the most local level”).
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ledger.430 It will do so both in the form of NIC investments and perhaps in
the form of portfolio-management under a PSF regime as mentioned above
and elaborated in other work.431 It can coordinate with the NIC in so doing,
or act on its own, depending on public comfort at any given time with the
central bank’s or public fisc’s being as forthrightly allocative in its assetacquisition decisions as the NIC for its part is explicitly designed to be.432
The advantages offered by Citizen Finance as I propose it here are
many. The first are perhaps best grasped by reference to the three problems
noted above to afflict present arrangements. The problems of financial
exclusion, the unbanked and underbanked, will be eliminated in a single
stroke, as will the exploitative practices often engaged in by retail banks
vis-à-vis less sophisticated depositors.433 Additionally, the problem of rogue
franchisee banks will be all but eliminated, as (1) their source of their
cheapest funding—depositors—will significantly recede, while (2) the
primary creditor to whom their liabilities are owed—the Fed or Treasury—
will now be better situated, and motivated, to monitor them and their
compliance with Discount Window conditionality than are their scattered
depositors.434
And finally, the pushing-on-a-string problem—and monetary policy
leakage more generally—will be fully eliminated as well.435 The Fed or
430

Assets of the Federal Reserve, Classification under Recent Balance Sheet Trends,
FED. RESERVE (Oct. 2, 2019 7:35 PM),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm
[https://perma.cc/9BWZ-GC8H] (“Total assets of the Federal Reserve have increased
significantly from $870 billion on August 8, 2007, to $4.5 trillion on January 14, 2015”);
see also id. at Selected Liabilities of the Federal Reserve (“On the liabilities side of the
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, the amount of currency outstanding has continued to rise
gradually, but reserve balances (deposits of depository institutions) have increased
dramatically relative to prior to the financial crisis.”).
431
See generally, Part IV.B.2. (arguing that certain changes to the balance of assets
will stem from liability side sources, including from asset issuances from NIC, and addition
of the Citizen and Resident Wallets); Open Labor, supra note 29, at 462 (documenting the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation as a form of “OMO Plus” and its effects on the
Federal Reserve’s balance). Also, again, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17.
432
See again, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17. See also National
Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 472 (advocating for the NIC’s structure similar to the
Federal Reserve System).
433
For more on these, see Do You Want Fries With That?, supra note 352 (utilizing the
need to insulate depository institutions from large financial firms as reason to update the
Glass-Steagall Act).
434
Another collective action problem—that faced by depositors—will hereby be
solved. Id. (“Another of Glass-Steagall's concerns was to limit the cheap funds that bank
affiliates would make available to speculative non-bank investors whose activities in late
asset price bubbles like those which burst in 1929 and 2008.”).
435
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 459 n.91 (2018) (citing Daniel
Alpert, Robert C. Hockett & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward, NEW AM. (Oct. 2011),
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Treasury will be able to act directly to rein-in spending activity during
booms and encourage or directly finance spending during busts, thereby
affording us much more rapid and reliable macroeconomic growth. It can
do this via changes in interest offered on Citizen and Resident Wallets, and
via direct “helicopter drops”436 in the unlikely event of any deep slump like
that of 2008-12—unlikely because solving the rogue franchisee problem as
mentioned above will eliminate a primary source of the bubble inflation that
culminates in busts in the first place. Similarly, it could temporarily
impound funds to slow “runaway inflation,” after the manner suggested by
Keynes in his How to Pay for the War.437 But again this is virtually
inconceivable during peacetime, for the source of inflation—public money
disseminated by rogue private sector franchisees—will simply be closed.
There are additional upshots to recommend what I propose here, but
these are best handled under the heading of new financial technology, to
which I turn next.
B. From Macro Logistics to Micro Technics: Why to Digitize Now
I have noted that the new financial and payments technologies now
sparking hype and, sometimes, more sober attention are not strictly
necessary to institute or implement Citizen Finance.438 We could probably
have offered some lower tech rendition of what I propose just as early as we
began doing it for private banking institutions with Fed Reserve Accounts
over a century ago, and certainly by the time of Fedwire’s and the WFC’s

https://www.newamerica.org/economic-growth/policy-papers/the-way-forward/
[https://perma.cc/WWJ5-72LG]) (exemplifying the pushing on a string problem through
the actions of the government in to affect supply and demand in 1932 and comparing it to
actions to effectuate consumer demand in 2009 to 2013); Ashton S. Phillips, Bank-Created
Money, Monetary Sovereignty, and the Federal Deficit: Toward a New Paradigm in the
Government-Spending Debate, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 221, 243 n.68 (2014) (citing
Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base-H.3, BD. GOV. FED.
RES. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current/
[https://perma.cc/8JYT-Q8XU]) (“[B]anks, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. . .
often retain ‘excess reserves’. . . Economists refer to [this and] the reality that individuals
sometimes prefer to hold their money in cash as ‘leakages.’”).
436
See supra note 291 and accompanying text (discussing the term ‘Helicopter Drop’
and its proposals).
437
J.M. KEYNES, HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR (1940) (proposing the preemption of inflation
occasioned by war spending through a system of national savings accounts which will be
drawable on only in extremis during wartime, then opened up to fuel stimulus once
demobilization begins and war spending ramps down.
438
See New Tech versus New Deal, supra note 4, at 736–737 (stating that fintech is
“by far the hottest topic in today’s finance”); Betting on Betacoin, supra note 17
(discussing the concerns related to “buyers flocking to Bitcoin specifically”).
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introduction in 1918 or of the banking reforms of the New Deal era—by
which time we even had a full-on proto-NIC in the form of the RFC.439
But the rapid spread and development of the new fintech modalities
now underway present a particularly opportune time to move forward with
alacrity. There are a number of reasons for saying this, some of which can
be catalogued under what might be called the brighter, or more positive side
of the ledger, and others of which belong under a darker, or more negative
side of the same.440 I will accordingly first say a bit about these two sides of
the ledger. Then, I will discuss, in Part VI, more detailed options for what I
shall call the “Democratic Digital Dollar,” or “3D”—the currency
counterpart of both the consolidated public ledger and the public payment
platform that the system of Citizen and Resident Wallets will effectively
constitute.
1. The Bright Side of the Ledger
As just noted, there are reasons that sound in affirmative benefit for
going digital where Citizen Finance is concerned, and there are reasons that
sound more in risk-preemption.441 On the positive side, twenty or more
central banks and monetary authorities worldwide, including the Bank of
England (BOE), the European Central Bank (ECB), the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Bank of Japan (BOJ),
and our Fed, are looking to upgrade their payments systems.442 Indeed some
are already doing so—or have already done so—as I recount more fully
below in Part VI.443 Most seem to be considering some form of blockchain
439

On the history of Fedwire, see, e.g., Adam Gilbert, Dara Hunt & Kenneth C.
Winch, Creating an Integrated Payment System: The Evolution of Fedwire, 3 FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 1–4 (1997) (describing the origins of the Fedwire system
and its challenges). On the RFC, see National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 458–
463 (summarizing the development of the RFC).
440
See discussion infra Parts V.B.1, V.B.2 (discussing positive and negative aspects of
the implementation of the Citizen and Resident Wallets regime).
441
Id. (observing benefits and risks associated with the Citizen and Resident Wallets
regime).
442
See Agustin Carstens, Guest View: Innovation Transforms Central Banking,
REUTERS (June 3, 2019, 6:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cenbanktechnology-breakingviews/breakingviews-guest-view-innovation-transforms-centralbanking-idUSKCN1T41AB [https://perma.cc/WVK6-3FEA] (discussing how central banks
are upgrading payment systems to work with fintech, mobile payments, and more).
443
When I began this project during late 2014, only a few digital currency enthusiasts
seemed to be devoting substantial time and attention to this prospect. Since then the
number of studies and proposals has burgeoned to seemingly no longer comprehensively
citable proportions. A few early and notable examples are those cited supra note 21
(enumerating the proposals to offer central bank accounts to the public by different
authors). Among the 20 or more central banks now issuing, or actively researching the
prospect of issuing, digital fiat currencies on new fintech platforms are those of Brazil,
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technology, partly for the replicability and associated indelibility properties
these platforms offer where recording and tracking transactions is
concerned, partly for the privacy and security optionality they offer, and
partly for the simultaneity of clearing and settlement they afford as real
prospects.444 An added benefit is the ease of system interoperability they
offer when it comes to linking up multiple national, subnational, and
transnational payments infrastructures.445
There are at least three ways that these developments render the
present an opportune time to move forward with implementing the new
Citizen and Resident Wallets regime that I am here calling for, along with
its associated Democratic Digital Dollar—the monetary form that is
counterpart to the payments system this regime will effectively constitute—
which I sketch out below.
First, if the Fed or Treasury decides to upgrade our payments
infrastructure in any event, as it is likely to do, it will be comparatively easy
to include an expansion to Citizen and Resident Wallets and an associated
Digital Dollar as part of that upgrade.446 The change then can be
characterized as simply an added benefit of that upgrade, much as new
optionality accompanying phone, laptop, and other device operating system
(OS) upgrades typically are characterized.447 And, crucially, this need not
Canada, China, Ecuador, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Norway,
Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, the U.K., and the U.S., among others. A helpful
recent survey of the now rapidly flowering terrain is COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES & MKTS. COMM., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK
DIGITAL CURRENCIES (2018), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZW5-KPV5] (explaining the concept of central bank digital currencies
and their benefits and risks).
444
Id. See also Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9–11 (heralding “digital currency
development” in the United States); Betting on Betacoin, supra note 17 (propounding that
Bitcoin may be outcompeted by other cryptocurrencies); Robert C. Hockett, Facebook’s
Proposed Crypto-Currency: More Pisces Than Libra For Now, FORBES (June 20, 2019,
2:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/06/20/facebooks-proposed-cryptocurrency-more-pisces-than-libra-for-now/#1d6ca7992be2 [https://perma.cc/4L8G-HWGD]
[hereinafter More Pisces Than Libra] (asserting problems and vulnerabilities of Libra).
445
See Thomas Lammer, Jose Antonio Garcia & Sacha Polverini, Establishing
Payments Interoperability: Coordination is Key, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Sep. 26, 2016),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/establishing-payments-interoperability-coordination-key
[https://perma.cc/B24P-EGDK] (discussing the benefits of worldwide interoperable
payment systems).
446
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9–10 (predicting that the U.S. payment system
“will be built upon something a lot like distributed ledgers” which will “render . . . ‘Citizen
Central Banking’” and that the “dollar will go digital”).
447
See id. at 10 (“A Fed-issued and -administered digital dollar will be every bit as
uniform and elastic as the Fed-issued and administered pre-digital dollar has been. Indeed it
will likely be even more easily managed. . . .”).
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be marketing hype. It can be made true, inasmuch as the Fed or Treasury,
with the overwhelming bargaining power it will have in whatever
partnership it might enter into in developing the new payment system
architecture, can effectively bake optimal Citizen and Resident Account
functionality in to whatever emerges.448 I will say more about this below in
Part VI, where I lay out the new payments system and Democratic Digital
Dollar that Fed Citizen and Resident Wallets will effectively constitute.
Second, current fascination with crypto-currencies and other forms
of fintech offers both Congress and the Fed or Treasury a rare public
relations opportunity to “lean in” to what clearly is appealing to many
people as an important new technological and associated social
development, in making the transition to a system of Citizen and Resident
Wallets and an associated new payments infrastructure with a Digital
Dollar.449 While the legislative change required to make such a transition is
surprisingly simple—it can involve, if we wish, literally no more than the
addition of one category to the eight or so categories of entity currently
authorized to bank with the Fed450—popular buy-in could be more difficult
until the benefits and absence of costs occasioned by the plan come to be
more widely appreciated.451 Riding the current wave of enthusiasm for all
things fintech would help the Fed or Treasury sidestep that source of
friction.452 So would riding the new wave of revulsion inspired by
448

See id. (asserting that “[a] Fed-issued and-administered digital dollar will be every
bit as uniform and elastic as the Fed-issued and administered pre-digital dollar has been”).
449
See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (discussing the popularity of
cryptocurrencies and central banks’ plans to develop digital currencies based on
cryptocurrencies and related financial technologies).
450
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (citing to 12 U.S.C. §§ 342, 391, 1435,
1452(d) & 1723a(g), 347d & 358, 286d, and 5465, which provide that, respectively, banks,
the U.S. Treasury, government-sponsored enterprises providing mortgages, foreign
governments, foreign banks, foreign central banks, and designated financial market utilities
may hold accounts with the Federal Reserve).
451
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 1 (2018),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP2G-8Y55] [hereinafter BIS
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES REPORT] (suggesting that the provision of a digital
currency by central banks “could bring substantial benefits” but the “benefits of a widely
accessible [central bank digital currency] may be limited if fast (even instant) and efficient
private retail payment products are already in place or in development”).
452
See generally New Tech versus New Deal, supra note 4, at 735 (arguing that fintech
“may present a unique opportunity to correct the increasingly problematic imbalance
between private misallocation of credit and the public's ability to modulate credit
aggregates,” but that, so far, private actors have taken the lead in fintech development, and
that “unless the public side proactively counters new technologies' potentially destabilizing
systemic effects, it may soon find itself in an impossible position of having to back up an
uncontrollable and unsustainably self-referential financial system”).
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Facebook’s latest Libra proposal—a proposal that enjoys the rare distinction
of having alienated Congressional Democrats and Republicans alike.453
Finally, the new technologies do seem to offer many of the benefits
noted above in connection with central banks’ proffered reasons for taking
interest in digital fiat currency and its associated platforms in the first
place.454 It is certainly true that the dollar, and most other sovereign
currencies, already are digital in one sense of the word, and have been for as
long as our banking and payments systems have been accommodating and
employing electronic payments infrastructures—including Fedwire, which
has been with us since 1918.455 It is also true, however, that some of the
better-known crypto platforms warrant considerable skepticism where their
putative speed and “frictionlessness” benefits are concerned.456 But some of
453

See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (commenting that lawmakers have
been very concerned about technology companies’ use of consumers’ personal data, and
that “[a]dding money and payments to the mix only heightens the worry—as our already
extensive regime of bank depositor privacy regulation, and as recent bipartisan
Congressional hearings on fintech, abundantly attest”).
454
See BIS CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES REPORT, supra note 384, at 1
(commenting that some central banks are “analysing a [central bank digital currency] that
could be made widely available to the general public and serve as an alternative safe,
robust and convenient payment instrument” and that in places where cash is disappearing,
“the provision of [central bank digital currencies] could bring substantial benefits”).
455
FEDWIRE FUNDS SERVICE, ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CORE
PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT PAYMENT SYSTEMS 7 (2014) (“In the early
1900s, settlement of interbank payment obligations often involved the physical delivery of
cash or gold to counterparties, which was both risky and costly. To mitigate these risks, in
1918, the Reserve Banks introduced a dedicated funds transfer network featuring a Morse
code system that connected the 12 Reserve Banks, the Board, and the United States
Department of the Treasury.”). Retail payment networks in the United States are quite slow
by global standards, as are wire transfers and credit card payments. Ironically, only
interbank transfers, for which the Fed uses “real time gross settlement” (RTGS), are
instantaneous. See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, THE U.S. PATH TO FASTER PAYMENTS
FINAL REPORT PART 1: THE FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE APPROACH 52-54 (2017)
(showing in a table how various types of payments in the United States are currently
handled). While the Fed could presumably offer RTGS for all payments between Citizen
Wallets and Resident Wallets using present technology, in particular Fedwire, currently
developing payments platforms appear to be designed with precisely this optionality in
mind. See Gilbert, Hunt, & Winch, supra note 197. For more on the history of RTGS,
which dates to the 1970s, see Morton L. Bech & Bart Hobijn, Technology Diffusion within
Central Banking: The Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement 1–3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.
Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 260, 2006) (discussing the history and development of realtime gross settlement systems and their use by banks).
456
See, e.g., Alexander Kroeger & Asani Sarkar, Is Bitcoin Really Frictionless? FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/is-bitcoin-really-frictionless.html
[https://perma.cc/4L7Y-QN54] (discussing the transactional friction that arises when
Bitcoin is traded on exchanges).
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the new platforms now being developed and experimented with do seem to
offer the prospect, in the not-too-distant future, of faster (even real time),
safer, more private, and even user-friendly payment, clearing, and
settlement than can presently be had, particularly among institutions not
using Fedwire.457
One need not be a breathless fadster or deluded “cypherpunk” to
believe that our payments system is changing—and doing so, as I will
elaborate in Part VI, in ways that we now both can and should capitalize on.
One need only look to the roughly forty-four jurisdictions that I will report
on below, where central bank digital currency (CBDC) development is
already well underway.458 Or one can look, as I also will in Part VI, toward
Europe, China, or Africa, where a large portion of transaction volume is
now carried on via mobile phones and similar devices. Or one can look to
the many largely rural countries in which citizens now do all banking by
phone,459 then remind oneself that digital wallets” can link just as readily to
457

See FEDWIRE FUNDS SERVICE supra, note 388; Morton L. Bech & Bart Hobijn,
Technology Diffusion within Central Banking: The Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement 1–
3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 260, 2006) for a discussion
about the development of real-time settlement and payment systems).
458
See Christian Barontini & Henry Holden, Proceeding with Caution — A Survey on
Central Bank Digital Currency 7 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Paper No. 101, 2019)
(presenting the results of a survey showing that 70 percent of sixty-three jurisdictions
surveyed now have development of various central bank digital currencies underway).
With regard to the ubiquity of mobile payments in African countries, see generally Mutsa
Chironga, Hillary De Grandis, & Yassir Zouaoui, Mobile Financial Services in Africa:
Winning the Battle for the Customer, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 2017),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/mobile-financialservices-in-africa-winning-the-battle-for-the-customer# [https://perma.cc/HS4Y-RQAU]
(concluding that “Africa is the global leader in mobile money” and showing that the MPesa mobile payment platform is used by 90 percent of Kenyan adults). On the growth of
mobile payments in Europe, see generally Sukriti Bansal et al., Global Payments 2018: A
Dynamic Industry Continues to Break New Ground, MCKENZIE & CO. GLOBAL BANKING
PRACTICE, Oct. 2018, at 5 (presenting data showing that “individual European countries
such as Sweden and Norway are executing no more than 20 percent of their transactions in
cash”). On the growth of mobile payments in China, see generally Aaron Klein, Is China’s
New Payment System the Future?, ECON. STUD. BROOKINGS (Brookings Inst., Washington,
D.C.), June 2019, at 8, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/ES_20190620_Klein_ChinaPayments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VV9B-5JW7] (“Over 90 percent of people in China’s largest cities use
WeChat and Alipay as their primary payment method, with cash second, and card-based
debit/credit a distant third.”).
459
A few examples. China, Africa, South Asia. See Moses Mozart Dzawu, Mobile
Phones Are Replacing Bank Accounts in Africa, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-13/mobile-phones-are-replacing-bankaccounts-in-africa (discussing the rapid growth of digital mobile payments platforms in
Africa, and concluding that “once people have phones there’s no need for a bank account”).
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Fed or Treasury Master Accounts as they can to anything else—another fact
I highlight below in Part VI.
One can also, of course, look to China in connection with the darker
side reasons for our central bank to get ahead of, rather than trailing or
falling behind, the fintech revolution.460 I turn to those reasons now.
2. The Dark Side of the Ledger
There are also risk-avoidance reasons for the Fed or Treasury to
associate Citizen and Resident Wallets with fintech developments. These
reasons all complement the more opportunity-levering reasons just
catalogued. The main one is the speed with which large private financial
conglomerates and social media firms are now storming into this space,
hoping to employ new financial technologies as means both to circumvent
present-day finance-regulatory regimes and to exploit clientele.461 Getting
out front of fintech development will enable the Fed or Treasury both to
redirect wind from these sails and affirmatively to shape, indeed to
determine, the course of fintech development itself.462
The wind in the sails to which I refer takes two forms, one of which
amounts to hot air but operates insidiously nonetheless. First, profit-seeking
private sector institutions appear to be beginning to use new fintech
technologies to replicate, in not yet declaredly illegal ways, transactions that

460

See Robert Hockett, When is “Social Credit” Orwellian?, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/01/03/when-is-social-credit-orwellian/
[https://perma.cc/NAL2-YUHA] [hereinafter, When is “Social Credit” Orwellian?]
(discussing moral and policy concerns with China’s electronically managed “social credit”
system, which extensively surveys and assigns scores to citizens).
461
See, e.g., More Pisces than Libra, supra note 377; New Tech versus New Deal,
supra note 4, at 742 (“What is commonly seen as the key micro-level advantage of fintech
its ability to eliminate transactional ‘frictions’ and to circumvent traditional market
boundaries-also operates to amplify the system's capacity to fuel financial speculation on
an unprecedented scale. On a macro-level, therefore, the key risk posed by fintech lies in its
(still not fully known) potential to exacerbate the financial system’s dysfunctional tendency
toward unsustainably self-referential growth.”). For more background information on how
regulators are looking to cope with the challenges posed by new fintech platforms, see
Fintech: Examining Digitization, Data, and Technology: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 45–58 (2018) (prepared statement of Saule
T. Omarova, Professor of Law, Cornell University),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg32753/pdf/CHRG-115shrg32753.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FSL7-8RWZ] [hereinafter Omarova Testimony].
462
See generally Jeff Galvin et al., Synergy and Disruption: Ten Trends Shaping
Fintech, MCKENZIE & CO. GLOBAL BANKING PRACTICE, Dec. 2018, at 3–4 (explaining that
“[t]o successfully enter new markets, [fintech developers] must adapt to new sets of market
dynamics and government regulations and select new markets based on a clear
understanding of regional variations”).
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would themselves be illegal.463 The most salient cases at the moment
probably are (a) Facebook’s ill-begotten new Libra proposal, which
amounts to a combined money market fund and forex platform that
Facebook either naively or disingenuously proclaims will be no more
carefully regulated than PayPal;464 and (b) various initial coin offerings, and
exchange traded coin funds, all of which appear to be aimed at exploiting
ambiguities both in the definitions of “securities” and “commodities” under
the nation’s securities- and derivatives-regulatory regimes, and relatedly to
exploit unclarity as to the boundary between the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s
jurisdictions.465 But, there are many more cases of this sort now in
gestation, and we can expect to see more of them proliferate at an
accelerating rate in the near future.
463

See New Tech versus New Deal, supra note 4, at 753–55 (describing the ways in
which the growth of fintech has led to the creation of a “shadow banking” sector and an
erosion of the post-New Deal “settlement” in the American financial sector that helped
constrain systemic risk); see also Amy Castor, Judge Applies Long-Established Securities
Law to ICOs, Bitcoin Magazine (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/federal-judge-applies-long-established-securities-lawicos/ [https://perma.cc/L5LA-AA42] (quoting former CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler as
saying that many cryptocurrency exchanges “re basically operating outside of U.S. law”);
Frank Chaparro, It Was True for Tulips, BUS. INSIDER, (June 23, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ico-community-should-be-worried-about-a-comingwave-2018-6 (highlighting the SEC’s legal concerns about initial coin offerings); Aislinn
Keely, Facebook’s Libra Could Meet Prying Regulatory Eyes from the U.S. and Beyond,
Experts Say, THE BLOCK (June 27, 2019, 7:52 PM),
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2019/06/27/facebooks-libra-could-meet-pryingregulatory-eyes-from-the-u-s-and-beyond-experts-say/ (explaining that regulatory bodies in
the United States and Europe have voiced grave concerns about Facebook’s proposed
cryptocurrency project); Celia Wan, Kik’s Troubles Mount SEC Files Suit Claiming
Securities Law Violations, Lawyers Say, THE BLOCK (June 5, 2019, 12:00 PM),
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2019/06/05/kiks-troubles-mount-as-sec-files-suitclaiming-securities-law-violation-lawyers-say/ (highlighting attorneys’ view and
predictions about the SEC’s allegations that Kik broke U.S. securities law with its initial
coin offering).
464
See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (suggesting that it is not clear what
value Facebook’s Libra will add to the current financial ecosystem, “particularly in light of
the regulatory burdens that they will inevitably and indeed necessarily face in connection
with any such offering that isn’t a mere glorified PayPal or Venmo”).
465
Id. (explaining that Facebook’s Libra will “likely have to register as and submit to
exacting regulation both as a de facto money market fund and as a systemically important
financial institution (SIFI) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), respectively”); Allen Kogan, Note, Not
All Virtual Currencies are Created Equal: Regulatory Guidance in the Aftermath of CFTC
v. McDonnell, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 199, 209–17 (2019) (explaining that currently,
cryptocurrencies are regulated in part by the SEC and in part by the CFTC, and concluding
that this regulatory regime is not satisfactory).
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Second, financial services industry personnel already are enjoying
considerable success, as they have in the past, in convincing gullible or
contribution-dependent White House officials and legislators into believing
that fintech is an exciting new field of only “upside” innovation, which
Congress must protect from innovation-stifling regulation with preemptive
legislation.466 The arguments offered on behalf of such urgings are in some
cases difficult to articulate with a straight face, as they are literally the very
same arguments offered in earlier times for insulating junk bonds, then
financial conglomerates, then generic derivatives, then subprime mortgage
loans and associated products, then credit default swaps, and then payday
and auto loans against regulation.467 It is always about consumer choice,
synergies, and efficiency-producing innovation, we are told, when in fact it
is about rule-evasion and rents.468
This is all inadvertent false advertising or advertent propaganda, as
the litany of innovations just cited should make plain.469 But it is evidently
persuasive propaganda in some quarters.470 And one way to preempt its
persuasive force at least among people who think and act in good faith is for
citizen-owned instrumentalities like the Fed or Treasury to embrace and
commandeer the new technologies themselves, ensuring that they develop

466

See, e.g., Robert C. Hockett, Let’s Get Real About “Financial CHOICE,” FORBES
(June 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2017/06/11/lets-get-real-aboutfinancial-choice/#55c3fe6e4c86 [https://perma.cc/TFT4-FCUG] (discussing dangers of the
“F-CHOICE Act”).
467
Id. (“It is that weaker or non-existent financial regulation somehow promotes —or
even equates to—"innovation, growth, and jobs" in the broader economy.”).
468
Id. (“What is the sophistical argument to which I refer? It is that weaker or nonexistent financial regulation somehow promotes – or even equates to – "innovation,
growth, and jobs" in the broader economy. Republicans and finance industry lobbyists are
now routinely trafficking in this false equation, apparently hoping that we too will
eventually come to associate the two things, Pavlov-style, if only we hear the words often
enough. Take a look at what House Speaker Paul Ryan said on behalf of the F-CHOICE
Act last week, for example ("a jobs bill for Main Street"). Or have a gander at what House
Financial Services Chair Jeb Hensarling had to say ("economic growth for all”). . .”).
469
Id. (“Notwithstanding its Pravda-redolent repetition by partisan politicians and
bank lobbying outfits, however, the putative ‘growth’ argument for gutting financial
regulation is complete and intentional nonsense. It is not merely "flawed" or misleading. It
literally lacks any basis in truth at all, and in fact stands the truth on its head.”).
470
Id. (“Notwithstanding the Act’s impending death on arrival in the Senate, however,
it is urgent that we attend nonetheless to the would-be real-world effects of the F-CHOICE
Act, along with what has emerged as the favored sophistical ‘argument’ that House
Republicans and their clients now make on the F-CHOICE Act’s behalf. For this phony
pseudo-argument will be made in the Senate this week as it was in the House last week.
And, as importantly, it will be made on behalf of much additional legislative mischief soon
to be proffered by White House and Congressional Republicans in coming weeks.”).
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in salutary and public-benefitting rather than corrupt and public-exploiting
directions.
This is not as fanciful as it might sound to those whose stereotyped
impressions of public sector and private sector action have been conditioned
by well-financed corporate and financial sector, not to mention privately
financed think tank, public relations campaigns. As noted before, the Fed
itself invented the repo transaction, which grew publicly salient only during
the shadow-banking boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s, over a century
ago.471 And the federal home finance GSEs—Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and
Freddie Mac—invented securitization at least three and arguably six
decades before securitization became publicly salient as yet another
modality of shadow-banking in connection with private label subprime
mortgage lending.472 And in both cases, everything worked smoothly until,
ironically, profit-seeking private sector entities were allowed into the act
(not unlike what subsequently happened to formerly public entities in
Eastern Europe after their handovers to private sector oligarchs).473
What distinguishes public sector franchisor from private sector
franchisee finance, then, is not innovation. It is what the innovation is
developed for, and how it is then deployed. Public sector franchisor
innovation, which remarkably (given private sector public relations
campaigns) often seems to precede private sector franchisee innovation, is
always developed and deployed for public purposes, and actually benefits
the public in whose name it is developed.474 Private sector franchisee
innovation, by contrast, is seldom either innovative—copied as it is from
public prototypes—or publicly beneficial. Unlike the internet, then, which
the public sector invented and then relinquished to highly concentrated
471

See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 28 (“Turning from bankreplication to public accommodation and monetization, it is first worth noting, if only in
passing, that the Fed actually invented repo, as a means of financing First World War
expenditures, while the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) now acts as the
largest counterparty in repo markets.”).
472
See Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 25, at 91 n.114. (“‘Securitization’ has grown
rapidly in the last decade and has given rise to some of the largest and fastest growing
securities markets. . . . It is often overlooked that all of this began with, and continues to be
largely driven by, the activities of erstwhile ‘government sponsored enterprises’ (‘GSEs’)
like Fannie Mae.”).
473
Republican Home-Owning, supra note 29, at 19 (“What changed after sixty odd
years of republican home-spreading and price-maintaining success? In essence, the story is
one of creeping privatization, deregulation, and attendant speculative profit-seeking,
accompanied by classic asset price bubble dynamics that our principal money-modulator—
the Fed—didn’t see fit to tamp down till too late.”).
474
Per Koch & Johan Hauknes, INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 18 (2d ed. 2005)
(“In the Public case studies we have found that idealism and the urge to develop a better
society is an important driving force for public innovation.”).
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private platform companies, fintech, which looks poised to prove nearly as
transformative as the internet promised to become two or three decades ago,
should from the get-go be kept principally public.475 The Fed’s or
Treasury’s taking charge of it in the cause of central banking and public
payments infrastructure for all citizens and citizen-owned enterprises would
be a most fitting way to ensure such a status.
It is worth noting in this connection, even if in closing this Part, that
once the we do this the messy array of coins, “stable coins,” “coin funds”
and cryptocurrencies on which too many ordinary Americans are now
wasting their real money and attention will likely disappear.476 These things
are little more than crypto renditions of the nineteenth century “wildcat”
currencies discussed above, which died out when the Treasury, then the
Fed, began issuing the Greenback that became today’s dollar.477 They will
go the way of those currencies virtually the minute the Fed begins issuing
Democratic Digital Dollars into new Citizen and Resident Wallets via a new
digital payments platform made possible by these Accounts themselves.478
They will have no use but small in-group uses and criminal uses.479
VI. FROM CITIZEN FINANCE TO CITIZEN FINTECH: THE DEMOCRATIC
DIGITAL DOLLAR & ITS POSSIBLE FORMS
As noted above, contemporary fintech is not strictly necessary for a
set of proposals of the sort I make here, but it does make things
simultaneously easier and more urgently necessary.480 This Part accordingly
situates the Citizen Finance proposal within the contemporary fintech
475

PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION, supra note 10, at 3 (2013) (“Banking, money and credit
are not market goods but are economic infrastructure, just as roads and bridges are physical
infrastructure. Banking and credit need to be public utilities for a capitalist market
economy to run properly.”).
476
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (“When we get there, what do you suppose
happens? This too seems easy: The dollar will go digital. The Fed will issue ‘Federal
Reserve Coins” and their keystroke equivalents much as it issues ‘Federal Reserve ‘Notes’
and their keystroke equivalents now. In this new world, there will be little more use for
what I will call ‘Wildcat Crypto’ than there was for ‘Wildcat Currency’ after the Legal
Tender, National Currency, and National Banking Acts of the 1860s. These ‘assets’ will
simply fade out, retained only as curiosities on a par with Colonial Scrip and ‘Confederate
money’ or as means of illicitly transacting in criminal activities until caught.”);
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67.
477
Id.
478
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (concluding that the demise of bank-issued
“wildcat” banknotes was inevitable when the Fed began issuing a centralized currency).
479
See id. at 10 (alluding to the fate of Colonial Scrip and Confederate dollars when
these currencies were replaced and thus lost their value as cash).
480
Id. (concluding that “the speed, reliability, and tractability of distributed-ledgertracked credits and debits” will help enable banking services directly between citizens and
the Fed).
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landscape and describes in greater detail a modern Democratic Digital
Dollar design that can be thought of as the technical, payments system face
of the broader Citizen Finance proposal. It also takes stock of what other
central banks and monetary authorities—the Fed’s and Treasury’s
counterparts—worldwide are now doing in this space.481
A. Moneys and Payment Systems
In view of the intimate linkages among finance, moneys, and
payment systems on the one hand,482 and the way the Fed or Treasury
balance sheet under my plan will immediately constitute a potential
payment platform on the other hand, it will be both crucial and
straightforward for the Fed or Treasury to pair up my proposed system of
Citizen and Resident Wallets with what I am calling a Democratic Digital
Dollar and associated savings and payments platform. While there are
various forms that a Fed-administered digital dollar could take,483 I think
that one form in particular is both natural and clearly preferable in light both
of the nature of Citizen and Resident Wallets and of the values that prompt
my push for more fully republican, Citizen Finance in the first place. I will
accordingly first briefly note options that now figure in the literature, then
describe the best option for present purposes, then report briefly on what
other central banks and monetary authorities are already doing.
To begin with options, it might at first glance look as though there is
a bewildering array of candidates to offer. Adequately assessing alternatives
for digitizing Citizen and Resident Account money might accordingly look
to require that one write a distinct essay devoted to that task alone. The
existing literature is replete, for example, with centralized electronic “bank
money” options like card, wire, and check-image services that build upon

481

See TOMMASO MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, CASTING LIGHT
ON CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 27 (2018) (providing examples of nations
“actively exploring” the use of centralized or decentralized digital currencies).
482
Conference Report, Eur. Cent. Bank-Bank of Eng., Payments and Monetary and
Fin. Stability (Nov. 12–13, 2007),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/paymentsmonetaryfinancialstability200801en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M65N-27GK] (“In the most basic terms, the central bank seeks to ensure
the ongoing ability of payment systems to support the monetary economy and, by
extension, the desired path of economic growth.”).
483
Chris Matthews, Why the Coming Recession Could Force the Federal Reserve to
Swap Greenbacks for Digital Dollars, MarketWatch (Sep. 21, 2019),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-coming-recession-could-force-the-federalreserve-to-swap-greenbacks-for-digital-dollars-2019-09-06/print [https://perma.cc/GY33JHJ8] (“‘The debate isn’t about whether we need [a digital currency],’ Michael Bordo, an
economist at Rutgers University and a fellow at the Hoover Institution, the public-policy
think tank at Stanford University, told MarketWatch. ‘It’s about how you do it.’”).
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sovereign money claims.484 It also features much on both centralized and
decentralized electronic money, or “e-money,” services like AliPay, Paxos,
and M-Pesa.485 And then there are variously centralized and decentralized
currency substitutes that include CBDC; privately issued crypto-currencies
like Bitcoin, Etherium; and so-called “stable coins” with comforting names
such as “Havven,” “TrueCoin,” or “TrueUSD,” vaguely worrisome names
such as “Tether,” or groovy lyrical names such as Facebook’s Libra.486
What, figuratively and literally, are we to make of all this? How
should we choose among options in digitizing a Fed or Treasury Citizen and
Resident Account-associated e-Dollar?
As it happens, things are not nearly as complicated as at first they
might seem. The system of Citizen Finance I am advocating largely
determines the form that a Democratic Digital Dollar should take. It will be
easiest to see why by proceeding sequentially through three contextualizing
observations that bring policy-relevant order to the present-day chaos that is
the digital currency literature—including the CBDC literature—now on
offer. These observations make clear that we can bracket and sidestep, with
confidence, all the confusion and unnecessary complication that vitiates
most of the still-burgeoning literature on digital monies and payment
platforms now on offer. Indeed we can render that thicket all but otiose.
The first contextualizing observation is that there is always a danger
of internal tension, if not incoherence, within any discussion of money and
payments, especially when conducted against the backdrop of our current,
hybrid public-private franchise-finance system.487 We must take special
care both to recognize and to avoid falling into these confusions.
There are two underlying sources of the confusion-potential to
which I allude, which interact in a manner that gums-up much current
“money-talk.” One is that money is partly distinguishable from payment
systems and thus independently addressable, up to a point, as a conceptual
matter,488 even while also in all cases being deeply embedded in and indeed
484

See TOBIAS ADRIAN & TOMMASO MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE
RISE OF DIGITAL MONEY 4 (2019) (commenting that “The key distinguishing feature of
[bank] money is that its redemption guarantee is backstopped by the government.”).
485
See id. (distinguishing electronic money from bank money in that the former’s
“redemption guarantees are not backstopped by governments. They merely rest on prudent
management and legal protection of assets available for redemption.”).
486
See id. at 3 (providing a diagram of various types of digital currency).
487
See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1147–49 (observing that “[p]ursuant to
[their franchise] arrangement, the sovereign public, as franchisor, effectively licenses
private financial institutions, as franchisees, to dispense a vital and indefinitely extensible
public resource: the sovereign's full faith and credit”).
488
We can talk for some purposes, for example, about money’s functions as a ‘unit of
account,’ ‘medium of exchange,’ and ‘store of value,’ as economists do, in abstraction
from the mechanical details of any particular payments system, leaving ‘exchange’ as it
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constituted by payment systems as a practical matter.489 The other source of
confusion-potential is the fact that hybrid public-private financial systems
like ours tend to produce multiple layers of money and near-money within
single hierarchies, each built on one publicly issued monetary base.490
These two facts tend to combine in a manner that breeds much confusion
about money and payment systems that we must avoid—and that a
Democratic Digital Dollar and associated payment platform will render
entirely superfluous.491
On the first point, money is always “that which pays” within a given
practice of paying or payments regime.492 Payment is like a move in a
game, we might say, and money is the score-keeping modality within any
such game.493 It is “that which counts” for purposes of accounting in any
system involving reciprocal exchange, credits, debits and associated
“accountability.”494 On the second point, moneys that operate within
different layers of a money hierarchy tend to count as payment-settling
devices within different transactional settings, hence within different
payment subsystems of the overall payments system, in confusion-causing
ways I shall presently show and clear up.495
Against this backdrop, it can be tempting to think of distinct layers
of a single monetary hierarchy as distinct moneys or forms of money, and
figures into the second of those features un-elaborated. This can then lead us to assume,
mistakenly, that the mechanics of particular payments systems do not matter for purposes
of theoretical discussions of money, even though such systems are always essential
backdrops to and even constitutive of moneys. See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at
44–46 (stating that while it has been argued that coins once held value outside of debt and
obligations, they were in fact always intertwined); Robert C. Hockett, Money’s Constitutive
Contexts (2018) (working paper, on file with the authors) [hereinafter, Money’s
Constitutive Contexts].
489
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 39 (“You temporarily transform
narrowly accepted notes into widely accepted note, horizontal money into vertical money,
private money into public money.”).
490
See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1149 (“Our re-conceptualization of modern
finance as a hybrid public-private franchise system. . . .”)
491
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 37–38 (stating that there has been much
confusion about private and public capital).
492
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 14 (“[O]ur money is just the general
form of our shared mode of organizing distributive and hence productive activity in any
‘decentralized exchange economy’ such as our own.”).
493
See id. at 17 (“[M]oney’s rootedness in normativity, obligation, accountability and
associated accounting, but also its elaboration into the notions of credit, asset, and liability
that populate the familiar legal and financial ‘universe’—or, if you prefer, ‘environment’ or
‘game reserve.”).
494
See id. (explaining that the system of accounting-credits and debits, depends on
reciprocal arrangements).
495
Id. at 37-38 (illustrating how financial institutions can be used to give credit in the
same way that private individuals can give credit to other individuals).
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then to explain the distinctions among them by reference to putatively
distinct natural kinds such as, for example, tokens, claims, accounts, “bmoneys,” or e-moneys, all treated as radically different phenomena.496 How
this gives rise to incoherence and confusion in the digital currency literature
will become clear as I move through the next two contextualizing
observations.
My second contextualizing observation is that the aforementioned
danger of tension or incoherence rises as payment system complexity rises,
with “complexity” here understood as the number of discrete nodes or steps,
and associated institutions interposed between payors and payees, in any
payment process.497 Indeed, in many cases these distinct steps and
associated institutions actually constitute the hierarchy of money layers just
noted.498 The more elements in a payment “value chain,”499 in short, and
hence the greater the degree of complexity that must enter into any
comprehensive assessment of particular monetary and payment system
possibilities, the more unavoidable it becomes to address multiple policy
decision points and thus to draw distinctions like those just alluded to.
My third contextualizing observation is that, the moment we bite the
proverbial bullet and decide that all parties shall have central bank or public
fisc digital wallets and be able to make payments to one another through
them, we also eliminate all the layers and associated complexities that
occasion all of the confusions that presently vitiate monetary and payment

496

See generally, David S. Bieri, Chapter 16: Regulatory Space and the Flow of Funds
Across the Hierarchy of Money, in HANDBOOK OF THE GEOGRAPHIES OF MONEY AND
FINANCE 377, 382 (Ron Martin & Jane Pollard eds., 2017) (“[T]he Löschian system as a
spatial monetary order where money and credit are created by different financial
institutions at separate levels of the hierarchy.”).
497
See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1177-78 (illustrating through a figure the
immense complexity of the securities markets).
498
See Jamie Toplin, The Payments Industry Ecosystem: The trend towards digital
payments and key players moving markets, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2018 11:44 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/payments-ecosystem-report (illustrating the corporate
players in a digital payment value chain, as well as the hierarchy and layering effects
present in the chain).
499
This is a term of art in the literature. See, e.g., Exploring the Payments System
Value Chain, FIRST DATA 1, 2-3 (2009), https://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thoughtleadership/fd_insight_payments-value-chain_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HR6-W224]
(explaining the changes to the payments value chain post financial crisis); Payments Value
Chain, METASECTION (last visited Apr. 2018), https://www.metasection.com/paymentsvalue-chain/ [https://perma.cc/BV42-9XA5] (introducing what a payments value chain is
and breaking down the hierarchy of said chain); Toplin, supra note 431 (illustrates the
corporate players in a digital payment value chain, as well as the hierarchy and layering
effects present in the chain).
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system discussion.500 For the latter, again, all stem entirely from the
presence of multiple steps and associated institutional interfaces in the
processes of payment—steps and institutional roles that produce the
aforementioned hierarchy of distinct moneys and near moneys in the first
place.501 Put all accounts on liability side of the Fed or Treasury balance
sheet, then—the accounting sheet whose unit of account, whose money, is
the sovereign issuance of the account-keeper itself—and you at once
collapse money “hierarchies” into just money, then sidestep the bewildering
and altogether unnecessary Ptolmeic distinctions pervading the literature
that stem from those hierarchies.502
The upshot of these observations is that the Democratic Digital
Dollar that I propose will effectively moot most discussions of digital
currencies and their associated technologies, including CBDC, that are now
underway.503 There simply will not be a “there” there anymore. In retiring
this discourse my proposal will also, in consequence, dissipate that headspinning and anxiety-prompting air of “embarrass de choix” that now hangs
over most digital currency and digital fiat currency discussion.504 There
really are not all that many choices or options once money goes fully
republican, for there are no longer multiple hierarchy layers to deal with.505

500

See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that once central banks start to
upgrade their payment systems and the Fed moves towards a crypto currency, banking will
become centralized monetary policy will become simplified).
501
See Finance Franchise, supra note 1 at 1170, 1180 (describing how ‘near monies’
play a role in the current monetary payment system).
502
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (arguing that once the distinctions between
public and private distinctions are discarded, then money can be centralized and digitalized
in the modern age).
503
See Ben S.C. Fung & Hanna Halaburda, Central Bank Digital Currencies: A
Framework for Assessing Why and How, BANK OF CANADA, 1, 12 (Nov., 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994052 (discussing the positives and negatives in implementing
a central bank digital currency); Dong He, Monetary Policy in the Digital Age: Crypto
assets may one day reduce demand for central bank money, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 13, 15
(June, 2018), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/pdf/fd0618.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49NP-2JAK] (exploring the ramifications of not issuing a central bank
digital currency).
504
Dan Lohrmann, “Could a New Wave of Cryptocurrencies Be on the Horizon?”,
GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY (May 26, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmannon-cybersecurity/is-a-new-wave-of-cryptocurrencies-coming-soon.html
[https://perma.cc/5QJY-F35V] (showing the wide number of cryptocurrencies already in
existence, as well as the many more that are planned and will be coming).
505
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that once central banks start to
upgrade their payment systems and the Fed moves towards a crypto currency, banking will
become centralized monetary policy will become simplified from the complex hierarchical
layers that came before).
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My proposal will accordingly simplify monetary conversations in the same
degree that it simplifies monetary and payment arrangements themselves.
It is easiest to show this by singling out two particularly oftencountered, and putatively fundamental, distinctions that nearly all
discussions of digital money now seem to assume as immutable background
conditions.506 My proposal, it will be seen, simply sidesteps both
distinctions—and with them, therefore, most modern digital money
proposals and associated discussions as well. It renders the laundry list of
options that I rattled off in opening this Part instantly obsolete—something
we need no longer waste valuable time on attempting to make sense of, let
alone disentangle.
The first putatively fundamental distinction is the one often cited
between so-called “account-based” and “token-based”—alternatively,
“claim-based” and “object-based”—forms of money and payment.507
Pursuant to this distinction, a payor can pay a payee either by directly
remitting tokens or objects that are recognized as legal tender in all relevant
settings—that is, cash—or can convey a claim to the payee that indirectly
entitles her to some portion of cash or its equivalent in effect held by the
payor in—or owed to the payer in the form of—some sort of account.508
This distinction is important, we are told, because (a) payors or their
account-administrators can prove to be insolvent before payments are
settled, and (b) cash, unlike accounts, allows for anonymity among
transacting parties.509
In our current payments system, this distinction does have some—
dare one say it?—purchase, for it does highlight actual dangers that can
506

See Adrian & Mancini-Griffoli, supra note 417, at 2 (“The first attribute that
defines a means of payment is type-either a claim or an object.”); Open Loop Card, supra
note 241(“An open loop card is a general-purpose charge card that can be used anywhere
that brand of card is accepted.”).
507
See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES & MKTS. COMM., CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (Mar. 2018)
(“Money is typically based on one of two basic technologies: tokens of stored value or
accounts . . . Cash and many digital currencies are token-based, whereas balances in
reserve accounts and most forms of commercial bank money are account-based.”); see
also, e.g., ADRIAN & MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, supra 417, at 2 (“The first attribute that defines a
means of payment is type—either a claim or an object.”). Other work employs similar
terminology in drawing what appears to be the same attempted distinction.
508
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 230, at 6 (discussing the direct and
indirect nature of transfer mechanisms where “[t]he transfer of cash is conducted on a peerto-peer basis, while central bank deposits are transferred through the central bank, which
acts as an intermediary”).
509
See ADRIAN & MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, supra note 417, at 3 (discussing that central
bank digital currency “could protect users’ data from third parties” but unlike cash, it
“would likely not be anonymous”).
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afflict payment transactions over the course of the value chain—dangers the
law must then mitigate.510 Checks used to bounce, for example, and
depository institutions could fail amidst multipart payment transactions
such as those, for example, that letters of credit involve.511 Much of
commercial law, negotiable instruments law, and banking law accordingly
prescribes to this day who has what rights to which things under what
circumstances.512
Much current discussion of crypto-currency and associated payment
infrastructure options, be they central-bank-administered or otherwise,
highlights and addresses these same sorts of dangers.513 Likewise, many
participants in current fintech discussions tout the preferability of “token”
or “object” money over “account” or “claim” money owing to its cashreminiscent anonymity properties.514 These people accordingly speak of

510

See generally BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 441, at 9 (discussing legal
considerations where some countries may not “have the authority to issue digital
currencies” and “issuance may require legislative changes”).
511
See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. vs. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426
(1986) (involving a failed bank in the midst of a standby letter of credit transaction).
512
See generally, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (stating pertinent law relating to the Durbin
Amendment on debit card issuers); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (establishing “fair and
transparent practices relating to the extension of credit under an open end consumer credit
plan”); Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1178;
12 C.F.R. § 210 (2017) (“Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks
and Funds Transfers Through Fedwire (Regulation J).”); 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2018)
(“Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC).”); 12 C.F.R. § 235
(2012) (“Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing (Regulation II).”); 12 C.F.R. § 1005
(2017) (“Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E).”); U.C.C. §§ 3-101–3-605 (NAT’L
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2009-2010) (stating pertinent law on
negotiable instruments); U.C.C. §§ 4-101–4-504 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 2009-2010) (stating pertinent law on bank deposits and collections); U.C.C.
§§ 4A-101–4A-507 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2009-2010)
(stating pertinent law on funds transfers). At the time of this writing, members of Congress
recently proposed another piece of payment system legislation that would be rendered
unnecessary by my proposal. See H.R. 3951, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Payments
Modernization Act of 2019.”); see also S. 2243, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Payments
Modernization Act of 2019.”).
513
See, e.g., Systemically Significant Prices, supra note 339, at 2 (“[Systemically
important prices and indices] render financial markets vulnerable to many of the same
systemic dangers as do [systemically important financial institutions] . . . .”).
514
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 230, at 17 (demonstrating the
preferability of cash-like properties by arguing that “the more anonymous the instrument
and the more decentralized the transfer mechanism was, the greater the opportunity for
cross-border activity . . . .”).
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“digital cash” and “digital wallets” as things radically distinct from and
preferable to “digital currency” and “digital accounts.”515
It requires little acuity or imagination, however, to see that these
distinctions and the dangers they highlight are entirely artifacts of a hybrid
public-private payments system in which multiple steps and associated
entities, nearly all of the latter being private sector institutions, stand
between payors and payees in the payments process.516 This means a move
to a system of Fed- or Treasury-administered Citizen and Resident Wallets
and an associated Democratic Digital Dollar like what I propose will, in
collapsing the money hierarchy and removing its layers, immediately
collapse the mentioned distinctions themselves and thus render discussions
predicated upon them no longer interesting.
Physical currency tokens such as dollar bills and coins, for example,
are claims upon—liabilities of—federal instrumentalities just as demand
deposits and associated transaction accounts are claims upon—liabilities
of—the private sector banks and other financial institutions that offer and
administer them.517 The aforementioned popular distinction between
“token” and “account”—or “object” and “claim”—is thus less a distinction
between kinds or types of money, in any natural kind sense of those words,
than it is between layers in the same money hierarchy associated with
public and private obligees—that is, between privately owned financial
intermediaries and publicly run sovereign instrumentalities.518
Since the system I am proposing simply dispenses with privately
owned intermediary institutions where both banking and payments are
concerned, these distinctions and the systemic vulnerabilities that render
them salient simply collapse. “Token” and “account,” “object” and “claim,”
become one and the same thing, just as they would be in a system in which
all payments were made in sovereign issued coin and currency, and all bank
accounts were publicly provided and guaranteed bailment services into
which additional, lent money or “helicopter” money could be dropped.519 In
effect, what I propose is simply a digitized version of just that—a version
that was technically unavailable in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
515

See id. at 4–6 (highlighting the key distinctions between token-based money and
account-based money where token-based benefits from anonymity and peer-to-peer
transfers while account-based does not).
516
See, e.g., Toplin, supra note 432 (listing the various private institutions that play a
variety of roles including issuers, card networks, and processors in the "payments
ecosystem").
517
See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1152 n.22 (noting that demand deposits are
to be thought of liabilities of the bank).
518
Id.
519
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing generally what “sovereign-issued
currency looks like . . . when paid out” by banks).
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but now can afford literally instantaneous clearing and settling in digital fiat
currency between any two or more parties.
The one caveat to this observation is that physical cash does afford
some privacy potentials that some systems of digital currency might not.520
But this is a matter of system design that confronts any electronic issuance
of anything, public or private, since electronic networks are, well, physical
networks.521 They are material infrastructures over which flows of electrons
can in principle always be tracked or retraced.522 This means that cashsimulating safeguards must be cryptographically built in—again, whether
the system in question be publicly or privately administered.523 I will come
back to this shortly in describing the Democratic Digital Dollar that is the
monetary counterpart of the payment system that our Fed or Treasury
balance sheet will constitute in a system of Citizen Finance.
The second putatively fundamental distinction that is salient only
under our current hybrid payments system arrangements is the difference
between so-called “open loop” and “closed loop”—a.k.a. “peer to peer” or
“P2P”—systems, a distinction that partly prompts interest in blockchain and
other distributed ledger technologies among many enthusiasts in the first
place.524 Broadly speaking, in contemporary parlance, an open loop
payments system is one in which intermediaries—typically, but not always,
financial institutions—stand between transacting parties and whatever party
manages the relevant payments platform or infrastructure.525 In a closed
loop system, by contrast, only a single payment platform and system

520

See generally, Mauro Conti et al., A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of
Bitcoin, 20 IEEE COMM. SURV. & TUTORIALS 3416 (2018) (discussing Bitcoin and
cryptocurrency security risks and possible solutions).
521
See Daniel DiMase et al., Systems Engineering Framework for Cyber Physical
Security and Resilience, 35 ENV'T SYS. AND DECISIONS 291 (2015) (discussing cyber
physical systems security and risk management).
522
See id. at 295 (stating that track and trace mechanisms provide “the internal and
network-based process and tools for determining the current and past locations and
logistics security controls” to perform their required duties).
523
See, e.g., id. at 298-298 (demonstrating that safeguards such as “resilience” must be
“built into the framework”).
524
See, e.g., Troy Segal, Open Loop Card, INVESTOPEDIA, (Jul. 16, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/open-loop-card.asp [https://perma.cc/RQT5-QDFL]
(defining open loop systems); Julia Kagan, Closed Loop Card, INVESTOPEDIA, (Apr. 11,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/closed-loop-card-definition-4683996
[https://perma.cc/UN76-HGS6] (defining closed loop systems); Finance Franchise, supra
note 1, at Part V (discussing institutional integration of banking and capital markets).
525
Segal, supra note 457 (describing how “open loop” systems are for general use;
cards may be used at a wide variety of places—credit cards and debits are good examples
of “open loop”).
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administrator stand between payors and payees.526 The coexistence of open
and closed loop systems is of course one case of that layering and
complexifying via intermediating institutions that I noted above to be a
confusion-sowing aspect of our present arrangements.527 That is particularly
true insofar as closed systems tend to integrate into and become subsystems
of broader open loop systems over time.528
A stylized case of an open loop system would be one in which Jack
pays Jill by in effect instructing his bank to pay Jill for him, whereupon his
bank debits his account and pays the payment system administrator, which
then pays Jill’s bank, which then credits Jill’s account. Most payment
service providers with which most of us are familiar operate on some
version of this model.529 Credit and debit card payment systems, wire
transfer systems, and even check image transfer systems are cases in
point.530 So is ACH—the Automated Clearing House Network—that has
managed billions of payments for decades now.531
In a closed loop or P2P system, by contrast, payment takes the form
of a payor instruction to the system administrator to credit the payee’s
account in the same system, which then occurs more or less simultaneously
to the payor’s account’s being correspondingly debited within the system.532
PayPal, Venmo, and Western Union are among the better-known payment
service providers operating on this model in the United States.533
526

Kagan, supra note 457 (describing “closed loop” systems, such as store-specific gift

cards).

527

Money’s Constitutive Contexts, supra note 421.
As discussed immediately below. See generally Systemically Significant Prices,
supra note 339 (developing a general account of systemically important prices and indices,
and the market vulnerabilities to which they can give rise); National Investment Authority,
supra note 4 (offering an account of “collective goods” as solutions to collection action
problems in decentralized markets).
529
Segal, supra, note 457 (describing commonly-used open loop cards from payment
service providers like credit card companies, banks, and credit card unions).
530
Segal, supra note 457 (“Open loop cards can take a variety of forms… credit cards,
debit cards….”); FED. RES. BD., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF THE ACH
SYSTEM AND OTHER PAYMENT MECHANISMS FOR REMITTANCE TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN
COUNTRIES (Mar. 2013) (“Less commonly, consumers… use ‘open-loop’ payment systems
such as wire-transfer systems, correspondent banking channels, and ACH networks.”).
531
FED. RES. BD., supra note 463 (clarifying that ACH networks are a type of open
loop system).
532
Kagan, supra note 457 (describing how closed loop systems allow cardholders (the
payor) to purchase from one specific vendor (the payee)).
533
Brett King, USA - World’s Largest Closed Loop Payment Systems? BANK
INNOVATION (Oct. 1, 2013) https://bankinnovation.net/allposts/biz-lines/payments/usaworlds-largest-closed-loop-payments-system/ [https://perma.cc/BZ8W-DPZJ] (discussing
the presence of large closed loop payment systems, including Venmo and PayPal, in the
United States.).
528
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While these systems are, by definition, “closed” relative to their
immediate users, it is noteworthy that they typically also participate in
wider “open” payments infrastructures in order to fund the interparty
payments that they conduct.534 Something like this happens, for example,
when one uses a bank card to make her PayPal payment to a payee.535 The
open system/closed system distinction is thus a fuzzy or relative one even
under present arrangements, and becomes ever more fuzzy as closed
systems integrate themselves into, and thus become subsystems of, broader
open loop systems. This in turn tends to produce further payment system
layering and associated money hierarchies of the kinds noted above—the
kinds that then force a baroque system of distinct bodies of creditor/debtor,
negotiable instrument, commercial, and banking law.536
The open/closed distinction can be salient in some circumstances
under current arrangements notwithstanding its porousness, however,
inasmuch as each sometimes offers distinct advantages and
disadvantages.537 For these apparent advantages and disadvantages
positively and negatively motivate, respectively, much that now goes by the
name of “innovation” in payment technologies.
One advantage of an open loop system, for example, is said to be
that it can quickly be made to operate on a large scale because the
intermediaries that act on behalf of payors and payees—typically
commercial banks—already have large customer bases.538 Even a small
number of such institutions’ joining a network accordingly brings millions
of exploitable payor/payees into the payment system “value chain.”539
The corresponding disadvantage of the open system is that operating
rules must be established and then maintained across multiple layers of
interfacing institutions, which then represent multiple “near-moneys” and
associated sites of potential error and associated legal liability in the event

534

Kagan, supra note 457 (providing a brief overview of closed loop system payment
infrastructures).
535
Id. (discussing card processing in closed loop systems).
536
See generally Open Labor, supra note 29 (offering a case for institutionalizing
continuous public operations in labor markets analogous to continuous Fed operations in
money markets); How to Make QE More Helpful, supra note 329 (suggesting innovations
to monetary policy).
537
See Dan Kosir, Open vs. Closed Loop Mobile Payments, Clearbridge Mobile (May
21, 2014), https://clearbridgemobile.com/open-vs-closed-loop-mobile-payments/
[https://perma.cc/V842-MEHB] (laying out the advantages and disadvantages of closed and
open loop systems as well as some emerging hybrid systems).
538
Segal, supra note 457 (listing several large financial institutions, including banks
and credit card companies that utilize open loop systems).
539
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT i (2018) (“As our 2018 results
show, we . . . added 12 million new Card Members”).
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something goes wrong.540 Such error can of course pose systemic dangers
and even occasion temporary payment system shut down—which, thanks to
money’s always being constituted by a payment system, can be the
functional equivalent of a liquidity crisis that morphs into a depression-or
recession-causing “credit crunch” in the financial system.541
Closed loop systems, by contrast to open systems, are comparatively
simpler and present flatter money hierarchies and fewer sites of potential
glitch and associated system-wide crash and liability.542 Their
corresponding disadvantage is that they ordinarily take more time and effort
to scale-up than do open systems, because, unlike the latter, they do not
always build upon already-large, ready-made client bases.543
This is one of the putative advantages that Facebook and other large
firms and social media platforms tout in connection with proposals like
Facebook’s Libra. With nearly two and a half billion users worldwide,
Facebook, in theory, could offer a closed loop system that boasts all the
simplicity advantages of a closed loop while also enjoying the scaling
advantages of an open loop system.544 The same goes for WeChat Pay and
AliPay in China, which are preparing to do there—save in collaboration
with China’s central bank— what Facebook proposes to do here.545
This in turn invites a thought: what better payments system could
there possibly be than one that is both maximally open and maximally
closed—i.e., one that cuts out all intermediating layers while also including
all possible payors and payees, all citizens, residents, and businesses? The
answer, as I will next show, is that no system could be better. And so that is
540

See generally, Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at Part II (discussing banking
institutions’ interactions with the public and banking liabilities).
541
Probably still the most infamous case in point is the brief global scare brought on
by Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974—a scare which both occasioned the establishment of the
Basel Committee so beloved by finance regulators and provided a name to a specific form
of systemic risk routinely now noted to afflict financial markets: ‘Herstatt Risk.’ Opinion,
The Long Dark Shadow of Herstatt, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, at 70–71 (discussing a
new financial institution aimed at reducing the risk of a crisis in foreign-exchange
payments post-Herstatt); Julia Kagan, Settlement Risk, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 9 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/settlementrisk.asp [https://perma.cc/9CZV-J9QX]
(describing settlement risk, also called “Herstatt Risk”).
542
See Kagan, supra note 457; see also Segal, supra note 457 (juxtaposing the closed
loop system with the open loop system).
543
Id. (discussing a specific disadvantage of a closed loop system that an open loop
system does not have).
544
See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (arguing that because of Facebook’s
large user base they can offer a closed loop system, therefore precluding an issue of
scaling).
545
Id. (stating that similarly to Facebook, WeChat and Alipay can offer a closed loop
system because of their large user base).
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what I will propose for the Fed’s or Treasury’s liability ledger and
associated Democratic Digital Dollar.
As suggested above, the same capacities to bridge open and closed
loops that render a Libra or AliPay attractive to some people also account
for some of the attraction of blockchain and other distributed ledger
technologies, along with associated crypto-currencies to the same people. In
effect, these technologies can be seen as offering the prospect of a payments
infrastructure bearing both the intimacy, quasi-anonymity, clearingsimultaneity, and middleman-minimization advantages of a closed loop
system, and the scale advantages of an open loop system.546 These reasons
drive many of the more reasonable, less silly, contributions we sometimes
find in the literature on crypto, blockchain, and other distributed ledger
technologies.547 This too, then, invites a thought: what need would there be
for these technologies were our payments system already both maximally
open and maximally closed? The answer, as again I shall indicate below, is
“undeniably some, but not as much as cryptopians claim.”
As in the case of the token/account or object/claim distinction
discussed above, then, here too the salience of a popular distinction and a
whole literature still growing around it is entirely an artifact of the roles
played by multiple private sector entities in constituting multiple “near
money” layers in our current hybrid, public-private payments infrastructure.
Were literally everybody to hold Citizen or Resident Wallets with the Fed
or Treasury in a form that employs Democratic Digital Dollars as a unit of
account, as I propose, there would be no need to develop hub and spoke
structures linking up various accounts already held at various institutions, as
privately offered open loop payment infrastructures do.548 Nor would there
be any need painstakingly to build user bases—or to piggyback upon
private sector social media user bases—as privately-run closed systems
must do.549 We would already have the whole possible user base—
ourselves, in our shared capacity as citizens of a democratic commercial
republic—available for inclusion.550
In such case everyone would immediately be on one ledger—a sort
of Consolidated Citizens’ & Residents’ Ledger—and payments would
546

See Kosir, supra note 470 (laying out the advantages and disadvantages of closed
and open loop systems as well as some emerging hybrid systems).
547
See id. (discussing benefits of hybrid systems).
548
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (arguing that a Citizen Account will
centralize banking and make it more efficient).
549
See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (juxtaposing the Citizen Account
approach with the approach of social media giants like Facebook who rely on their user
bases).
550
Id. (arguing that a user base would already be pre-built if a Citizen Account
proposal was created because everyone would be on a “Citizens’ Ledger”).
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simply be simultaneous creditings and debitings on that single ledger.551
There would be little need to distribute, even if some advantage in
distributing, a ledger as a means of indelibly mimicking centralized clearing
among disparate peers.552 For there simply would be traceable centralized
clearing among all paying and paid citizens and approved residents, via a
democratically owned and operated digital payments system and associated
Democratic Digital Dollar platform.553 Blockchain’s sole use then would be
less as a money-platform than as a useful “smart contract” and linkedtransaction file folder, as I will explain presently.554
In effect, then, many putative benefits—at any rate, non-criminal
benefits—said to be offered by new crypto-currencies and associated tech
architectures will be immediately rendered superfluous under my
proposal.555 They will have no more use in the future than have nineteenth
century bank-issued “wildcat” currencies now.556 We will have moved on
from fintech to what might be called “Ourtech”—or perhaps even better,
just plain old “tech.”557
The same goes for all options mentioned in the opening paragraph of
this Part. The only salient benefits that these technologies will offer will be
(a) the privacy-maintenance prospects they promise, and (b) certain bookkeeping virtues they afford in connection with contracting apart from
payment-consummation. The latter benefits are of some relevance for
present purposes—indeed I am developing uses for them in other contexts
such as mortgage registration and chain-of-title tracking558—but not as
much as cryptopians claim. The former, or privacy, benefits, for their part,

551

See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (predicting that the Fed will begin
administering a Distributed Ledger Technology to more efficiently track transactions).
552
Id. (describing the benefits of a centralized distributed ledger).
553
Id. (describing the benefits of a centralized distributed ledger).
554
Id. (implying that blockchain technology’s primary use would be to track
transactions).
555
See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (stating that if Facebook makes the
Libra “regulatorily tolerable” then it will result in the Libra being monetarily superfluous).
556
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (arguing that if the Fed adopts a digital
dollar, the current cryptocurrencies would have no use).
557
Id. at 12 (arguing that even though technology is changing the way we use money,
it will always be “our money” (the sovereign public’s money) that is allowing these new
technological changes; hence “ourtech”).
558
See, e.g., Robert C. Hockett & William Fry, The Simplified Mortgage and Recorded
Title (SMART) Act of 2019 19-04 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 19-04,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298870 (providing an
example of some of these uses in another context).
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are easy to bake in to a Democratic Digital Dollar and associated payments
architecture with cryptography.559 I turn, then, to doing just that.
B. From Payments to Moneys: Technical Options for the Democratic
Digital Dollar—and Its Counterparts Abroad
What, then, should a Democratic Digital Dollar look like? How
should payments be made and transactions clear? The answer might initially
look surprisingly simple. But the surprise should not be long-lasting in light
of the foregoing observations. For those observations lead directly to the
conclusion that most decision points commonly said to be implicated by
digital currency proposals need not actually be decided upon at all. They
can be mooted the moment we opt for Fed- or Treasury-administered
Citizen and Resident Wallets, for they rest on distinctions that are mere
artifacts of our not having yet instituted such a system of public accounts.
My answer to the “what will a Digital Dollar look like” question,
then, is that all can proceed much as it appears on the surface—or, in
industry parlance, at “the back end”—already, save without intermediating
payment processors, banks, or other financial institutions calling shots
under the surface—that is, at “the front end.” The Fed or Treasury will
simply debit and credit transacting parties’ Citizen or Resident Wallets, just
as the Fed now does with bank Reserve Accounts.560 Payment instructions
for their part can be made to the Fed or Treasury much as they are presently
made to banks or to closed loop payment service firms like PayPal—
namely, via phones, laptops, chip cards, strip cards, wire, etc.— in short, all
of the above and all that might emerge in the future.561
In this connection the Fed or Treasury can supply payment cards to
those who prefer plastic with strips or with chips to smart phones or other
devices, and will post freely downloadable “Wallet apps” for use on
electronic devices. We should also, I think, continue to make cash and coin
available, at either or both ATMs and teller windows as noted above, at
least for the time being. And these forms should be freely interchangeable
with all digital forms just as they are now via check-cashing and ATM
withdrawals. Perhaps one day paper currency, coin, and other old money-

559

See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (analyzing privacy benefits of
Facebook’s Libra).
560
Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1147-48 (explaining how reserve accounts
work at the Federal Reserve).
561
See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, Payment Instructions, (last visited Oct. 16, 2019)
https://www.morganstanley.com/spc/amazon/docs/en/Payment_Instructions_Amazon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J65V-WR7J] (providing an example of payment instructions at Morgan
Stanley).
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media will die out, but I see no need publicly to force the issue, and see
compelling reasons not to do so.562
How about privacy? Well, as noted above it is easy to bake this in to
any digital system in a manner that replicates or simulates what we do now
with cash and bank-administered transaction accounts.563 Under this regime,
transactions in cash or by transfer, when for values below certain threshold
amounts, enjoy specific privacy protections. Transactions in amounts
exceeding those threshold amounts, by contrast, must be reported.564
There is no reason we cannot import this regime into the system of
Citizen and Resident Wallets, either with (a) cryptographic protections
provided to transactions valued at amounts lower than the same thresholds,
(b) prepaid value cards whose amounts can be withdrawn at will, or (c) both
(a) and (b). Digital Dollars can thereby be made to constitute cryptographic
currency or coin up to stipulated threshold amounts in connection with
specific transactions, and something more like presently traceable bank
money beyond those thresholds.565
Violations of such protections by public instrumentalities including
the Fed or Treasury itself, in turn, would of course constitute actionable
violations of Fourth Amendment rights.566 And the regime will at all events
always be, as it is now and as the Fed system more generally is,
democratically determined—by federal statute.567 This is far better for
privacy than would be any system driven by the profit- or rent-seeking
motives that could move privately owned banks and other financial

562

I say this notwithstanding the warnings of Kenneth Rogoff, whose concerns are
readily addressable by means that do not throw elderly people off of the payment
technologies to which they are accustomed. See generally KENNETH ROGOFF, THE CURSE
OF CASH (2017). For more reasons not to dispense with contemporary cash forms too
quickly, see, e.g., Satyajit Das, Think Twice about Going Cashless, BLOOMBERG (May 21,
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-05-21/world-should-think-twicebefore-abolishing-cash.
563
See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (stating that digital currency utilizing
distributive ledger technology affords consumers increased privacy).
564
Filing Obligations for Reports of Transactions in Currency, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311
(2011) (requiring reporting of transactions over $10,000).
565
Are Cryptocurrencies Anonymous?, COINBASE (last visited Oct. 16, 2019),
https://www.coinbase.com/learn/are-cryptocurrencies-anonymous [https://perma.cc/NQU3T3X9] (stating that cryptocurrencies are generally traceable).
566
See, e.g., Protection of Nonpublic Personal Information, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012)
(creating an obligation on financial institutions to protect the privacy and confidentiality of
its customers).
567
See, e.g., id. (providing an example of a federal statute protecting against Fourth
Amendment violations).

The Capital Commons - DRAFT

[1-June-18
122

institutions, not to mention Facebook and other social media firms whose
business model just is data-“harvest” and -sale, to violate user privacy.568
As for blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies, these
will be contingently useful even though not strictly necessary in a Fed- or
Treasury-administered Digital Dollar payments system. One virtue of
blockchain technology, for example, is the ease with which it enables
associated transaction records to be in effect “stapled” together for purposes
of tracking complex sets of transactions as clusters or wholes.569 Letter of
credit transactions are obvious cases in point, as would be mortgage-lending
and -transfer transactions and other species of negotiable instrument
transaction.570 In essence, any transaction type involving multiple
component actions with documents associated with each component—e.g.,
the multiple documents used in documentary letter of credit transactions, or
the documents linked in a chain of title—will of course lend themselves to
tracking by suggestively named blockchain technology.571
Insofar as payments within such transaction-clusters are made across
Fed or Treasury Citizen or Resident Wallets, it would presumably become
convenient at some point for the Fed or Treasury to make use of blockchain
technology in effecting the relevant transactions.572 It would be of obvious
benefit to the parties, and probably also to the Fed or Treasury itself. Hence
one can deem it desirable. It would not be essential, however, hence the
decision whether to do it will amount to a garden-variety cost-benefit

568

See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (describing major data breaches of
personal data like that of Cambridge Analytica).
569
See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1209 (explaining that blockchain
technology uses a distributed ledger to record and verify each transaction and is not stored
at a single host which eliminates the risk of alteration).
570
See, e.g., Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45 (providing an example of such
mortgage-lending transactions).
571
See Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends, VOX
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-currency-concepts-and-trends
[https://perma.cc/RRB7-8AAC] (“Blockchain is a type of distributed ledger where each
transaction is verified using encryption keys and digital wallets; the numbers of the
transactions are recorded on a new electronic distributed ledger, which is then connected
through a chain (using hash functions) to previous, proven distributed ledgers using the
proof-of-work process.”).
572
As noted below, central bank experiments with DLT-based CBDCs thus far suggest
that the technology is promising but not yet cost-effective. See Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank
Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends, VOX, (Mar. 6, 2019)
https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-currency-concepts-and-trends
[https://perma.cc/RRB7-8AAC] (“Most of the central banks concluded that their
experiments successfully transferred digital tokens on a distributed ledger in real time and
in reasonable volumes.”).
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decision we can leave to the Fed or Treasury or to Congress.573 Similar
remarks hold of all forms of distributed ledger technology.574 On the one
hand it will not be necessary to my proposal insofar as the tracking benefits
that typically recommend it are already had on a centralized ledger such as
the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet will be.575 On the other hand, it
offers other benefits that the Fed, Treasury or Congress might deem worth
offering when upgrading our payments system with the new features I am
here proposing, particularly as they become less costly. At the very least,
their replicability and associated indelibility properties lend them good
back-up or potential that can afford payment system resilience once the new
Democratic Digital Dollar regime is in place.
And that is essentially it. There need be no further complication or
layering. Nor, therefore, need there be any more “hierarchy” of moneys and
“near moneys” associated with discrete privately managed subsystems of
the full public payments system. There will simply be one payment system,
run on the liability side of the Fed’s or the Treasury’s balance sheet, and
one associated digital payments platform and associated currency. And both
will be democratically sovereign and citizen-owned.
Diagrammatically, then, the system I envisage is as depicted in
Figure 2 above or Figure 5 immediately below. Payment from any A to any
B will take the form of a card or mobile device or other such instruction to
the Fed or Treasury Master Account administrator, which will then
simultaneously debit A’s and credit B’s Citizen or Resident Wallet. Any
person C, moreover, will be able to convert dollars she holds in some form
X—e.g., digital cash—into dollars she wishes to hold in some other form
Y—e.g., paper notes or metallic coins.

573

Id. (“[N]o central banks have found strong advantages to issuing their own digital
coins due to technical constraints.”).
574
Id. (“The board of directors shall perform the duties usually appertaining to the
office of directors of designated financial market utilities (as defined in 12 USC § 5462(4))
and all such duties as are prescribed by law.”); see also Simon Scorer, Central Bank
Digital Currency: DLT, or Not DLT? That is the Question, BANK UNDERGROUND (June 5,
2017), https://bankunderground.co.uk/2017/06/05/central-bank-digital-currency-dlt-or-notdlt-that-is-the-question/ [https://perma.cc/49EX-2NAR] (“It’s important for central banks
to determine exactly what might motivate them to ever issue CBDC . . . .”).
575
See supra Part III (“As early as the 1920s, foreign central bankers were noting how
U.S. Fed open market operations had become the primary determinants, not only of the
U.S., but also of the global money supply.”).
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Figure 5: Fed- or Treasury-Administered Digital Dollar Payments System
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How does this compare to what other jurisdictions are doing? As
noted earlier, many central banks and monetary authorities worldwide—
nearly twenty at this point—are now considering the adoption of some form
of digital fiat currency.576 News of Facebook’s Libra proposal, moreover,
appears to have instigated some acceleration along these lines.577 Some
central banks at present are merely studying the prospect of issuing digital
currencies, others are actively conducting limited experiments with a view
to determining in advance what opportunities to exploit and what pitfalls to
avoid before actually instituting anything, and a few are now actively doing
such instituting.578 The farthest along at this point is Sweden’s Riksbank,
576

See, e.g., Mike Orcutt, At Least 15 Central Banks Are Serious About Getting into
Digital Currency, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 15, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612573/at-least-15-central-banks-are-serious-aboutgetting-into-digital-currency/ (“In fact, no fewer than 15 such central banks around the
world are taking the idea seriously, and many others are at least exploring it, according to a
recent report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).”).
577
See, e.g., Ana Alexandre, China’s Central Bank Developing Own Digital Currency
in Response to Libra, COIN TELEGRAPH (July 8, 2019),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinas-central-bank-developing-own-digital-currency-inresponse-to-libra [https://perma.cc/QEU2-KLCV] (“China’s central bank is reportedly
developing its own digital currency in response to Facebook’s Libra . . . ”); Claire Jones,
Central Bank Plans to Create Digital Currencies Receive Backing, FIN. TIMES (June 30,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/428a0b20-99b0-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36 (“Global
central banks may have to issue their own digital currencies sooner than expected . . . ”);
Nicholas Megaw, BIS Warns on Facebook Risk to Finance After Libra Plan Unveiled, FIN.
TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/db37a29e-95a8-11e9-8cfb30c211dcd229 (“The BIS, the central bank for central banks, said regulators worldwide
may need to ‘revamp’ rules to deal with the structural changes being brought about by
entrants that control ‘key digital platforms’ such as ecommerce sites and social
networks.”).
578
See supra nn. 509-10.
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and I think it no accident that the Swedish plan also is the one that most
closely resembles my own.579
Plans now being actively considered or vetted fall into two broad
categories, which I will call “citizen-benefitting” (or “retail”) and “bankbenefitting” (or “wholesale”).580 The idea behind proposals being made and
studies being conducted under the latter category is in essence simply to
make improvements to existing payments infrastructures, not to upend or
replace them.581 The focus is on wholesale central bank to private bank
transfers and wholesale intra-bank transfers among private sector banking
institutions themselves.582 And the thought is that cryptographic distributed
ledger technology might make safer, faster, and more cost-efficient real
time gross settlement of large batches of payments possible.583
Central banks exploring this model are accordingly thinking simply
in terms of incremental “system-upgrading” rather than far-reaching
systemic transformation.584 Prominent among central banks going this route
thus far are those of Brazil, Canada, the Eurozone, India, Japan, Singapore,

579

See Gabriel Söderberg, What is Money and What Type of Money Would an e-Krona
Be?, SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECON. REV. (2018) (discussing Sweden’s central bank issued
digital currencies and the e-krona).
580
A number of jurisdictions are still very much in “study and deliberation mode.”
These include the Bahamas, Curcao, the Czech Republic, the Eastern Caribbean Central
Bank, Malaysia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, the UK, and the US, among
others. See infra nn. 514, 518, 524 (summarizing the various states of different central
banks concerning the institution of digital currency).
581
See, e.g., Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends, VOX
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-currency-concepts-and-trends
[https://perma.cc/B79M-DS5Z] (“This proposal is the most popular among central banks
because of the potential to make existing wholesale financial systems faster, less expensive,
and safer.”); see also Michael Kumhof & Clare Noone, Central Bank Digital Currencies—
Design Principles and Balance Sheet Implications 23 (Bank of England, Staff Working
Paper No. 725, 2018) (“CBDC is therefore a substitute for bank deposits, with
substitutability determined by relative functionality and convenience, and actual
substitution determined by these in conjunction with relative returns.”).
582
See Shirai, supra note 514 (“In contrast, reserve deposits are available only to
designated financial institutions such as commercial banks (and are thus called ‘wholesale
central bank money’), and are used for managing the real-time interbank payments and
settlements system. Wholesale central bank money is not necessarily available 24 hours a
day or 365 days a year, although central banks have been making efforts to improve
systems to enable faster and more efficient transactions.”).
583
Id. (“This proposal is the most popular among central banks because of the
potential to make existing wholesale financial systems faster, less expensive, and safer.”).
584
See Ashley Lannquist, Central Banks and Distributed Ledger Technology: How are
Central Banks Exploring Blockchain Today?, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Mar. 2019)
(discussing central banks use of blockchain).
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South Africa, and Thailand.585 The consensus concerning the results of
CBDC experiments conducted to date in these jurisdictions seems to be that
distributed ledger technology does offer promise along the desired lines just
enumerated, but that it is not quite ready for prime time yet.586 Presumably
the technology will grow more cost-effective in time, and thus we might
well see wholesale CBDCs being adopted in some of the enumerated
jurisdictions before long.587 This prospect is not altogether interesting in
connection with what prompts my proposal, however—apart, perhaps, from
the system interoperability benefits it might ultimately afford people with
Fed or Treasury Citizen or Resident Wallets who wish to transact abroad.
More interesting are plans and proposals of the first category I
mentioned—citizen-benefitting CBDC. These plans and proposals fall into
two sub-categories, one of them well suited to countries that already have
well-developed payments infrastructures, the other well-suited to countries
with less well-developed such infrastructures. The idea in the latter case is
for the central bank or monetary authority simply to issue digital tokens on
a distributed ledger platform instead of paper currencies and metallic
coins.588 These then could be held in and paid out of digital wallets. The
central bank would not necessarily hand out or manage the wallets, but it

585

Id. (“Since 2016, experiments have been conducted or examined by the central
banks of countries including Canada, Singapore, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand,
as well as the euro area.”); see also Yves Mersch, Executive Board Member, European
Central Bank, Fairwell Ceremony for Pentti Hakkarainen, Deputy Governor of Suomen
Pankki – Finlands Bank (Jan. 16, 2017) (“In some European countries, for instance in
Sweden and Denmark, electronic payments have started crowding out the use of cash.”);
Laura Shin, Canada Has Been Experimenting with a Digital Fiat Currency Called CADCOIN, FORBES (June 16, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/06/16/canada-has-been-experimenting-witha-digital-fiat-currency-called-cad-coin/#7f84279046a4 [https://perma.cc/9LPX-R6QF] (“A
momentous development in digital currency was announced in a low-key way on
Wednesday, at a Canadian payments conference.”); Ministry of Finance, Government of
India, Medium Term Recommendations to Strengthen the Digital Payments Ecosystem
(2017), http://finance.du.ac.in/du-finance/uploads/pdf/Reports/watal_report271216.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4TV-2XQC] (“[Digital payments] offers an unprecedented opportunity
to our people, most of whom live in rural India or are migrants in big cities.”).
586
See Exploring the Payments System Value Chain, supra note 432, at 4 (“SEPA
and other market pressures have opened the box on European payments with the result that
the industry’s value chain is being fundamentally changed.”).
587
See Shirai, supra note 514 (discussing the CBDC trend).
588
See Toplin, supra note 432 (“As noncash payment volume accelerates, the power
dynamics of the payments industry are shifting further in favor of digital and omnichannel
providers, . . . .”).
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would replace physical cash with digital cash that can interface with such
wallets.589
The prompting considerations behind these plans and proposals
seem to be to avoid having (a) to build extensive payments infrastructures
from scratch, (b) to incur the printing and minting expenses that non-digital
cash issuance occasions, and (c) to deal with the untraceable illicit financial
flows that non-digital cash can enable.590 Countries whose central banks are
either implementing, experimenting with, or considering this model include
China, Ecuador, Lithuania, the Marshall Islands, Senegal, Tunisia, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.591
The other subcategory of citizen-benefitting CBDC now being
implemented or considered makes use of already well-developed payments
system capacity, but has the central bank opening and administering
accounts like Citizen and Resident Wallets in which a digital rendition of
the existing currency serves as the unit of account.592 This is Phase 2 of the
e-Krona project, now under study by the Riksbank of Sweden and its
counterparts in Denmark and Norway.593 Phase 1, which is further along, is

589

See Payments Value Chain, supra note 432 (“The payments value chain has
become increasingly industrialised, with back office processes increasingly automated and
centralised.”).
590
Toplin, supra note 432 (“This is helping payments become seamless, allowing
firms to boost adoption, build and strengthen relationships, offer more services, and
increase usage. But payment ubiquity and invisibility also comes with challenges.”).
591
Shirai, supra note 514 (explaining that this model benefits emerging economies
“desire to take the lead in the . . . fintech industry, to promote financial inclusion by
accelerating the shift to a cashless society, and to reduce cash printing and handling
costs”); see also El BCU presentó un plan piloto para la emisión de billetes digitales,
BANCO CENT. DEL URU. (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Comunicaciones/Paginas/Billete_Digital_Piloto.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PT6B-HWWL]; Uruguayan Central Bank to Test Digital Currency,
AGENCIA EEE, (Sept. 20, 2017) https://www.efe.com/efe/english/business/uruguayancentral-bank-to-test-digital-currency/50000265-3385232 (quoting the president of the
Central Bank that digital currency “will be implemented in Uruguay”).
592
See, e.g., Cecilia Skingsley, Speech at FinTech Stockholm 2016, Should the
Riksbank Issue e-Krona?, at 10 (Nov. 16, 2016) (“[T]he Riksbank is not intending to
abolish banknotes and coins, but is considering supplementing them with another service to
the general public.”).
593
See, e.g., id. at 9 (stating that the Riksbank plans to investigate the feasibility of
digital currency in Sweden); Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Riksbank, Do We Need an EKrona?, at 3 (Dec. 8, 2017) (explaining that “Sweden and the other Nordic countries” are
ahead of the trend toward technological solutions to the decline of cash use); Jon
Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor, Speech at Nor. Acad. of Sci. and Letters, What Should the
Future Form of Our Money Be?, at 11 (Apr. 25, 2017) (addressing Norges Bank’s future
will involve electronic central bank money).
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more limited, resembling the pilot plans mentioned above underway in
China, Ecuador, Lithuania, and several other jurisdictions.594
The prompting considerations behind e-Krona are essentially two.595
The first is that Sweden has gone largely cashless by now, with many
payees no longer accepting paper notes or metal coins.596 The Riksbank is
accordingly worried that system failure on the part of privately-run epayment services could bring down the Swedish financial system and
broader economy.597 A digital form of sovereign banknote is accordingly
needed.598 This is what prompts e-Krona Phase 1.599
The considerations prompting e-Krona Phase 2 are in sync with my
own, though the Riksbank is less un-ambivalently committed to acting upon
them than I am.600 They include interest in a more inclusive electronic
payments infrastructure that will facilitate much more effective monetary
policy transmission.601 Sweden plans also to enable at least some degree of
anonymity as I have recommended above, by issuing e-Krona in the form of
prepaid cards limited in value even after opening Riksbank accounts to the
citizenry if such they do.602 Phase 2 of the e-Krona has just moved, as of the
start of 2020, into a pilot program now operational “on the ground.”603
594

See Skingsley, supra note 525; see also SVERIGES RISKBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S EKRONA PROJECT: REPORT 2 38 ( 2018) [hereinafter Riksbank Report 2] (“[T]he initial
focus will be on an e-krona that constitutes a prepaid value (electronic money) without
interest and with traceable transactions”); Sveriges Riksbank, Special Issue on the e-Krona,
SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECON. REV. at 25 (2018) [hereinafter Special Issue on the e-Krona]
(acknowledging that the Riksbank has “begun to investigate the possibility of introducing a
digital form of the Krona”).
595
See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 2 (stating that the decline of cash and the
Riksbank’s need to promote safety are two important issues behind the investigation into eKrona).
596
Id. at 5 (“According to the Riksbank’s survey from 2018, only 14 percent paid for
their most recent purchase in cash. The corresponding figure for 2010 was 39 percent”).
597
Id. at 29 (discussing e-Krona’s effect on financial stability in times of ease and
distress).
598
Id. at 2–3 (explaining the ways e-Krona can contribute to the public welfare).
599
Id. (discussing the conditions that gave rise to the e-Krona).
600
Id. at 35 (stating that “technology need[s] to be further examined before the
Riksbank can decide how a development project could be designed”).
601
See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 3 (describing how a completely neutral
digital infrastructure could affect efficiency and inclusiveness by increasing competition,
reducing fees, and reaching those without access to payment instruments other than cash).
602
Id. at 16–17 (explaining that all e-Krona transactions will be traceable “with the
exception of a prepaid e-krona card used as cash and handed over from one user to
another,” so long as the card is no more than EUR 250); see also Shirai, supra note 276
(describing the two proposed models for Riksbank’s digital currency as “non-anonymous”
and “traceable”).
603
See Riksbank Announcement, “Riksbank to Test Technical Solution for the eKrona,” February 20, 2020, available at https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-
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At present, the e-Krona project eschews reliance on DLT,
presumably because (a) the technology underlying the Swedish payments
infrastructure is already apparently safe, fast, and cost-efficient, and (b)
DLT is itself still developing along those lines, as noted above in
connection with the first category of CBDC experiments that I noted.604
Presumably the time will come when DLT proves itself worthy of
deployment in a comprehensive payments system upgrade.605 Fortunately in
light of present purposes, however, Sweden and possibly Norway might
have in place something like what I am proposing even before that, thereby
affording a live experiment from which to learn by the time my proposal
draws sufficient attention to invite movement.606 Even before that, the State
of New York, in which legislation I’ve drafted to institute what I call an
“Inclusive Value Ledger” is now before the State Assembly and Senate,
might offer our republic a live pilot in our largest metropolitan area and
indeed the world’s very financial center.607
VII. CITIZEN FINANCE & THE DIGITAL DOLLAR: CAVILS AND COMPETITORS
I noted in introducing this article that many proposals have been
made in the wake of our hybrid finance franchise’s failings in the lead-up to
2008 and thereafter.608 I noted also that I expect some to object to or quibble
with what I propose.609 Here, I will briefly consider some of those other
proposals along with anticipated objections to mine. I treat them roughly in
the order in which I first referenced them in the Introduction.
One objection that I expect is that I have misidentified the culprit in
our nation’s no longer tenable finance franchise arrangement—that it is the
public franchisor, not the private franchisees, whose role should be newly
published/notices-and-press-releases/notices/2020/the-riksbank-to-test-technical-solutionfor-the-e-krona/ (last visited March 10, 2020).
604
See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 34 (explaining that e-Krona must be
designed flexibly so that it may be “integrated with other systems in the financial
infrastructure” of Sweden); see also Shiari, supra note 276.
605
See Shiari, supra note 514 (“[Central banks] have not taken further steps towards
implementation because the current technology is seen as not yet sufficiently advanced to
cope with privacy protection issues.”).
606
See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 8 (“The Riksbank and Nordic central
banks have mainly been interested in a version [of CBDC] that is broadly available to the
general public . . .”).
607
See, e.g., Jordana Rosenfeld, “New York is Proposing the Creation of a ‘Public
Venmo,” Vice, January 7, 2020, available at
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pked9v/new-york-is-proposing-the-creation-of-apublic-venmo (last visited March 7, 2020).
608
See supra nn. 5–8 (describing events that prompt a reconsideration of our current
economic system).
609
See supra p. 9 (suggesting the existence of objections or alternatives to the
proposed new system).
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curtailed or eliminated. Some will follow Ron Paul in crying “end the
Fed!”610 Some will follow Murray Rothbard in crying “back to free
banking!”611 Others will follow Peter Schiff in crying “back to gold!,”
investing in the same while so crying.612 And still others will follow John
Taylor in crying “tie their hands!” —“rules, not discretion!”’613
These would amount less to objections to my proposal than to
counterproposals, and the discussion above in Part I, along with earlier
work which that Part reprises and references, makes clear why they are very
bad ideas. A usable currency must be a stable currency—one that retains
more or less constant value across jurisdictional, temporal, and geographical
spans.614 That in turn requires managed currency “elasticity,” which in turn
requires daily fine-tuning by a central bank or other monetary authority—a
publicly instituted collective agent able to address that system-wide
collective action challenge with which all financial and money markets
involving exchange, not just those in a democratic commercial republic like
ours, are continually confronted.615
As Parts II and III above indicated, it took us quite literally over a
century to learn this, during which time we successively rejected, first,
wildcat banknotes; second, “gold-backed” Greenbacks; and finally, “rulesbased” monetary policy.616 Advocates of Fed-ending or Fed-binding
proposals of this sort might never have learned this history, but our
610

See Paul, supra note 7, at 5 (suggesting ending the Federal Reserve “would be the
single greatest step we could take to restoring American prosperity and freedom . . .”).
611
See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE MYSTERY OF BANKING 11 (1st ed. 1983)
(popularizing a ‘right wing libertarian’ read of the ‘Austrian’ tradition of monetary
economics).
612
See, e.g., PETER D. SCHIFF, CRASH PROOF: HOW TO PROFIT FROM THE COMING
ECONOMIC COLLAPSE 210 (2007) (describing the Federal Reserves’ abandonment of the
international gold standard in 1971 as bringing the United States dollar “to the brink of
collapse”).
613
See generally, e.g.,JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT
ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS (2009) (popularizing a view developed in the academic literature over the 1970s).
614
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 51 (describing how currency is not
money, rather “represents money” in jurisdictions that recognize such representation);
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9 (“Nothing whose value is unstable can function for long as
bona fide ‘money’”).
615
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9 (“A money whose supply can be ‘modulated’ .
. . is essential if we’re to avoid needlessly disrupting either transaction activity, investment
activity, or currency value”).
616
See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 3 (“Money figures as something that
‘doesn’t grow on trees,’ must be ‘backed up’ by gold . . . and is ‘debased’ by ‘the
government’ itself when the latter resorts to ‘mere printing’ of ‘mere fiat’ money.”);
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining how Greenbacks eventually brought an end to
‘wildcat’ banknotes).
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commercial republic is, happily, unlikely to forget it.617 The problem with
our Fed is its incomplete citizen-ownership, not its citizen-ownership.
Hence the advocacy here of what I am calling Citizen Finance and a
Democratic Digital Dollar.618
A second objection I expect works from the other side of the
public/private divide, in effect crying, not “end [or limit] the Fed,” but “end
[or limit] banking.” The idea here is that “ending” banking a la McMillan,
“narrow banking” a la Cochrane, “limited purpose banking” a la Kotlikoff,
“100% money”” a la Fisher, or perhaps what I call “40% money” after
Admati and Hellwig, would be preferable to the system of Citizen Finance
that I here propose.619
This line of thinking, like “end the Fed” thinking, agrees that the
fault in our nation’s finance franchise arrangement stems from its hybridity,
but in effect faults the franchisee side of the public/private divide more than
the franchisor side.620 It is the height of moral hazard, the argument in effect
617

See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 9 (explaining our polity is our “joint
emanation . . . our ‘internal’ means of selecting our shared destinations, not an ‘outward’
imposition of radically separate destinies”).
618
See supra Parts IV–VI.
619
The ‘100% Money’ plan originates with the remarkably fertile mind of Irving
Fisher. See IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY AND THE PUBLIC DEBT, 8–9 (2009) (arguing for a
“plan to put and keep a 100% cash Reserve behind all Demand Deposits.”). Variants were
subsequently advocated by several Chicago economists, whereupon it began to be called
‘The Chicago Plan.’ Since the 2008 crash, revivals have been attempted by Cochrane,
Kotlikoff, and several others, including my friends Jonathan McMillan. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD, 157 (2010) (advocating a system that
would require depository institutions to “transfer all their checking accounts into cash
mutual funds and use their reserves to provide cash to back these shares”); McMillan,
supra note 21, at 145–46 (advocating an expansion of the definition of solvency to include
only “real assets” to prevent “a daisy chain of balance sheets” where “the solvency of one
balance sheet . . . depends on the solvency of balance sheets further up the chain”); John H.
Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free Financial System, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL Crisis 197, 198 (Martin N. Baily & John B. Taylor eds.,
2014) (“In this vision, demand deposits, fixed-value money-market funds, or overnight
debt must be backed entirely by short-term Treasuries.”). By ‘40% Money,’ I refer, tonguein-cheek fashion, to my friends Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig’s recently proposed 40%
capital requirement. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKER’S NEW
CLOTHES 181–82 (2013) (postulating that there is no reason “why banks should not have
equity levels between 20 and 30 percent of their total assets”).
620
See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 21, at 8 (“The banking system turned into a
dysfunctional public-private project.”); KOTLIKOFF, supra note 550, at 52 (“[T]he critical
takeaways . . . are that power is extremely concentrated at the very top in modern American
financial companies, that decisions are being made as much on emotion and ego as careful
business planning, that the folks at the top are so rich as to face no real financial loss for
themselves or their families if they role [sic] the wrong dice for their companies, that board
after board of directors did nothing to oversee the decisions of their ultimate paymasters,
and that the correlation between performance and compensation was negative.”).
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runs, to entrust profit-seeking private sector entities with the management of
a public resource that is as systemically important as the monetized full
faith and credit of the United States.621 Advocates accordingly hold that
simply removing the credit-generation authority from banks—or at least,
say, some 40% of that authority—is the appropriate policy response.622
Banks would continue to manage accounts and offer payment
services to depositors under these proposals, but would no longer operate as
disseminators of monetized public full faith and credit by lending in excess
of what has been antecedently deposited with them.623 They would
effectively become mutual funds, and regulation would accordingly make
true the intermediated scarce private capital story that I have long argued, as
noted above in Part I, is not true.624
It should be clear from what I have argued both here and elsewhere
that I do not think it necessary or desirable that private sector banks and
other financial institutions continue to operate as the primary allocators of
our nation’s monetized full faith and credit. Both the Citizen and Resident
Wallet plan and the Democratic Digital Dollar plans elaborated above, and
the NIC and PSF proposals reprised above and detailed elsewhere, make
plain what I think about that.625 But simply ending private bank creditgeneration, without simultaneously replacing it thoughtfully and
pervasively with public credit-generation, would be as profoundly
deflationary as “returning to gold” would be.626 Before ending creditgenerative private sector banking, then, we must put in place explicitly
credit-generative public institutions and procedures. That is precisely what
the Citizen Finance and its Democratic Digital Dollar as elaborated above
do.
621

See, e.g., MCMILLAN, supra note 21, at 43 (“[W]ith government guarantees in
place, depositors now that their money is safe no matter what. They have no incentive to
step in if their bank takes excessive risks. Knowing this, banks indeed take excessive
risks.”).
622
See, e.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 550, at 181–82 (arguing banks should be
subject to somewhere between 20-30% capital requirements); FISHER, supra note 550, at
8–9 (“[P]ut and keep a 100% cash Reserve behind all Demand Deposits.”).
623
See, e.g., KOTLIKOFF, supra note 550, at 156–58 (describing the functioning of
banks under his scheme).
624
Further elaboration on this point see Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1151
(characterizing financial institutions in this scheme as “effectively variations on the mutual
fund form”).
625
See generally Finance without Financiers, supra note 1; Finance Franchise, supra
note 1; Money’s Past, supra note 3; supra, Part IV (expressing skepticism about the current
banking system’s stewardship of the people’s full faith and credit).
626
This is precisely why Keynes politely declined to sign on to the first-ever proposal
along these lines, when invited by Fisher to do so in 1934. See KEYNES, supra note 246, at
125 (critiquing the Fisher conception of appreciation and interest).
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The next set of proposals I referenced in introducing this paper
involve various forms of small-scale “public banking,” understood as
embracing either or both (a) deposit-taking and transaction-accountmanaging, and (b) retail credit-extending and -allocating.627 As my remarks
on “narrow banking” immediately above should make plain, I sympathize
with many such proposals. Indeed, I am explicitly associated with and
working on several of them.628
I do not, therefore, regard these as being in any fundamental tension
with my proposals. I see them, rather, as proposed local or smaller scale
complements to my more comprehensive and nationally applicable
proposals—micro or half-complete counterparts, as it were, to my macro
Wallet, Digital Dollar, NIC and PSF plans. The “central banking for all”
proposals of McMillan and Gruen in 2014, of Andolfatto and Niepelt in
2015, and of The Economist and Ricks, Crawford and Menand in 2018, for
example, overlap with what I propose at least for one piece of the liability
sides of central bank balance sheets.629 So does the Swedish Riksbank’s
already well-underway e-Krona project discussed above.630 The many
“public bank,” revived “postal bank,” and “microfinance” proposals made
over the last thirty years also aim to do something akin to what I would do
with the Fed’s or the Treasury’s liability book, not to mention my earlier
“Shoeboc Bank” started for homeless friends and “Occupy Bank” founded
during the Wall Street “Occupation” of 2011, prompted as these all are by
the value of greater financial inclusion.631
What these earlier proposals do not do, however, is engage seriously
with the asset side counterparts of their particular liability side
627

See, e.g., BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 92–94, 113
(discussing the new paradigm of commercial banks entering the microfinance space);
PARZEN & KIESCHNICK, supra note 10, at 78-85 (discussing the deposit and credit services
that banks should provide under her system).
628
Cf. Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 10 (citing and critiquing the small-scale
models).
629
See Ricks, Crawford, & Menand, supra note 21, at 1 (“We propose giving the
general public—individuals, businesses, and institutions—the option to hold accounts at
the central bank, which we call FedAccounts.”); Andolfatto, supra note 21 (describing a
system of digital federal currency); Niepelt, supra note 21 (“Letting the general public hold
reserves at the central bank and use them for electronic payments would lower the risk of
bank runs and strengthen financial stability.”); MCMILLAN, supra note 21, at 10, 164–65
(describing the effects of a system without banking: “[t]o spend more money than it earns,
the government will have to gain trust from potential lenders, that is, from its citizens”).
630
Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 8 (discussing an electronic digital money
widely available to the public).
631
See, e.g., BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 178–81
(“Financial development could contribute directly to poverty alleviation by easing credit
constraints on the poor and indirectly by fostering economic growth that benefits the
poor.”).
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recommendations.632 Nor do most of them concern themselves with how to
make use of, or even more generally what to do about, the rapidly unfolding
revolution now underway in the realms of financial, commercial, and
payments technology.633 And that is because each of them seems to concern
itself with but one or two perceived problems instead of the broader array of
mutually reinforcing problems that afflict contemporary financial and
macroeconomic policy thanks to our system of hybrid, public/private
finance.634
That narrowness of focus need not be a bad thing—there is much to
be said for addressing discrete challenges in discrete ways. I do not think it
possible to deal optimally with any one of the problems discussed in this
paper, however, without dealing with all of them. For they are all in this
case, as argued above, mutually reinforcing. And whatever one thinks of the
comparative merits of piecemeal and comprehensive structural reform
strategies, the important point for present purposes is that these proposals
need not in any event be at crossed-purposes to mine. We can go “both/and”
here instead of “either/or,” and in consequence let a thousand flowers
bloom.635
Another objection that I anticipate would stem from a claim that
there is something “Orwellian” or otherwise “dangerous” about what I
propose here—that putting us all on one Consolidated Ledger denominated
in Democratic Digital Dollars will render us vulnerable to system-wide tech
failure or subject us to centralized scrutiny and thereby imperil our
“freedom.” Those who issue these warnings might also argue that the
blemishes presently marring our finance franchise arrangements are better
rectified simply through better regulation.636 Cautious “incrementalists,”
wild-eyed crypto-anarchists, and any number of starry-eyed cryptopians
632

See PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION, supra note 10, at 352–360 (discussing the various
different proposals).
633
See, e.g., PARZEN & KIESCHNICK, supra note 10; FISHER, supra note 550 (though
perhaps this is merely the result of technology outpacing scholarship).
634
See, e.g., Ricks, Crawford, & Menand, supra note 21, at 2 (proposing a
FedAccounts system for financial stability, smooth monetary policy communications, and
regulatory simplicity); Niepelt, supra note 21 (focusing on eliminating both “the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates” and “anonymous transaction[s] that may obstruct the fight
against crime, money laundering, tax evasion, and the like”).
635
Professor Omarova and I argue similarly in National Investment Authority and
Public Actors. National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 438–39 (addressing the
challenge of “ensuring structurally balanced, sustainable, and socially inclusive long-term
economic development” via a “National Investment Authority”); Public Actors, supra note
4, at 122 (outlining a range of modality extensions forming the buds of the enlightened
financial flower).
636
See When is “Social Credit” Orwellian?, supra note 393 (discussing the perils of a
widespread social credit system that extends beyond the purely financial).
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will likely approve this response to my proposal, as will some older school
self-styled libertarians, money-launderers, drug-dealers, terrorists, and other
criminals.
The problem with the response, at least in its good faith guise, is that
it is ill-informed both as to the present sources of systemic and Orwellian
danger and, therefore, as to how that same danger is best addressed.637 As
for the source of the danger, the discussion above should make plain that
our present patchwork payments system, which has developed ad hoc
through the actions of profit-seeking private sector institutions, is itself
vulnerable to glitches and associated panics at each node and connecting
line segment in the “value chain.”638 Indeed it is more vulnerable than any
unitary system without multiple layers and connecting nodes ever can be.
Moreover, as also noted above, it is easy to build indelibility into
transaction records on the Fed or Treasury balance sheet not only with
backup computing power as is done now, but also with the new payments
technologies I have just discussed.639 And lest anyone doubt that the Fed
and Treasury have this capacity, they need only look at the comprehensive
flow-of-funds data the Fed and Treasury compile, process, and publicly
report every quarter.640 Or, they can look at how each of the six mega-banks
that now dominate our hybrid financial system handle clearing and
settlement of transactions among the literal scores of millions of citizens
and counterparties who transact on their books every hour.641
As for Orwellian danger, the discussion above also makes plain that
Orwellian intrusion and invasion of privacy—indeed, even illicit mining,
“harvesting,” and selling of private financial and other data—right now
does not emanate from our citizen-owned, public sector, republican

637

Id. (drawing attention to the distinction between an algorithmic valuation of purely
financial metrics and one of social ilk).
638
See MetaSection, supra note 432 (diagraming the complicated flow of payments
systems); First Data, supra note 432 (highlighting the rapid change in the industry and
proclivity for the industry players themselves to drive that change).
639
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (praising the “superior tracking ability
afforded by [distributed ledger technology]”).
640
At the time of this writing, the most recent is FED. RESERVE SYS., Financial
Accounts of the Unites States, Quarter 1 (June 6, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20190606/z1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6YT6K7S].
641
See Steve Schaefer, Five Biggest U.S. Banks Control Nearly Half Industry's $15
Trillion In Assets, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2014/12/03/five-biggest-banks-trillionjpmorgan-citi-bankamerica/#459c8976b539 [https://perma.cc/MG9F-WKMY] (reporting
that the five biggest banks control nearly half of the assets held by banks in the United
States).
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institutions.642 It emanates from gargantuan elite-owned private sector
monopoles and oligopolies.643 The threat comes, that is, from the huge
platform and social media firms—Amazon, Facebook, Google, and so on—
that now harvest individual data they both use and sell on in an ever-greater
commoditizing of our general public for private gain.644 Moreover, as noted
above, large private sector banking and other financial institutions are now
actively partnering with these same platform and social media firms,
precisely in order to circumvent banking and finance-regulatory privacy
laws and extract further value from all of us.645
Reclaiming commercial and financial access and public investment
as republican citizen functions, as my plan aims to do, is accordingly to be
understood as a measure aimed at recovering and safeguarding citizens’
access, privacy, and critical public infrastructures, not undermining or
ending them. We cannot take away what we have already given away. We
can only reclaim it. This is, again, precisely what the project of Citizen
Finance laid out here is meant to do.
These same observations carry over to the suggestion that
“regulation’s enough.” Obviously, regulation is not enough. That was the
thrust of Parts I through III and my prior work cited there. Financial privacy
regulation is precisely what banks entering fintech right now are attempting
to arbitrage out of.646 And public money-modulatory and credit-allocative
regulation is precisely what banks that successfully rolled back GlassSteagall regulation, derivatives regulation, mortgage loan regulation,
consumer financial protection regulation, and now even Dodd-Frank
macroprudential regulation are always and everywhere seeking to evade—
and paying legislators to help them evade.647
Of course, they will try likewise to roll back a system of Citizen
Finance too once it is in place. But two things should be remembered here.
642

See Omarova Testimony, supra note 394, at 7 (emphasizing the danger that tech
companies pose due to their unimpeded access to consumers’ financial data).
643
Id. (highlighting large tech platforms’ unauthorized use of personal data).
644
Id. at 7 (describing how tech companies can gain access to private financial,
information and use it to influence consumers into buying what they want to sell).
645
See, e.g., Kristina Russo, Regulatory Oversight Uncertain Amid Growing Fintech
Partnerships with Banks, American Express (last visited Nov. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/articles/bank-fintech-partnershipregulatory-void/ [https://perma.cc/42P9-LVG3] (discussing the lack of regulation
surrounding fintech and the partnering of banks with fintech to take advantage of this).
646
See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 2 (describing how fintech and cryptocurrencies
create privacy “paradises”).
647
Katy Milani, Latest assault on Dodd-Frank has bank lobbyists beaming, THE HILL
(Mar. 5, 2019) https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/376749-latest-assault-on-dodd-frankhas-bank-lobbyists-beaming [https://perma.cc/8VAE-Q44U] (describing lobbying efforts
by banks to weaken and remove Dodd Frank regulations).
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First, that it is much harder to take away popular public institutions than it is
to roll back regulations, as the popularity and longevity of Social Security,
Medicare, Medicaid, public education, the National Parks and National
Monuments and a host of other civic institutions attests.648 And second, my
proposal amounts also, especially in the long run, to a massive downsizing
of precisely those industries whose enormous rent revenues and gigantic,
“too big to fail,” self-hostage-holding capacity have enabled them to strongarm our legislators and other public officials in the first place. They will not
be able to do that next time, for the plan here is precisely to shrink and
disarm them, in addition to rendering us no longer dependent upon them.
CONCLUSION: FROM FINTECH TO OURTECH—AND OUR FINANCE
I have covered a fair bit of ground in this paper, from characterizing
our present public-private franchise system of payment and finance, through
explaining how it came to be and why it was destined never to be more than
a way-station en route to full citizen-managed money and finance, to
describing in detail that better and final destination. Along the way I have
clarified the nature of money, credit, payment, and finance themselves—in
particular, their continuing and yet still hidden character as public-private
franchise operations.
The hidden character of our system’s hybridity, I believe, is
responsible for many delusions and misapprehensions, which manifest
themselves in the persistence of dysfunctional monetary and financial
arrangements that prevent our all being as productive and prosperous as we
could be, all while subjecting us to exploitative privately-owned mega-firms
that extract from us without giving back to us. These drive a bipolar
financial treadmill that by turns trips us by rushing more quickly than we
can run, and then holds us back by not moving at all. This ceaseless, manicdepressive oscillation between unstoppable bubble and unforgiving bust is
the inevitable upshot of a franchise arrangement in which the franchisor
routinely forgets its role, standing by idly as rogue franchisees dispense low
quality knockoffs of its product—effectively “counterfeiting” it—with
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abandon.649 That is where regular over-emission and misallocation of our
monetized public full faith and credit originates.650
The solution is to bring to the surface what has been there all along,
and then to correct it. Our mutual credit and debit relations effectively
constitute one citizens’ ledger. Our monetized public full faith and credit—
our money—just is the set of relations that constitute that ledger. It is
accordingly both our prerogative and our responsibility both to put and to
keep this ledger—our ledger—to rights. The trajectory of American
commercial and financial development, I maintain, is such as to recommend
doing that reclamation in one simple stroke. That is the stroke of making
our central bank and public fisc our central bank and public fisc, our public
investment our public investment, and our money our money. That, in this
country, will be a Citizens’ Fed or Treasury, a Fed- or Treasuryadministered public savings and payments platform, and an associated
Democratic Digital Dollar. That, in our democratically productive
commercial republic, will be Citizens’ Finance.
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